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This Concept Map, created with IHMC CmapTools, has information related to: Debate-Stern-review-Climate-economics, Stern (2006: 61) draws "very specific inferences from just four scenarios," although "the forty scenarios which informed the IPCC work under the third assessment report were explicitly stated to be “equally valid with no assigned probabilities of occurrence.” "Stern then employ expected utility modelling, which is know to be an inadequate representations of human behaviour e.g., assuming away loss aversion (Perrings, 2003). Subjective probability density functions then give precise computer generated outcomes. This belies the fact that prices cannot be predicted by economists with such accuracy over short time horizons let alone over 200 years, and that climate change is endogenous to economic production systems so causing all prices to change with every scenario. Comparative statistics, shifting from one equilibrium to another, conceal complex processes of change. Thus Stern manage to convert unknown and unknowable futures into events with known probabilities, and miraculously strong uncertainty becomes weak uncertainty." (Spash 709) objects "The parameter ranges used as model inputs are calibrated to the scientific and economic literatures on climate change", "At the same time, PAGE2002 shares many of the limitations of other formal models. It must rely on sparse or non-existent data and understanding at high temperatures and in developing regions, and it faces difficulties in valuing direct impacts on health and the environment. Moreover, ... the PAGE2002 model does not fully cover the ‘socially contingent’ impacts. As a result, the estimates of catastrophic impacts may be conservative, given the damage likely at temperatures as high as 6 - 8°C above pre-industrial levels. Thus the results presented below should be viewed as indicative only and interpreted with great caution. Given what is excluded, they should be regarded as rather conservative estimates of costs, relative to the ability of these models to produce reliable guidance." (Stern 2006e, 153) supports "such models must make drastic, often heroic, simplifications along all stages of the climate- change chain. What is more, large uncertainties are associated with each element in the cycle. Nevertheless, the IAMs remain the best tool available for estimating aggregate quantitative global costs and risks of climate change." (Stern 2006e, 145), "risks of catastrophic species losses of 25 per cent or even 50 per cent or more would only enter the decision calculus inasmuch as one could put a monetary value on them." (177) supports (Baer-Spash) goods such as human lives and environmental quality are incom- mensurable with income and con- sumption, i.e. they cannot be measured by a dollar value, the Stern Review uses "a preference utilitarian framework where costs and benefits are measured as changes in consumption" only therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Spash, 708) Stern's cost-benefit analysis is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations, "The logic behind the Review’s social welfare function is not as universal as it would have us believe. It stems from the British utilitarian tradition with all the controversies and baggage that accompany that philosophical stance." (692) supports "alternative ethical perspectives are possible" so that we have to justify our choice (693), since the the effects of GHG emissions "are potentially very large, and many may be irreversible" (Stern 2010), it is justified to "magnify" impacts in the future objects (M.H.) "very low discount rates" magnify" impacts in the distant future and rationalizes deep cuts in emissions, and indeed in all consumption, today. If we substitute more conventional discount rates used in other global- warming analyses, by governments, by con- sumers, or by businesses, the Review’s dramatic results disappear" (Nordhaus, 2007, 689), if "The risks of the worst impacts of climate change can be substantially reduced if greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere can be stabilised between 450 and 550ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2e)" and if "Central estimates of the annual costs of achieving stabilisation between 500 and 550ppm CO2e are around 1% of global GDP, if we start to take strong action now," then "the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year" if we start to take strong action now and if we target a stabilisation between 500 and 550ppm CO2e therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Stern, vii) "the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year" if we start to take strong action now and if we target a stabilisation between 500 and 550ppm CO2e, how to protect millions against sea-level rise and extreme weather events? defeats (M.H.) "Yet another approach would be a precautionary (minimax) principle in which societies maximize the minimum consumption along the riskiest path; this might involve stockpiling vaccines, grain, oil, and water in contemplation of possible plagues and famines." (692), PAGE2002 IAM "meets this requirement by producing estimates based on ‘Monte Carlo’ simulation" supports we use the PAGE2002 IAM (Stern 2006e, 153), talking about a consumption loss "now" is mis- leading because "with near-zero discounting, the low damages in the next two centuries get overwhelmed by the long-term average over the many centuries that follow. In fact, using the Review’s methodology, more than half of the estimated damages “now and forever” occur after the year 2800. The damage puzzle is resolved. The large damages from global warming reflect large and speculative damages in the far-distant future magnified into a large current value by a near-zero time discount rate." (696) objects (Nordhaus 2007) if "business as usual will lead to climate change "between 2001 and 2200" whose costs will be equivalent to 5 to 14.4% "loss in per-capita consumption, now and forever," and if the upper bound of these costs should be increased by about 1/3 to account for equity weighting, then busi- ness as usual will lead to costs of 5 to 20% "of the value of global per-capita consumption, now and forever" (144), if not acting implies that "the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever," and if "the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year" if we start to take strong action now, then "the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting" therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Stern 2006a, vi) "the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting", there is potential for catastrophic surprises therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU:Spash, 711) cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations, if there is potential for catastrophic surprises, then cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU:Spash, 711) cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an unsuitable tool for generating climate policy recommendations, if "business as usual will lead to climate change "between 2001 and 2200" whose costs will be equivalent to 5 to 14.4% "loss in per-capita consumption, now and forever," and if the upper bound of these costs should be increased by about 1/3 to account for equity weighting, then busi- ness as usual will lead to costs of 5 to 20% "of the value of global per-capita consumption, now and forever" (144) therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Stern 2006e) business as usual will lead to costs of 5 to 20% "of the value of global per-capita consumption, now and forever" (144), "alternative ethical perspectives are possible" so that we have to justify our choice (693) supports it has not been shown that this ethical principle is better than alternative ethical principles, if "Human induced climate change holds the prospect of large-scale unique changes outside human historical experience," then "The standard scientific approach of repeated experiments to produce an ‘objective’ probability distribution is ... of no practicable use." (175-6) therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Baer/ Spash) "The standard scientific approach of repeated experiments to produce an ‘objective’ probability distribution is ... of no practicable use." (176), Even if we accept the first sentence, the second one is wrong because it takes only monetary and technological capital into account, but not natural or environmental capital. If this were included, the "Rawlsean" principle might well lead to the same result as Stern's defeats (M.H.) Another "alternative would be a Rawlsian perspective that societies should maximize the economic well-being of the poorest generation. The ethical implication of this policy would be that current consumption should increase sharply to reflect the projected future improvements in productivity." (692), a target of 500 to 550ppm CO2e "means effectively accepting global average temperature increases above 2°C" therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU: Baer/ Spash, 168) a target of 500 to 550ppm CO2e is not sufficient to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, we do not know the preferences of future generations (693) therefore (ArgScheme: modus tollens AU=Nordhaus) this ethical principle is not justified (693), using 0.1% as discount rate of pure time preference results from the possibility of extinction by other causes like a meteorite hitting the earth: "the only sound ethical basis for placing less value on the utility (as opposed to consumption) of future generations was the uncertainty over whether or not the world will exist, or whether those generations will all be present." (Stern 2006c, 45) explains (2) we should apply a low discount rate of pure time preference of 0.1%