



# Campaign Planning

Joint Doctrine Publication 5-00  
Second Edition

# Joint Doctrine Publication 5-00

## Campaign Planning

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Director Concepts and Doctrine

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# Joint Doctrine Publications

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in JDPs.<sup>1</sup> From time to time, Interim JDPs (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions which can subsequently be developed in due course as more formal doctrine. Alternatively, a JDN may be issued to place some doctrinal markers in the sand, around which subsequent debate can centre.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 *Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*.

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<sup>1</sup> Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

## Record of amendments

Amendment no.	Date of amendment	Initials

# Preface

1. **Purpose.** Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (BDD) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) describes crisis management (a cross-government endeavour that is often multinational as well as multi-agency) and the circumstances under which UK Armed Forces contribute. JDP 01 *Campaigning* addresses the military contribution from the perspective of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).<sup>1</sup> Based on good practice developed during recent UK and coalition operations, JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* describes the process of Defence crisis management and the fundamentals of operational-level planning. With JDP 2-00 *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Operations* and JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*, underpinned by JDP 01 *Campaigning*, it provides authoritative guidance on the conduct of joint operations.

2. **JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2) is not a major rewrite.** Instead it: incorporates the amendments proposed in 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition Change 1; provides updated doctrine on the joint action model to ensure coherence with JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)<sup>2</sup>; and includes reference to the National Security Council and its role in strategic direction. The discussion on centre of gravity has also been updated. The forthcoming revision (2013) of the *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD) Interim V1.0 published in December 2010,<sup>3</sup> and the ratification of *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning* (Allied Joint Publication 5(AJP-5)<sup>4</sup>) have allowed the removal of the supplement on the NATO planning process. Similarly, the re-issue of USA *Joint Operation Planning*, (Joint Publication 5-0 (JP-5)<sup>5</sup>), on 11 August 2011 has encouraged the removal of the supplement on USA planning; JP-5 Executive Summary, Commander's Overview, provides an excellent synopsis for reference. The supplement on planning with other government departments has been updated.

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<sup>1</sup> 'The operational commander of a nominated joint force', Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database* (8<sup>th</sup> Edition).

<sup>2</sup> Promulgated in July 2012.

<sup>3</sup> *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*, COPD Interim V1.0. Available at: <http://www.dcdc.dii.r.mil.uk/Objects/D/74FE53D8BDE649769D3BC92C2C689FD7.htm> (downloaded 10 May 2013).

<sup>4</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine Publication-5 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning* dated June 2013. Available at: [http://defenceintranet.diiif.r.mil.uk/libraries/library1/MOD/July2013/20130730-AJP\\_5\\_Planning\\_secured.pdf](http://defenceintranet.diiif.r.mil.uk/libraries/library1/MOD/July2013/20130730-AJP_5_Planning_secured.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> USA Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 dated 11 Aug 2011. Available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp5\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf) (downloaded 10 May 2013).

3. **Audience.** JDP 5-00 is primarily aimed at those engaged in, or studying, operational-level **planning**, specifically staff employed in the:

- Permanent Joint Headquarters;
- Joint Force Headquarters and, when deployed, respective Joint Task Force Headquarters or National Contingent Headquarters; and
- Component Command Headquarters.

It will also be of considerable use to those routinely employed in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation including representatives from other government departments (specifically the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the multi-departmental Stabilisation Unit).

4. **Structure.** JDP 5-00 is divided into three chapters:

a. **Chapter 1 – Analysis** emphasises the importance of a JTFC understanding the strategic context as a precursor to effective planning. It describes the role of analysis in providing a JTFC with the requisite knowledge of the context within which he may be required to intervene, as part of a comprehensive response to a crisis.

b. **Chapter 2 – Planning** describes the campaign planning process. With an understanding of the strategic context already reached through analysis, the six-step operational estimate enables a JTFC to frame the problem and then, through a flexible and adaptive process designed to address ill-structured problems, establish a suitable course of action to achieve campaign success.

c. **Chapter 3 – Defence crisis management** describes the development of military strategic direction, and subsequent operational-level planning for national, multinational and multi-agency campaigns and operations.

## Linkages

5. JDP 5-00 is linked with:

- JDP 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition);
- *Defence Strategic Direction*;
- *The DCDC Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040*;
- JDP 01 *Campaigning* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition);
- JDP 04, *Understanding*;
- JDP 2-00 *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition);
- JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1);
- JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*;
- JDP 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition);
- JDP 6-00 *Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations* (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1);
- AJP 5-00 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*; and
- *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (Interim version 1.0).

6. Knowledge of UK doctrine alone will not be sufficient to prepare headquarters staff for planning a multinational operation. The most likely coalitions will be US-led and, although this doctrine is compatible with that of our major allies, it is not identical. Therefore, every effort should be made to become familiar with the equivalent doctrine of the lead nation or organisation. JDP 5-00 reflects principally UK national arrangements. Commanders and more probably their staff should know where to access relevant alliance and coalition lead nation doctrine.

- a. **Allied doctrine.** JDP 5-00 is coherent with the thrust of extant Allied joint doctrine: Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01 *Allied Joint Doctrine*, AJP-3 *Allied Joint Operations* and AJP-5 *Allied Joint Operational-Level Planning*. Where there are variations, UK joint doctrine has primacy for UK national and UK-led operations.

b. **Other multinational doctrine.** Useful guidance on operating within an *ad hoc* coalition can also be found in the Multinational Interoperability Council *Coalition Building Guide* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). Equivalent US doctrine is centred on Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning*.

# Campaign Planning

## Contents

Title page	i	
Authorisation	ii	
Joint Doctrine Publications	iii	
Record of amendments	iv	
Preface	v	
Contents	ix	
<b>Chapter 1</b>	<b>Analysis</b>	
	Introduction	1-1
	Conduct of analysis	1-6
	Annex 1A – Scope of analysis	
<b>Chapter 2</b>	<b>Planning</b>	
	Strategic direction	2-1
	Planning at the operational level	2-10
	Campaign planning concepts	2-15
	Operational estimate	2-32
	Conducting the estimate	2-41
	Campaign planning products	2-55
	Planning throughout the campaign	2-60
	Campaign continuity	2-67
	Annex 2A – Political/military interface and Defence crisis management	
	Annex 2B – Representative Chief of Defence Staff's Planning Directive	
	Annex 2C – Representative Chief of Defence Staff's Directive	
	Annex 2D – Representative Joint Commander's Mission Directive	
	Annex 2E – Centres of gravity	
	Appendix 2E1 – Examples of centre of gravity analysis	
	Annex 2F – Operational estimate techniques and processes	
	Appendix 2F1 – Example operational estimate – Three-column format	
	Appendix 2F2 – Example operational estimate – Course of action formats	

Appendix 2F3 – Example operational estimate – Comparative format  
 Annex 2G – Schematics/tables/matrices  
 Appendix 2G1 – Campaign planning concepts – symbols  
 Appendix 2G2 – Campaign schematics  
 Appendix 2G3 – Decisive conditions/supporting effects tables  
 Appendix 2G4 – Effects schematics  
 Appendix 2G5 – Joint action table  
 Appendix 2G6 – Joint action schematics  
 Appendix 2G7 – Joint action synchronisation matrix  
 Annex 2H – Military risk  
 Appendix 2H1 – Risk analysis and management  
 Annex 2I – Red teams, wargaming and operational analysis  
 Appendix 2I1 – Wargaming  
 Annex 2J – Representative Joint Task Force Commander’s Campaign Directive  
 Annex 2K – Representative Operation Plan  
 Annex 2L – Representative Operation Order  
 Annex 2M – Representative Force Instructions Document

### **Chapter 3            Defence crisis management**

Introduction	3-1
Crisis response planning	3-2
Contingency planning	3-8
Current operations planning	3-10
Multi-agency crisis management	3-12
Multinational crisis management	3-16
Annex 3A – Crisis management groups	
Annex 3B – Planning at the strategic and operational level	
Appendix 3B1 – Crisis response planning	
Appendix 3B2 – Contingency planning	
Appendix 3B3 – Current operations planning	

<b>Supplement 1</b>	<b>Transition and termination</b>
<b>Supplement 2</b>	<b>Planning with other government departments</b>
<b>Supplement 3</b>	<b>European Union military planning</b>
<b>Lexicon</b>	

## Chapter 1 – Analysis

Chapter 1 describes the importance of situational understanding as a precursor to effective planning. It describes the role of analysis in providing a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with the requisite operational context.

Section 1 – Introduction

Section 2 – Conduct of analysis

### Section 1 – Introduction

101. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (BDD) (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) describes the circumstances under which UK Armed Forces contribute to crisis management. JDP 01 *Campaigning* addresses the military contribution, from the perspective of the JTFC,<sup>1</sup> in the context of a comprehensive national or multinational strategy. This publication focuses on the planning of the military contribution, principally at the operational level. An important precursor to planning is analysing the context within which a particular crisis has arisen, or looks as if it might arise in the future.

#### Rationale for analysis

102. Understanding the nature of a crisis *situation* (to which the term analysis refers) helps to identify the *problem* as part of the process of planning; both of these activities are separate from (and should precede) determining the *solution*. This Chapter describes in detail the rationale for situational understanding, the key issues being:

- a. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. A significant start point in the crisis management process is a description of the current situation, in terms that promote shared understanding for as many stakeholders as possible.
- b. Any particular crisis may usefully be described as a series of conditions that characterise what is perceived to be wrong, and what

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<sup>1</sup> 'The operational commander of a nominated joint force', Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database* (8<sup>th</sup> Edition).

might be changed to improve matters; in other words, that which is required to effect a planned transition from one set of conditions to another, often described as a theory of change. A theory of change will only be viable if cause and effect is correctly understood; this requires analysis of relationships and perceptions.

c. Crises may arise in numerous different ways and, as importantly, can be perceived differently by individual actors. There are seldom objective facts upon which to establish, with any certainty, what is happening and where, let alone why. Ambiguity, confusion and contradiction are likely to permeate, more or less continuously.

d. The time available for analysis will almost always be limited. This demands a trade off between the improvement of understanding and the imperative to develop clear orders and instructions.

### **Context and complexity**

103. The need for a commander to understand his situation, and to keep on updating that understanding before and during a campaign, is not new. There are, however, two reasons why analysis<sup>2</sup> is particularly important. First, it provides a commander with an appreciation of the potential complexity of the current situation and, second, the process begins to indicate (based on existing *unfavourable* conditions) what might represent a more favourable situation in the future. In addition to affording analysis sufficient time, the other critical requirement is to gather a broad range of perspectives. These should include, perhaps most importantly, those that challenge any existing (national and/or military) paradigms.

104. **Context as setting.** The term context is used to describe the relevant circumstances, participants and relationships, surroundings, and other influences that, collectively, form the setting for an event or crisis. Analysis, the scope of which is described in Annex 1A, incorporates:

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<sup>2</sup> The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated operational context). JDP 01 *Campaigning* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).

- a. The strategic conditions in which military activity is expected to take place, including with whom it is to be carried out (including allies, coalition partners and other government departments (OGDs)), and who such activity is intended to affect.
- b. The actors involved (hostile, friendly, neutral or belligerent), to what extent they are involved, and the nature of their involvement (history, culture, relationships, motivations, perceptions, interests and desired outcomes).
- c. Other influences, both internal (for instance, societal factors) and external (for example, regional hegemony).
- d. The local conditions which might have a bearing on the outcome, including geospatial, demographic, religious, cultural and language factors.

105. **Dealing with complexity.** Understanding context depends on not only acquiring the requisite *knowledge*, drawing upon information and intelligence, but also on applying *intellect*. It is ultimately a commander's own reasoning and judgement that provide him with his *comprehension* or individual perception of a crisis situation. This thorough comprehension is perhaps the pre-eminent challenge for a JTFC, as he prepares to *frame the problem* and to plan the military contribution to the response. Because crises are invariably complex (with a multitude of frequently interconnected parts) they also tend to be:

- a. **Adaptive**, such that any action causes reaction and any benefit has an associated opportunity cost.
- b. **Uncertain**, often confusing; some risks may be incalculable.
- c. **Ambiguous**, in that they can be perceived in quite different ways by different actors or external observers; there is seldom a universal view of the context to any particular problem (however manifestly 'clear' the situation may appear from an individual perspective).

- d. **Competitive or adversarial**, requiring compromise, if not submission, in relation to conflicts of interest or need, or perceived security.
- e. **Constrained**, by different parties' varying commitment to resolve a crisis, their capability to do so, and (internal and external) legitimacy to try.
- f. **Unbounded**, and permeating, or being affected by, regional dynamics and, with increasing globalisation, the rest of the international community as well.
- g. **Dynamic**, altering from the moment that military or other intervention is anticipated, let alone occurs.

106. **Looking at the whole situation.** A crisis situation should be examined in its entirety *as a system*, recognising that no single element exists in isolation. Intervention itself invariably alters the dynamics of a situation. Moreover, almost all situations are affected by external intervention and influences as well as by internal dynamics.

### **Nature of analysis**

107. Analysis is expansive and open-minded; it is different from problem-solving *per se*, which by necessity, tends to be more narrowly focused on the key issues. Analysis not only takes into account all relevant factors, better to understand the complexity and causes of a crisis, but it also actively seeks to discover what has hitherto been unknown. It must also include different perspectives, including the novel, the contrary and the extreme.

108. Analysis is based on a combination of objective data (for example, physical and demographic data) and subjective opinion (such as actors' reported aspirations and views). In interpreting the information presented, steps should be taken to guard against partiality or bias, especially given the natural inclination to exclude the unexpected, the inexplicable, the unpalatable or the counter-intuitive. Analysis is never exhaustive, nor absolutely certain, for the dynamics of most crises are too complex and volatile, but effective

analysis can help a JTFC to rationalise (though not necessarily reduce) that complexity and ambiguity to some degree.

109. Periodic review, including by those previously uninvolved, can provide a fresh perspective on a JTFC's analysis, and offset any tendency towards groupthink. During the execution of a campaign, while analysis will often become better informed, the gap between perception and reality (like the gap between actual and reported crime) will always remain.

110. Analysis does more than look at the current situation, it also addresses what might happen next, based upon alternative assumptions regarding the actions and reactions of different actors (including the impact of any intervention). Together these enable a JTFC to:

- a. Understand the context in which he is operating or intends to operate.
- b. Understand the potential impact of his actions or other events.
- c. Use this understanding to plot a path that is most likely to lead to the achievement of his operational end-state. This is the basis of the theory of change.

111. As well as informing a JTFC of what is known (its primary purpose), analysis also identifies knowledge gaps, indicating risk – of the unknown – which should be managed accordingly. Analysis also highlights risk in broader terms, namely the risk associated with acting or not acting, and the risk of failure. Risk management is covered in Chapter 2.

### **McNamara: Paralysis by analysis**

Robert McNamara was the youngest Assistant Professor of Harvard Business School. He became the President of the Ford Motor Company at the age of 44 in 1960. Five weeks later President-elect John F Kennedy invited him to become the US Secretary of Defence.

McNamara introduced many modern business practices into the Pentagon, including computer-based forms of systems analysis, which used almost exclusively quantitative (numerical) data. In theory the process was transparent to all; in practice few could understand the sheer weight of data presented. It was also thought that some results were effectively tailored by analysts to support decisions that McNamara had already taken.

Systems analysis was introduced to support analysis and assessment of the conduct of the Vietnam War. Its emphasis on quantitative data led, amongst other things, to the notorious 'body count'. Large numbers of staff spent considerable effort analysing and assessing, but systems analysis did not deliver adequate direction to tactical commanders.

Analysis and assessment are critical to the conduct of military operations. But it is important not to allow the tools and processes used to overtake their purpose, which is to guide military decision-making. Numerical assessments have their place, but so too does a commander's subjective analysis.

## **Section 2 – Conduct of analysis**

112. Analysis includes the intelligence process and is a continuous, whole-headquarters activity to gain knowledge of the factors that characterise a situation. As a situation evolves, analysis is updated by continuous assessment of progress.

### **Principles**

113. **Purposeful.** As a preliminary activity to planning, albeit one that continues during both planning and execution, analysis is invariably carried out against a finite, and often challenging, timeline. It should be managed pragmatically and purposefully, to provide situational understanding; analysis is a means to an end.


114. **Expansive.** Analysis is about understanding the nature of the crisis situation; it is during the planning process that a JTFC searches for a solution. Analysis involves revealing factors, exploring different perspectives and expanding knowledge rather than focusing on what ought to be done to address a perceived issue.

115. **Inclusive.** Although time is always a limiting factor, consideration must be given to as many sources of information and ideas, perspectives and opinions as possible. Additional credible views and insights, however inconsistent or contradictory, can enrich understanding.

116. **Receptive.** The tendency to adopt a particular perspective early on, and then ignore information that fails to support that view, must be resisted. The impact of a closed mind may be to reject contrary views, and even exclude those who hold them, thus breaching an inclusive approach.

117. **Challenging.** A balance should be struck between being inclusive and being sufficiently discerning or discriminating. All ideas and information should be tested for their validity; any gaps in information should be similarly examined in a bid to build a comprehensive picture of the situation in the time available.

118. **Forward-looking.** It is important that analysis looks forward as well as examining the present, with its roots in the past. Outcome assessment involves the generation of a range of alternative scenarios, of varying likelihood and with variable consequences (more or less beneficial). These can then be represented as a spread of alternative outcomes. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.



**Figure 1.1 – Alternative scenarios derived from analysis**

## Methodologies

119. The most appropriate methodologies for analysis will be dictated by the problem and the JTFC's knowledge and preferences. Annex 1A elaborates on the four main areas of analysis which are: crisis circumstances and surroundings, actors and influences, causes of crises and implications. When conducting this analysis commonly used tools include:

- a. **Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis**, frequently used in strategy formulation, helps to identify the (internal) strengths and weaknesses, and (external) opportunities and threats associated with a particular object (for example, country, group, organisation or tribe). A problem situation can thus be understood as a balance between protecting strengths, minimising weaknesses, exploiting opportunities and mitigating threats.
- b. **Stakeholder analysis** is used to identify the driving and restraining forces for change in a situation. The eventual resolution of a crisis should satisfy the majority of stakeholders, or at least ensure that no powerful (and legitimate) stakeholder is left (too) dissatisfied. Stakeholder analysis can take a number of forms, but the purpose is broadly the same – to identify relevant stakeholders and the ways in which each may influence, or be influenced by, the situation. Actors and their influences can be depicted diagrammatically to depict formal, and informal, relationships – in essence, a stakeholder network.
- c. A **cultural estimate** addresses a situation from a sociological perspective, addressing groups of actors' objectives, economic resources, political resources, means of social unification and weaknesses.

120. In support of these tools, a number of check lists can be employed. Which one to use will depend on the nature of the situation, noting that all are simply guides to structure the analysis. Each factor may represent either a strength or weakness of a party to the conflict, and thereby an opportunity or a threat to campaign success. The factors listed may not be amenable to direct control by a JTFC, but will undoubtedly impact on how a crisis develops, and the potential effectiveness of military and other activities. These are shown in

Table 1.1. ASCOPE can act as a checklist or, alternatively, can be used to further breakdown the constituent elements of the other checklists in a matrix form.

<b>PESTL</b>	<b>STEEPLEM</b>	<b>PMESII</b>	<b>Constituents of a nation</b>	<b>ASCOPE</b>
Political	Social	Political	Rule of law	Areas
Economic	Technological	Military	Education	Structures
Social	Economic	Economic	Commercial	Capabilities
Technological	Environmental	Social	Humanitarian	Organisation
Legal	Political	Infrastructure	Health	People
	Legal	Information	Information	Events
	Ethical		Military	
	Military		Economic	
			Diplomacy	
			Administration	
			Governance	

**Table 1.1 – Analysis checklists**

These checklists can be used in the form of a matrix; for example, STEEPLEM can be compared in tabular form against ASCOPE. This approach offers a thorough analysis methodology, although not all areas of the matrix will be relevant to the JTFC. This is shown in Table 1.2.

	<b>Areas</b>	<b>Structures</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>	<b>Organisations</b>	<b>People</b>	<b>Events</b>
<b>Social</b>						
<b>Technological</b>						
<b>Economic</b>						
<b>Environmental</b>						
<b>Political</b>						
<b>Legal</b>						
<b>Ethical</b>						
<b>Military</b>						

**Table 1.2 – An example of a checklist matrix**

## Analysis community of interest

121. Analysis is driven by the commander to frame the problem. Problem-setting must precede problem-solving (see Chapter 2). The process is multi-disciplinary and pan-headquarters, driven by the Chief of Staff, who should harness the power of the staff. J2 will be the primary advocate, but analysis frequently involves other staff divisions. An effective community of interest should ideally be selected by the commander and draw upon external expertise. The pre-eminent beneficiary of analysis is the JTFC; consequently he directs the community of interest from the outset and remains involved throughout. He re-directs, seeks clarification and adds perspective, not least because the knowledge stemming from his oversight of all activity makes him an invaluable contributor.

122. **Membership.** A community of interest need not be a permanent fixture, but may operate as a federated or virtual organisation convening in accordance with the headquarters' campaign rhythm, with J2 staff providing continuity. Membership may include:

- a. **A leader**, selected from the most appropriate staff division, according to the nature and stage of the operation. He should include information security and information management within his responsibilities.
- b. **Chief J2 and other J2 experts**; the Defence Intelligence community and national intelligence agencies are represented directly or through the Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG).
- c. **Representatives of the main staff divisions and branches**, including: J3 and J35 (operations support); J5 (planning); Joint Force Engineer staff (geospatial expertise); J4 (logistics and infrastructure input); J6 (communications and information systems (CIS) input on friendly and host nation CIS infrastructure and information security); and J8/9 (financial, civil secretariat and political advice), according to the nature and stage of the operation. For instance, during a reconstruction phase J4 and J8/9 may play a larger part than during major combat operations.

- d. **Representatives from other government departments**, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Stabilisation Unit.
- e. **Official host nation representatives**, with appropriate security clearances.
- f. **Multinational partner representatives.**
- g. **Subject matter experts (SMEs)**, including government employees, academics and other experts (especially host nation nationals), covering areas such as country/regional knowledge, human factors (culture, language, religion, anthropology and sociology) and business/commercial aspects. A JTFC can exploit reach-back, including through secure video-teleconferencing, to exploit expertise not available in theatre. This might include, for example, universities, professional bodies for defence and security, and think tanks. In practice, subject matter experts' input may be distorted, consciously or subconsciously, by personal perspectives; its objectivity should be tested against alternative viewpoints wherever possible. The in-depth cultural awareness provided by indigenous subject matter experts is particularly important to inform both analysis and pre-deployment training.
- h. **Linguists.** MOD personnel with appropriate training may have command of relevant language(s), but individuals with appropriate national or ethnic backgrounds, whether UK based or locally employed, could have greater understanding, particularly in the areas of slang, idiom and colloquialisms. While likely to have a more developed sense of the cultural setting, indigenous linguists may also introduce their own local prejudices. Warning: linguists provide a *support function* only, which should not to be confused with *subject matter expertise*. If the boundary is blurred, linguists are too easily perceived as *de facto* subject matter experts or *quasi* staff officers, which risks them achieving undue influence through personal bias.

123. **Information sources and management.** JDP 2-00 *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* details potential information sources and their management.

### **Challenging the orthodoxy**

124. All groups of people suffer from a degree of bias. The Defence Intelligence Course lists some 50 examples of different biases, and the close environment of a well disciplined and highly motivated team exacerbates this problem and can lead to flawed assumptions and decision making. As an insurance against this, and other forms of faulty analysis and planning, it is useful for a commander to employ a red team to assist him, or his staff, in understanding a specific problem.

125. **Red teaming.** A red team is a team that is formed, under a nominated red team leader, with the singular objective of subjecting an organisation's plans, programmes, ideas and assumptions to rigorous analysis and challenge. Red teaming is the work performed by the red team in identifying and assessing, *inter alia*, assumptions, alternative options, vulnerabilities, limitations and risks for that organisation.<sup>3</sup> Red teaming is the employment of a tool set, the use of which will provide the commander or staff with a more robust baseline for decision making. Working in parallel with the planning team, the red team will check the planners' assumptions, identify gaps in the analysis and check their logic and deductions. The red team will identify wider factors that may affect outcomes, highlight alternatives and consider consequences. The aim is to improve understanding and decision making by considering alternative perspectives and critical thinking. Further details of the techniques involved are laid out in the MOD publication Red Teaming Guide (2<sup>nd</sup> edition).

126. **Red teams function.** Red teaming should not be confused with the 'red cell' functions which are normally performed by the J2 branch in support of the operations planning team. Drawing on the same data as the planning team they will conduct an adversarial estimate in step with the planning team's activities. They will produce a discrete adversarial plan and will normally provide the enemy representation in a wargame.

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<sup>3</sup> After Defence College of Intelligence, Intelligence Analysis Course book, 2007.

### **Operational-level planning for the Kosovo air campaign: inadequate appreciation of an adversary's perspective**

The Kosovo air campaign of 1999 was arguably a failure of operational-level planning. The error was not, however, one of setting inappropriate goals, nor of changing them during the operation. It was that of misunderstanding the adversary's perspective by failing to note how the adversary had adapted to previous experience.

In 1995 the NATO Operation Deliberate Force persuaded Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to join the negotiations which led to the Dayton peace accords and an end to conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In early 1999 the deteriorating situation in Kosovo prompted the Rambouillet peace talks.

Milosevic did not attend. Serbia rejected the draft accord, which called for autonomy of Kosovo under NATO administration. On 23 March the Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy, but rejected the related military conditions. On 24 March NATO initiated Operation Allied Force.

Operations Deliberate Force had persuaded the Serbian leadership to negotiate, and NATO considered that coercion would work again, but the Serbs were mentally and physically prepared to sustain future attacks. It is often the loser who learns most and the Serbs had probably learnt more than NATO from Operation Deliberate Force.

The early phases of Operation Allied Force were a failure. Bad weather played a part. Moreover, the Serbian military dispersed among the civilian population and decentralised its decision making. The campaign rapidly became a test of NATO unity and resolve. Milosevic was prepared to accept some damage and play for time. NATO nations had difficulty agreeing to widen the scope and intensity of the campaign. When they finally did, Milosevic realised that NATO had sufficient resolve and agreed to negotiate. Other factors played a part, and it was probably not the bombing itself which directly persuaded Milosevic. The bombing did, however, show that NATO had the determination to conclude the issue on its terms.

NATO did not shift the goalposts. In broad terms, it achieved what it had set out to do. But it initially either underestimated Serbia's newly-found resolve, or it could not find consensus for a larger air offensive from the start. Of the two alternatives, the first is arguably the more plausible.

## Analysis products

127. The representation of the analysis can assist the commander in developing his narrative and theory of change. The results of analysis could include models of complex systems, but only as an aid to comprehension, not as a means to conduct operations. The results of analysis should be shared widely through the dissemination of (preferably web-based) graphical, textual and other products. The information generated may be extensive (including, for example, specific studies on local cultures, religions or political leaders) and an executive summary should be used to highlight the key points. Supporting detail can be portrayed using:

- a. **System mapping.** Diagrams and mapping of the relationships within a system or network, for example, network or link analysis.
- b. **Geospatial material.**<sup>4</sup> Mapping and nautical charts (hard and soft copies), with information overlays covering areas such as opponent locations and activity, population distribution, language/religious/cultural divides, and infrastructure.
- c. **Other graphic products.** Charts, diagrams and PowerPoint-type products showing, for example, economic statistics and demographics.

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<sup>4</sup> Including meteorological, geographic and hydrographical material.

## Annex 1A – Scope of analysis

1A1. The scope of analysis – *what* is to be analysed – varies from one situation to another, but its purpose is always the same: to enable a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) to understand his situation and to frame the problem. Analysis includes:

- An orientation to the circumstances and surroundings of a particular crisis or situation, from both a current and an historical perspective.
- An examination of potential sources of conflict, especially those which appear to be most prominent in the contemporary context.

### Section 1 – Crisis circumstances and surroundings

#### Circumstances

1A2. **History of conflict.** The background to a crisis is frequently complex. Many crises are influenced by their historical origins as well as their more immediate causes.<sup>1</sup> Background analysis addresses:

- Significant events and relationships, perceived by one or more parties as fundamental to their identity or as pivotal moments in their history.
- Re-alignment of borders and boundaries, both formal and informal, that may have contributed to tensions or previous conflicts.
- Recent events that initiated the current crisis.

1A3. **Geo-strategic position.** A country's geo-strategic position – based on, for example, geography (including relations with neighbours), natural resources (such as oil) or particular expertise (such as nuclear capability) – has a major impact upon a crisis. Globalisation of ideas, expertise and economies, however, means that crises are rarely bounded; both regional and

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<sup>1</sup> The former may remain directly and enduringly relevant to some actors. For example, Serbs still evoke the memory of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 in their rhetoric, even though its true relevance is questionable in the contemporary context.

global actors may seek to manipulate events to their advantage. Influential diasporas can also increase the risk of conflict spreading.

#### 1A4. **Physical environment.**

a. **Climate and the environment.** The potential effects of climate on the environment can be incorporated into planning to mitigate against known secondary effects. These could include increased risk of disease and drought associated with the climatic norm. Disputes over water access and grazing rights, deforestation, desertification and population displacement affect populations and economies, contributing to instability. In addition, deviations from the climatic norm, or severe weather events, can significantly change the physical and working environment in a much shorter period of time. For example, by exacerbating the impact of poor road infrastructure.

b. **Geography, hydrography and oceanography.** Terrain affects the range of actors' potential activities, supporting some tactics and frustrating others. Hydrography and oceanography influence the nature of maritime, riverine and littoral activity. The weather and seasons affect both and must be factored into the overall terrain/maritime analysis process.

1A5. **National and regional infrastructure.** Infrastructure may have a significant bearing on the operating environment, both directly (for example, influencing the essential services provided to an indigenous population) and indirectly (the potential contribution of other actors, such as other government departments (OGDs) as part of an integrated approach). Relevant aspects include the following.

- Transport networks: road, rail, waterways and internal air services, and associated airports and seaports.
- Energy: electricity supplies, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.
- Communications: Internet and telephones (fixed and mobile networks).

- Media: radio, television and the press.
- Medical: hospitals, clinics and pharmacies.
- Education: primary, secondary and tertiary.
- Security sector: police forces, army, judiciary, prison service, etc.
- Manufacturing and industry: munitions, chemicals, nuclear, electronic and other industries.

## Population and culture

1A6. **Population.** A population (also referred to as the human terrain) may be divided on the basis of cultural, religious, ethnic, demographic or class distinctions.

- Ethnicity.** The ethnic make-up of a population often reveals on the one hand overt distinctive cultural traits of a group in society, yet on the other hand much subtler differences between ethnic groups which need detailed study to appreciate. Ethnic boundaries may not coincide with physical borders or other boundaries; a complication that could restrict access to a population.
- Language.** Language is a key component of identity and, through variations in understanding, barriers are created between actors and groups.
- Class.** Class may conform to a broadly Marxist model (wealthy, bourgeoisie and proletariat) or be further complicated by caste, pastoral or agrarian differences.
- Demography.** 87% of people under the age of 25 live in the developing world, providing a large pool of fighting age males with low economic expectations. Countries and regions where young adults comprise more than 40% of the population are statistically more than twice as likely to experience societal conflict.

e. **Distribution.** Changes or extremes in population distribution, such as an urban/rural divide, major population centres and densely/sparsely-populated areas, can cause tension, frequently compounded by internal migration.

f. **Epidemiology.** Knowledge of regional epidemiology (the incidence and distribution of diseases and other factors relating to health) is essential, not only for planning purposes, but also as part of an integrated approach. Prophylactics or cures for many debilitating diseases can be cheap, and improved health for an indigenous population may contribute to lasting crisis resolution.

1A7. **Culture and religion.** Cultural awareness is essential, not just for analysis, but also for training as part of force preparation. Culture and religion, which are often intertwined, can precipitate a crisis or influence an actor's inclination to use violence to resolve differences.

a. **Religious divides.** Religious divides may be inter-faith (such as Christian/animist) or inter-tradition (such as Sunni/Shi'ia).

b. **Fundamentalism.** There is often tension between extreme fundamentalists and moderates within a religiously observant society.

c. **Cultural divides.** Cultural divides include, for example, a rural/urban split or a traditionalist/modernist conflict. Such divisions may be deep-seated and exacerbated by resource inequality.

d. **Distinctive cultures.** Some societies, or groups within a society, have a distinctive culture, such as a nomadic lifestyle or warrior ethos, which separates them from other elements of society.

1A8. **Political, economic and social issues.** Political, economic and social issues may have caused discontent and sporadic conflict for generations or be more recent.

a. **Government.** A government's national and international legitimacy may be a symptom or a cause of a crisis. Indigenous governance may not follow conventional Western models, and the

influence of religious, ethnic, tribal and other social networks should also be considered.

b. **Economy.** A local economy may not adhere to conventional Western rules and practices, but an improved economy is often crucial to longer-term stability. Most economies are a combination of formal (for example, paid employment) and informal (for example, unregulated exchanges of goods or services) arrangements, with the latter predominating in less-developed countries. The availability of resources may cause a crisis<sup>2</sup> or provide a means to pursue it.<sup>3</sup> If a JTFC can establish basic needs and the actual capacity to help fulfil them, he will better be able to manage expectations.

c. **Organised crime.** In some places, organised crime has permeated society to such an extent that it affects the politics, economy<sup>4</sup> and social structure of a state, challenging the primacy of indigenous authority. In such circumstances, those engaged in organised crime may wield influence comparable to the recognised government and may be involved in crisis resolution.

1A9. **Media.** The media's impact on national and international opinion can both reflect and influence a crisis. Reporting can be subject to bias – sometimes extreme – and media access to different audiences will determine its local, regional, and even global, influence.

1A10. **Legal issues.** Legal issues include the legal system of the country in crisis, and national or international law applicable to any intervention force:

a. **Crisis/host nation law.** The three main systems of law are: common law,<sup>5</sup> a Civil Code,<sup>6</sup> and religious/culturally based law.<sup>7</sup> The imposition of religious law may even be a causal factor in a crisis.

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<sup>2</sup> In Nigeria, for example, the environmental impact of oil extraction and the subsequent distribution of oil wealth, have led to armed conflict.

<sup>3</sup> Money from 'blood diamonds' in Africa has funded conflicts in Angola, Liberia and the Congo, and money from narcotics is a major economic factor in Afghanistan.

<sup>4</sup> Opium (and heroin) production forms over half the gross domestic product of Afghanistan; the 'narco barons' in South America have huge influence in more than one country.

<sup>5</sup> The legal systems of the UK, many commonwealth countries and the US are based on common law.

<sup>6</sup> As exemplified by the French legal system.

<sup>7</sup> Such as Sharia courts used in Iran and parts of Afghanistan; many other nations' legal systems also incorporate traditional cultural practices.

While Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), or exchange of letters covering the deployment of forces normally exempt personnel from local law, deployed forces should nevertheless be conversant with it. As with local governance and economic practice, local laws may not follow conventional Western practice, but could reflect local cultural, religious and societal norms.

b. **National and international law.** UK forces are subject to UK national law and international law,<sup>8</sup> as well as the legal provisions of any UN or other mandate.

## Catalysts

1A11. Geographical, functional or socio-cultural factors may act, or may have the potential to act, as catalysts for conflict.

a. **Natural resources.** Some actors, such as local warlords, may seek to exploit natural resources, such as diamonds or strategic minerals, to fund their activities (or to deny the legitimate government any related income in an attempt to weaken it). The impact of these activities may depend on the resource's ease of extraction and processing; oil, for example, demands major investment, whereas alluvial diamonds can be literally available for the picking.

b. **Borders and boundaries.** Borders and boundaries, especially those that ignore tribal and ethnic areas of interest, may act as focal points for discontent. Boundaries are sometimes disputed or unclear. There may be a requirement to support boundary commissions to resolve disputes or inter-ethnic divides.<sup>9</sup>

c. **Critical infrastructure and lines of communication.** Actors may wish to deny aspects of critical national infrastructure, including lines of communication, to a legitimate government (or, alternatively, to control them for their own purposes).

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<sup>8</sup> Such as the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions.

<sup>9</sup> The UN Buffer Zone (colloquially referred to as the Green Line) in Cyprus, dividing the Greek-Cypriot population from the Turkish-Cypriot population is an example.

d. **Socially-marginalised or excluded populations.** Socially-marginalised or otherwise excluded, often minority, populations are often concentrated in particular areas. These may become centres of hostile activity, require additional protection, or yield potential allies.

## Section 2 – Actors and influences

1A12. Those actively participating in a crisis, as well as those with the potential or inclination to do so, influence the course of events in ways which may be positive or negative, certain or uncertain, temporary or enduring. Most crises will be attributed to human interactions, sometimes with a hitherto cooperative state of affairs transformed into one of confrontation or conflict. In addition to an awareness of the circumstances and surroundings described in Section 1, a JTFC needs a thorough understanding of the full range of actors, their motivations and relationships, but will seldom have it. Therefore, he needs to find ways to test his hypotheses, if necessary by assessing reactions to his own actions.

### Categorisation of actors

1A13. **Adversaries.** Adversaries, or opponents, are potentially hostile to the achievement of the desired outcome. They may employ legitimate political means, within a democratic system, or resort to violence. Some adversaries may use both. Opposition may be singular and monolithic,<sup>10</sup> but is more likely to comprise a multitude of actors with shared<sup>11</sup> or multiple goals.<sup>12</sup>

1A14. **Belligerents.** Belligerents are hostile to each other; they may oppose the desired outcome, even if not directly hostile to the presence of an intervention force.

1A15. **Neutrals.** The degree of neutrality spans those who stop short of active opposition to the desired outcome, to those who support it with few reservations. They may or may not remain neutral. Neutral actors may

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<sup>10</sup> As in the (Communist-led) Malayan Races Liberation Army during the Malayan Emergency, 1948 – 1960, or the Viet Cong in Vietnam during the US involvement in Vietnam 1965 – 1972; both organisations allowed no rival.

<sup>11</sup> As in Northern Ireland, where the main Republican groupings (The Official Irish Republican Army (IRA), Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army) all shared the same goal of a united, independent Ireland.

<sup>12</sup> As in Iraq, where the common goal amongst the majority of actors was the removal of what they saw as Western occupation; beyond that, they had a multiplicity of goals.

include international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

1A16. **Friendly.** Friendly actors broadly support the achievement of the desired outcome; they may include allies and coalition partners, host nation security forces, as well as local population groups and those international organisations and non-governmental organisations who are amenable to being characterised in this way.

1A17. **Spoilers.** Spoilers have an interest in maintaining the *status quo* and attempt to frustrate progress or prevent any change that could adversely affect their activities. Examples include groups benefiting from a war economy: arms/drug dealers, smugglers and individuals or groups, such as warlords, whose influence would decline if the crisis were to be resolved.

## Range of actors

1A18. Within each category of actor there may exist a variety of different individuals, groups and organisations whose identity, status and influence all need to be understood. These may include:

1A19. **Key leaders.** The identification of, and subsequent engagement with, key leaders may be critical to success. Key leaders may be political, religious, tribal or military, acting as individuals or in cliques. Even within unitary states, including those with apparently cohesive leaderships, such identification and engagement is not always simple; it becomes even more complex amongst actors with non-conventional (by Western standards) power structures. Link analysis may help to identify key leaders. Analysis should consider:

- a. **Real leader.** The apparent leader may be a figurehead, and the real power may lie with separate power brokers or activists.
- b. **Power structure.** The structure may be pyramidal or flat; it may follow a conventional Western pattern or, for example, a tribal model led by elders, families or hereditary rulers. The JTFC should try to work out where the power lies and who has the biggest influence on senior level decision making, for example a close cohort of advisors or followers.

- c. **Power base.** A leader's power base may be a democratic mandate, an institutional party, a tribe or a religious sect. It may be economic, in that the leader maintains his power while he continues to provide perceived benefits to all, or to a powerful group within that society. The leader may derive his power from arms, as a dictator or warlord.
- d. **Leadership style.** The leader may be autocratic or consensual.
- e. **Strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities.** A leader's strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities may be institutional or personal, internal or external.
- f. **Aims and intentions.** A leader's aims and intentions may be institutional or personal, internal or external. In some cases, his only aim may be to retain power.

1A20. **Other leaders.** Apart from key leaders, other subordinates and associated organisations (local, national, regional and international) may also play an important role.

- a. Power brokers.
- Political parties and networks (and non-political interest groups, such as peace groups).
  - Military leaders and armed groups.
  - Traditional authorities, such as tribal and clan leaders/elders.
  - Religious leaders and organisations.
- b. Popular forces.
- Civil society.
  - Population (including refugees and internally displaced people).
  - Diaspora groups.

- c. Private sector/business (and associated trade unions).
- d. Extra-territorial interests.
  - Neighbouring states.
  - Foreign embassies.
  - Regional organisations, such as the Arab League or African Union.
- e. International organisations and non-governmental organisations.

### Analysis of actors

1A21. Actors, as described above, impact upon a situation to varying degrees depending upon their aims, intentions and capabilities, ascertained through stakeholder analysis.

- a. **Aims.** An actor's underlying aim drives his activities. It may be broad and aspirational<sup>13</sup> or specific<sup>14</sup> and of local, national, regional or even global significance.
- b. **Motivation.** The achievement of an aim provides part of an actor's motivation, but local factors and allegiances such as score settling, personal gain and the thrill of risk taking or challenging authority may play a part. Motivations differ between individuals or sub-groups, and senior or junior echelons within an organisation.
- c. **Positions.** Actors may adopt specific positions for particular issues, irrespective of the interests and goals of others. An actor may, for instance, take what he sees as a principled position based on his political views, regardless of the potential consensus elsewhere.
- d. **Intentions.** Intentions are an actor's plans for current and near-term activities.

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<sup>13</sup> Al Qaeda's ultimate aim may be described as the re-creation of a transnational Islamic caliphate.

<sup>14</sup> The former Provisional IRA's stated aim was to create a '32-county Socialist Republic of Ireland'.

e. **Sub-culture.** Individual groups of actors, although part of a wider culture, often have their own sub-cultures, which influence their aims.

f. **Relationships.** Relationships are reflected in the interactions between actors at various levels; perceptions of these interactions may be as important as reality. As a situation changes, so too may the relationships. Seemingly strong alliances may be transient.<sup>15</sup> Analysis, informed by red teaming, should identify:

- historical relationships;
- current relationships and the rationale behind them; and
- possible future relationships as the situation changes.

g. **Capacity.** An actor's capacity is his capability to affect a situation, positively or negatively. Capacity is defined in terms of personal authority, arms, resources, access, social networks and alliances, within a given context and at a given time.

h. **Critical vulnerabilities.** All actors have vulnerabilities; actors are vulnerable to each other, to environmental and natural disasters, and to external intervention. These vulnerabilities are a key factor in centre of gravity (CoG) analysis.

### Section 3 – Causes of crises

1A22. Understanding why states or other groups resort to the use of force is essential to the planning and conduct of operations. Coercion and its subordinate principle, deterrence, are introduced in British Defence Doctrine,<sup>16</sup> and planners must consider why coercion, encouragement and/or reassurance, using all levers of national power, might have failed to prevent crisis. Previous state-versus-state and force-on-force combat is giving way to complicated manifestations of conflict, including proxy and hybrid warfare, with well-hidden adversaries combining conventional capabilities and irregular tactics in complex terrain. Factors that have caused a crisis indicate both *why* events have occurred and, potentially, *how* they may be influenced to develop

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<sup>15</sup> As in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where several disparate groups united or set aside their differences to fight the Soviets. Once the Soviets left, this unifying factor disappeared, leading to civil war.

<sup>16</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, p 1-16 to 1-20.

in a more favourable manner in the future. Crises are seldom attributable to a single cause (in the same way that they are seldom bi-polar). Analysis should encompass: the extent of causes, their strength and nature, and the linkages between them.

1A23. **Elemental causes.** Elemental causes are those fundamental factors that relate to a nation, government or other actor's identity, its relationships with neighbouring nations or groups, or in extreme cases its very existence. They include:

- a. **Fear or survival.** Even where success is not guaranteed, a state or group may initiate armed conflict because of its fear, or perception, of an adversary's intentions or capabilities. It may also seek to avoid disadvantage by pre-emption.
- b. **Self-interest.** A state or group may have an interest in gaining or preserving a position of relative power or preferential control of resources and territory.
- c. **Ideology and values.** An absolute belief in the justice of a cause, ideology or set of values, whether secular or religious, may drive a party to conflict. When an ideology, sense of honour or reputation is perceived to be at stake, an actor may attempt to impose its will on another.

1A24. **Momentum for conflict.** Even if the elemental causes above do not directly precipitate conflict, two other factors can increase momentum towards it.

- a. **Culture.** Some actors have a culture of violence (a 'warrior nation'), normally reinforced by political, social or religious imperatives.
- b. **Political will.** The will of an actor or group, and its ability to mobilise and sustain popular support, shapes its propensity for violence.

1A25. **Structural causes.** Structural causes of instability are intrinsic within the policies, structures and fabric of certain societies.

- a. **Illegitimate government.** A government may be perceived illegitimate for a variety of different reasons; it may have no electoral mandate, may be the result of a palpably corrupt electoral process, or may have been imposed by force or at the behest of another country.
- b. **Poor governance.** A government may be corrupt or inept.
- c. **Lack of political participation.** The political process may be controlled by interest groups based on religion, ethnicity, class or business, excluding or even persecuting minorities.
- d. **Inequality and social exclusion.** Wealth distribution may be unequal, for instance between urban and rural communities. A significant underclass, based on ethnic, cultural, language, religious or economic circumstances, may be denied full participation in society.
- e. **Inequitable access to natural resources.** Scarce natural resources may be allocated to, or retained by, particular interest groups; for example, water rights may be granted to certain actors to the detriment of others.

1A26. **Proximate causes.** Proximate causes may contribute directly to a crisis, or provide the bedrock for more deep-seated but less immediate concern.

- a. **Uncontrolled security sector.** Militias, and even private military and security companies, operating initially in support of ineffective state security forces, may overreach their remit.
- b. **Light weapons proliferation.** The collapse of state, or neighbouring state, structures, arising from a successful insurgency, for example, may result in arms and munitions, especially light weapons, being readily available throughout a population, exacerbating instability.

c. **Human rights abuses.** Inhumane methods used to counter an internal crisis may result in the gradual alienation of an entire population, or of discrete groups within it.

d. **Destabilising role of neighbouring countries.** Neighbouring countries may attempt to influence the outcome of a crisis by supporting specific groups within an unstable, or potentially unstable, state.

e. **Role of diasporas.** Diasporas may support particular factions or groups within their country of origin, or may use influence in their country of residence to provoke unhelpful political/media pressure.

1A27. **Triggers.** Triggers are actions or events (or their anticipation), that may set off or escalate violence. These triggers could include:

- elections;
- arrest/assassination of a key figure;
- military coup;
- environmental disaster;
- increased price/scarcity of basic commodities;
- economic crisis, such as a rapid increase in unemployment or a collapse of a local currency; or
- capital flight (when a group or population take their money and other portable assets out of the country, or convert circulating local currency into non-circulating hard currency or precious metal/stones).

1A28. **Crisis-generated causes.** Crises can be self-perpetuating:

a. **Material causes.** Conflict inherently increases the supply and circulation of weapons, which inevitably spread from those actors involved in the initial crisis to others, allowing them to pursue their own agendas; other weapons may fall into the hands of criminal actors. A 'war economy', with funds from backers and potentially foreign aid, may

benefit some actors to the point that they are materially better off during a crisis.

b. **Emotional causes.** A culture of violence can emerge, or the success of certain actors in achieving their aims may create new enemies, or inspire previously dormant actors to take up arms. In some cultures there is a tradition of revenge (such as the Pashtun *badal* – to seek justice) or vendetta; conflict, even if resolved at a higher level, may leave some individuals or groups dissatisfied and liable to re-ignite violence.

## Section 4 – Implications

1A29. The practical output of analysis is a clearer picture in the mind of a JTFC, based on as many different opinions, perspectives and viewpoints as possible, of *what* is happening, *why* and, hence, what may happen *next*. Interaction between the various constituents of a given situation may have a number of implications, generating variously worst case, best case and most likely future outcomes. Each has associated with it different implications, with different possibilities of occurring, and different second-order effects. These may be highlighted in terms of:

a. **Current trends.** Current trends may be identified as enduring, or likely to escalate or de-escalate, subject to defined changes in circumstances.

b. **Shocks.** Shocks are unexpected (low probability) but significant (high impact) occurrences likely to introduce a discontinuity in an established trend or pattern of events. Shocks may be natural (such as an unforeseen environmental disaster) or man-made (the result of unanticipated adversary activity). While their occurrence may be a surprise, their implications can be addressed through contingency planning and resilience measures.

c. **Risks and opportunities.** Negative or positive developments generate risks and opportunities for a JTFC. His analysis of the situation assists him in managing the former and exploiting the latter.



## Chapter 2 – Planning

‘The Plan is nothing. Planning is everything.’<sup>1</sup>

Chapter 2 describes the campaign planning process, in eight sections:

- Section 1 – Strategic direction
- Section 2 – Planning at the operational level
- Section 3 – Campaign planning concepts
- Section 4 – Operational estimate
- Section 5 – Conducting the estimate
- Section 6 – Campaign planning products
- Section 7 – Planning throughout the campaign
- Section 8 – Campaign continuity

201. This Chapter builds on Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 *Campaigning* and addresses the *how* and *why* of campaign planning, including the operational estimate; Chapter 3 addresses the *who*, *what* and *when*, in terms of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO). For clarity, this Chapter focuses principally on national operations to provide an overall perspective, but that broad viewpoint is also valuable in a multinational operation as a junior partner. Section 1 addresses the formulation of crisis management strategy (building specifically on JDP 01 Chapter 2 – Military Strategy). Multinational (alliance and coalition) considerations are subsequently covered in Chapter 3.

### Section 1 – Strategic direction


#### Overview of military planning and decision making

202. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation, situated within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Head Office in Whitehall and at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), provides the MOD focus for crisis management, both as a strategic headquarters and as a Department of State. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation translates political intent into military activity; it also issues direction to, and monitors reporting from, deployed commands

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<sup>1</sup> General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

as shown in Figure 2.1. It is, however, but one part of a cross-government and potentially multinational response to crises, which could involve other government departments (OGDs), other national governments, international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The UK may commit military forces overseas on national operations, or on multinational operations (as the framework or lead nation, or as a contributing nation).<sup>2</sup> Correspondingly, commanders may deploy under a number of alternate command relationships: national or multinational/combined Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC); National Contingent Commander (NCC) on multinational operations; or Component (or Contingent) Commander (CC) on national or multinational operations.



**Figure 2.1 – UK military planning and decision making**

<sup>2</sup> Although this Joint Doctrine Publication is concerned with operations overseas, much of it also applies to operations in the UK. The latter, while involving the DCMO, are not ordinarily directed by PJHQ; instead, the Chief of Defence Staff has appointed Commander Land Forces (CLF) as the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) with the primary responsibility for the Defence contribution to the planning and execution of joint and other government departments-led civil contingency operations. See JDP 02 *Operations in the United Kingdom: The Defence Contribution to Resilience* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).

## Political control and direction


203. Democratic control and political direction of the Armed Forces are exercised by Ministers, either individually or in committee. Desired outcomes are identified as government policy, expressed as government intent in the form of a national strategic aim, and translated into actionable objectives for national cross-government strategic planning. Ministers decide on the most effective approach on a case-by-case basis, drawing upon a variety of cross-government committees, the most significant being the National Security Council (NSC); its role is described at Annex 2A. The Head Office role in directing operations and other military tasks is described in the New Operating Model.<sup>3</sup>

## Formulation of national strategy

204. Based upon the Prime Minister and Cabinet's intent, and drawing on the framework of the National Security Strategy the National Security Council determines policy and national strategic objectives through a process of political strategic analysis, and provides guidance for national planning. National policy is then implemented through an integrated cross-government strategy, coordinated through the (Cabinet) Overseas and Defence Secretariat (or another cross-government body, as appropriate). Figure 2.2 illustrates the structure for formulating national strategy.

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<sup>3</sup> *The New Operating Model – How Defence Works*, version 3.0 dated December 2012, describes how Defence will work from April 2013 and beyond. It is available through the defence intranet at: <http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/Policy/HowDefenceWorks/Pages/HowDefenceWorks.aspx> and through the internet at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-new-operating-model-how-defence-works>



Legend	
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
IO	International organisation(s)
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NGO	Non-governmental organisation(s)
NSC(OD)	National Security Council (Overseas and Defence)
OGD	Other government department(s)
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PM	Prime Minister

**Figure 2.2 – Formulation of national strategy**

205. **Political strategic analysis.** Political strategic analysis is a cross-government analysis of a crisis and the options for its resolution; it is not necessarily led by any one Department, although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), guided by routinely updated political-military estimates (see paragraph 206), usually leads on overseas policy including foreign security. Political strategic analysis seeks to balance national priorities and resources in often complex, ambiguous and uncertain circumstances. Any crisis is likely to be dynamic, and it may also take time for political direction to evolve, especially where the UK intends to act in conjunction with other

nations or multinational institutions (who may develop their responses at a different tempo). Consequently a definitive national strategy may take time to mature; in the interim, military commanders should begin their planning based upon a judgement (informed by policy guidance) about the desired outcome. Prior to the definition of a formal national strategic aim, planners at the strategic level may agree a unifying theme (a central idea reflecting the character, context and direction of government strategy) to underpin and provide coherence to initial planning efforts.

**206. Political-military estimate.** The MOD contributes to the formulation of national strategy by conducting its own political-military estimate. The political-military estimate is seldom neatly bounded or based on well-defined parameters from the outset; it develops over time with the cross-government political strategic analysis and the progress of national and international political dialogue. Although MOD-led, key representation from the Cabinet Office and other government departments (specifically the FCO, the Department for International Development (DFID), and the multi-departmental Stabilisation Unit) validates the balance of political-military advice. Its central aim is to consider potential crisis areas around the world<sup>4</sup> and to assess political implications against military feasibility and sustainability. It makes a vital contribution to political strategic analysis and the development of national strategy; likewise, it informs any decision to initiate a Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS') planning directive.

## Strategic outcomes

**207.** The term strategic outcome describes the government's aims and objectives<sup>5</sup> for a particular crisis, terms that are widely used, but not always well-defined across government. How these are articulated will vary depending upon the nature of the crisis, the nature of the intended response (with varying degrees of emphasis on the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power), and the extent of collaboration envisaged with other nations, multinational institutions and international organisations. The MOD

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<sup>4</sup> Prioritised by the Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement (STRIDE) which replaced the Security Cooperation Operations Group (SCOG). Along with the Defence Engagement Board the STRIDE is the senior level governance structure for Defence Engagement to ensure it delivers against policy goals and is coherent with other Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) implementations strategies.

<sup>5</sup> Strategic objectives are reliant upon the contributions made by each of the national instruments of power. In describing strategic outcomes, military-strategic objectives are accompanied by diplomatic and economic objectives.

ascribes specific meanings to promote clearer dialogue within MOD and with other departments.

208. Strategic outcomes evolve over time, their definition and detail increasing as a crisis unfolds. Assumptions play an important part in strategic planning. They may inform initial planning, and how the commander envisages change (to ensure that long-term contingency planning, for example, is not delayed awaiting definitive planning guidance). As the strategic outcomes evolve, military commanders must ensure that assumptions are revalidated, and military activity adjusted as required. In such circumstances a balance will need to be struck between the principles of war of 'selection and maintenance of the aim' on one hand, and 'flexibility' on the other.

209. **National strategic aim.** A national strategic aim is 'the government's declared purpose, normally expressed as a future desired outcome'. The national strategic aim may be articulated personally by Ministers, or it may be discerned indirectly from UK foreign policy statements and official records (such as the minutes of Cabinet, National Security Council, Cabinet sub-committees and engagements with multinational partners), or through discussions between politicians and officials. Achieving the national strategic aim invariably requires contributions from cross-government, and perhaps from multiple agencies. It provides the unifying purpose and strategic narrative for military commanders and leaders of non-military organisations.<sup>6</sup> The ability to *influence* participants involved in a crisis, rather than simply to intervene or *act* in a given situation, is critical to achieving the national strategic aim. For this reason, a national information strategy will normally be formulated by the cross-government Information Strategy Group.<sup>7</sup> The national information strategy articulates policy, desired outcomes, and the strategic narrative to which all government departments must work.<sup>8</sup> It includes the themes and messages to be communicated, and the specific actions to be conducted.

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
<sup>6</sup> JDN 1/12 *Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution* describes narratives as compelling story lines which explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn.

<sup>7</sup> National Information Strategy is described as the coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives. (JDP 3-45.1 *Media Operations*).

<sup>8</sup> Strategic narrative is described as communication that portrays a story designed to resonate in the mind of the audience that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan. (JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*).

210. **Strategic objectives.** A strategic objective is ‘a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim’. It may be explicit, or deduced from government policy, strategic direction or the decisions of the National Security Council. Objectives are likely to require significant coordination across departmental boundaries, even if allocated to a particular department to lead. In practice, formulating strategic objectives by consensus between departments may be challenging; the process should, ideally, be coordinated centrally, for example, through the Cabinet or National Security Council.

211. **Military contribution to the national strategic aim.** The extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is termed the military strategic end-state, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives. Within the resources, including time and space, assigned to him, a JTFC is responsible for a series of campaign objectives, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions (DCs), the achievement of which indicates his campaign end-state (see Figure 2.3). The military contribution must accord with the diplomatic and economic contributions towards the same national strategic aim.



The **national strategic aim** is the government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome.

The **desired outcome** is a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively.

*The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations.*

A **national strategic objective** is a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim.

The **military strategic end-state** is the extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives.

**Military strategic objectives** are goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the national strategic aim (and are the responsibility of the military-strategic commander (CDS)).

The **campaign end-state** is reached when all the campaign objectives have been achieved. It therefore represents the extent of the Joint Task Force Commander's contribution to meeting the national strategic aim.

A **campaign objective** is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim.

### Figure 2.3 – Objectives and end-states

#### Military strategic direction

212. Chapter 3 describes how military strategic direction is developed and promulgated via the DCMO.<sup>9</sup> Military planning at the operational level is initiated by a CDS' Planning Directive, issued to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) (normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)). Once it has been decided to commit military resources, CDS' Operational Directive provides authority to conduct operations. Annexes 2B and 2C provide illustrative examples of CDS' Planning and Operational Directives. These are for guidance only and can be modified as described in the Annex. Small deployments or tasks may not require every aspect of the directives to be completed, and slavish completion will be inappropriate; staff work must be as concise as possible.

213. CDS will nominate a Jt Comd. The Jt Comd issues a Jt Comd's Directive to empower the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and direct the enabling functions of deploy, sustain and, if applicable, recover. Key issues such as, command authority, deployment plan, targeting delegations, rules of engagement (ROE), intelligence, force protection (FP), training, logistics and

<sup>9</sup> DCMO Standing Operating Procedures provide detail of the process.

medical will feature in this directive. A suggested format for a Jt Comd's Directive, incorporating the Theatre Reference Document, is at Annex 2D.

## Strategic communication

214. Strategic communication is defined as: *advancing national interests by using all Defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people.*<sup>10</sup> It is primarily a philosophy, partly a capability and partly a process. Philosophy is the key element since it underpins the alignment of words, images and actions to realise influence. The CDS' planning and operational directives will articulate the desired information effect<sup>11</sup> to the JTFC, who will deliver the operational level military contribution as part of the wider cross-government strategic communication for a campaign or operation. This should be articulated through a strategic narrative or, where additional focus is required, a MOD departmental narrative<sup>12</sup> from which the JTFC will derive his key themes<sup>13</sup> and messages.<sup>14</sup> In this way the JTFC ensures that the words of strategic communication are matched by the deeds of the joint task force.

## Section 2 – Planning at the operational level

215. **Hierarchy of military activities.** Military activity takes place at all levels of warfare. There is a hierarchy of terms that describe military activities and how they fit together linking strategy to tactical activity. This linkage is illustrated in Figure 2.4.

- a. At the highest level, national strategy directs the application of the levers of national power to resolve a crisis; this is crisis management.<sup>15</sup> The military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is one or more campaigns that are designed to achieve the military strategic objectives. The contribution the campaign(s) makes to the national strategic aim is expressed as the campaign end state.

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<sup>10</sup> JDN 1/12. This is a distillation of the National Security Council draft definition of 'the systematic and coordinated use of all means of communication to deliver UK national security objectives by influencing the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, groups and states'.

<sup>11</sup> Information effect is defined in JDN 1/12 as: *the resultant attitudes and behaviours of audiences produced by words, images and actions.*

<sup>12</sup> The requirement for a departmental narrative is situation dependent. Hereafter the strategic or departmental narrative is referred to as either the strategic narrative or simply the narrative.

<sup>13</sup> JDP 3-40 describes the theme as an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad communication application.

<sup>14</sup> JDP 3-40 describes messages as a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific target audience.

<sup>15</sup> JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning*, Section 1.


- b. The operational level of warfare is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Campaigns are invariably joint, and most often multinational and multi-agency.
- c. A campaign consists of a single or a series of operations<sup>16</sup> that achieve, or shape progress towards, one or more campaign objectives.
- d. Operations have a unifying theme (for example, major combat operations or stabilisation)<sup>17</sup> that gives the underlying purpose and helps the commander frame the operating environment and problem. Operations consist of a series of synchronised military actions that achieve the commanders' specified objectives articulated as decisive conditions and their constituent supporting effects.
- e. Actions comprise tactical military activities that are orchestrated through joint action.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Operations may be concurrent or sequential. Although they can be discrete there is likely to be significant interdependencies between them. If operations are sequential they may be aligned with the phases of a campaign.

<sup>17</sup> ADP *Operations* uses a similar hierarchy of terminology to discuss military activities at the tactical level. It should be noted that the JDP 5-00 description of *operation* is broadly analogous with *military activity* in ADP *Operations*.

<sup>18</sup> JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution* defines joint action as: *the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on an actors' will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them.*



**Figure 2.4 – Relationship between operational and strategic planning**

Recent campaigns, such as our contribution to complex stabilisation in Afghanistan, have been described as compressing or blurring the levels of warfare. This happens because stabilisation is inherently political at all levels, and national levers of power are combined, not just at the strategic and operational level, but also at the tactical level. This enables the security effort to be synchronised with economic development and governance. Although the characteristics of the operational level may now manifest themselves at the tactical level, the nature of operational-level command has not changed; it is still defined by complexity not scale. The analytical and planning tools of the joint operational level now have utility to both large scale campaigns and smaller scale operations conducted at the joint tactical level as part of a larger campaign. If future operations are to be similarly complex and multi-agency, this may apply to national operations too. Based on the complexity, duration and scope of operations, the commander could elect to plan, direct and control joint operations from a single headquarters, based on a framework component, without establishing one or more component commanders. In this case his staff would be augmented by appropriate subject matter experts to perform specialist functions and assist in planning and coordination.

216. **Command-led planning.** UK operations planning is command-led and dynamic. While staff may assist a JTFC, ultimately it is *his* plan and he drives its development. The essence of this relationship is based on an acknowledgement that planning is a mental activity, aided but not driven by process. Although each individual campaign has a unique context, scale and mix of military activities, all campaigns share a common purpose: to translate strategic intent into tactical activity. Operational-level planning requires a JTFC to determine how (the *ways*) a favourable situation (the dictated *ends*) may be created within the time and resources available (his allocated *means*). Such planning should be conducted in concert with other government departments and other agencies, and where necessary allies, whose combined and often inter-dependent efforts are required to achieve the national strategic aim.

217. **Operational art.** Operational art is the theory and practice of planning, preparing and conducting campaigns to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. In practice, it is essentially a commander's skill in orchestrating tactical actions in concert with other agencies to achieve the desired outcome.

What is *to be achieved* can be aspirational, for which it is normal to use broad terms such as outcome, conditions and effects, which leave room for individual tactical flair and initiative. However, when describing what an individual or organisation *is to achieve*, then clear aims, objectives and activities should be stated. The former tend to indicate the purpose or criteria that underlie the latter. Operational art is realised through a combination of a commander's skill and the staff-assisted processes of campaign design and campaign management. It is fundamentally a JTFC's business, and its mainspring is his creative and innovative thought or ideas.

218. **Campaign design and management.** A *campaign design* sets out a commander's ideas, clearly articulating what he seeks to achieve and why. It is informed by a clear understanding of the strategic context, and all the factors that influence the outcome. Tools and processes, for example, the operational estimate, assist with campaign design. *Campaign management* is the process of delivering the campaign design. It involves assessment of progress, and the integration and synchronisation of activities to ensure that objectives are achieved.

219. **Speed of planning.** The product of planning will be determined by a combination of quality and speed. While acting early and fast is generally beneficial, the ideal is to assess, analyse and act *earlier and faster* than the adversary. Speed should always be seen in its appropriate context; sometimes it is right to gather all available information for a crucial decision. At other times, no amount of information will resolve ambiguity; sometimes more information will increase ambiguity. Optimum speed enables optimum weight of planning effort. Therefore, a principal skill for a JTFC is to sense the *last sensible moment* to make any decision. Planning too quickly risks missing crucial information; always seeking more information to resolve ambiguity slows down planning and risks decision paralysis. The test of any commander and the efficiency of his staff is how well they can issue clear, achievable and above all timely orders.

220. **Operational estimate and associated techniques.** The operational estimate (described in detail at Section 4) is a problem-solving tool; it helps a JTFC to analyse an ill-structured problem. The process is rational, in that it progresses logically from factor to deduction, but a JTFC is not constrained to

objective analysis alone. While his intellect and practical ability will inform his decision making, his creativity and vision are more likely to prove decisive.

221. **Campaign plan and assessment.** A campaign plan is the actionable expression of a JTFC's intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders. During its execution, a campaign plan is kept under continuous review, informed by campaign assessment, and modified iteratively to reflect changes in the situation and in strategic direction.

### Section 3 – Campaign planning concepts

222. Campaign planning uses a variety of building blocks known as campaign planning concepts to focus planning (i.e. they aid analysis and understanding), and to describe a plan in directives and orders (i.e. they aid communication). Different concepts have utility at different times during campaign planning; not all concepts are useful on all occasions. The following paragraphs might suggest – especially in the calm of an academic environment – that a JTFC could adopt a mechanistic approach to planning. The planning process is but one way to deconstruct a complex problem to a level at which elements of it might better be understood. No matter how carefully any plan is conceived, it is not likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Campaign planning, like most contemporary operations, is highly dynamic. It does not lend itself to pseudo-scientific approaches. The concepts are explained below.


#### Campaign end-state

The extent of the Joint Task Force Commander's contribution to meeting the national strategic aim.

JDP 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

223. End-state analysis confirms the relationship of the in-theatre military contribution within the overall effort to reach a desired outcome. A JTFC may be given his campaign end-state, or he may have to derive it himself. Subsequent analysis helps him to appreciate the political and military strategic purpose behind his specific activity and the intended relationship with the other instruments of power. Many techniques can exist, for example, hierarchical

mapping; a campaign end-state can be mapped against other strategic outcomes, to explore their hierarchical relationship. Figure 2.5 shows only the military contribution (in terms of campaign and military strategic objectives), but could be expanded to include the contributions of other participants.



**Figure 2.5 – Hierarchical end-state analysis mapping**

## Centre of gravity

A characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight.

JDP 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

224. All parties to a conflict are likely to have a centre of gravity which, if neutralised, will render their position untenable. The centre of gravity may therefore represent the key to unlocking the solution. It might not need to be attacked or destroyed, but it will need to be affected in some way for the end-state to be reached. It is of paramount importance that the centres of gravity of all significant entities are correctly identified, analysed, and incorporated into campaign design.

225. The identification of centres of gravity is one of the most significant decisions that a commander can make; the right selection will enable the campaign plan to be focused on what is decisive in delivering the end-state, whereas the wrong choice will lead to effort being wasted on chasing a goal that does not necessarily lead to campaign success. The choice should be clearly justifiable with evidence to show why alternatives have been rejected. Intuition will rarely suffice. The process of identifying centres of gravity will also expose more detail on the operating environment, as the commander and his staff focus their energies on considering their, and their adversary's, sources of strength.

226. Once centres of gravity have been identified, analysis seeks to expose their vulnerabilities; those of the friendly force will be protected, and those of the opponent attacked. In this way centres of gravity represent an adversarial relationship. Centre of gravity analysis will allow the progression of the campaign to be defined, as objectives or decisive conditions are identified and sequenced in different courses of action. Analysis must also be done from a perspective other than one's own. The obvious perspective is from that of the adversary, but widening the analysis community of interest or red teaming may provide alternative viewpoints.

227. There may be different centres of gravity at different levels but, if so, they should all be nested. At the strategic level a centre of gravity is often an abstraction such as the cohesion of an alliance; at the tactical level it is usually a capability or strength that can be affected through defined engagements over limited time-scales. Identifying an operational-level centre of gravity depends on the context, circumstances and anticipated military activity. Even where there is no obvious single centre of gravity, a commander may still find the concept useful to ensure that he remains focused, in potentially complex and multifaceted crises, on what is *militarily* critical to the desired outcome.

228. In situations where there is no particular enemy, and no obvious value to be gained by focusing effort on any one actor, a more abstract centre of gravity may be useful. This is more likely to be the case in a complex campaign in which conflict is not simply between two parties, but represents a web of competing interests.

229. Centres of gravity might change during the course of a campaign. Commanders must also be open to the possibility that the wrong centre of gravity may have been selected during campaign planning. Centres of gravity should therefore be reviewed throughout a campaign as understanding of the relationship between cause and effect within a conflict evolves. Annex 2E outlines some methods associated with identifying and analysing centres of gravity.

230. In some circumstances it may not be possible to identify and centre of gravity. Centre of gravity identification is not a mandatory element of campaign planning, or of a campaign plan; it is a planning concept useful in providing input to a plan. The unifying focus of a campaign plan is the commander's intent – if a clear and useful centre of gravity is not identifiable, alternatives such as SWOT analysis can be used to underpin a campaign plan.

### **Centre of gravity in the South Atlantic**

Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982. Britain responded rapidly by despatching a task force to reoccupy the Islands.

The Argentinian armed forces had 220 jet aircraft. The British Task Force had 34, all of which were Harriers. Control of the air was vital to enable amphibious landings and provide the freedom of manoeuvre for surface forces. Initial planning showed that even after a successful reoccupation of the Islands, the Royal Navy would have to retain two aircraft carriers in the South Atlantic for several weeks, and probably longer. The only hard-surface runway in the Falklands, at Stanley, was not long enough to operate fast jet aircraft and could not easily be extended.

The Royal Navy had two aircraft carriers: HMS HERMES and HMS INVINCIBLE. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS had been launched but was not yet operational. The deduction was simple: for control of the air, the Task Force could not afford to lose a carrier.

That premise shaped the naval campaign. The Falklands lie 300 miles east of Argentina. Placing the two carriers east of the Falklands would keep them out of range of enemy aircraft. That had implications for the availability of air cover; the Harriers had to make relatively long transits to and from station. Because relatively few aircraft were available, they could keep station for only short periods. It was planned to build a forward operating base to accommodate 12 Harriers once land operations got underway. However, the loss of much of the stock of perforated steel planking on the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR limited the capacity of that base to only four aircraft.

HMS ILLUSTRIOUS joined the Task Force later in the year, but only after the Falkland Islands had been reoccupied. Using today's campaign planning concepts, two functioning carriers would arguably have been the Task Force centre of gravity. The Argentinians knew how important the carriers were and repeatedly tried to find and sink them.

## Campaign objective

A goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim.

JDP 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

231. Campaign objectives are assigned to a JTFC, as part of the MOD's overall military strategy; their collective achievement represents the campaign end-state. A military campaign is seldom conducted in isolation. A JTFC's campaign objectives are likely to be linked to those of other actors; collaboration is invariably required to ensure that all actors' activities contribute to the national strategic aim, as shown in Figure 2.4.

## Decisive conditions

A specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective.

JDP 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

232. A decisive condition is a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when achieved, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent, or contribute materially to achieving a campaign objective.<sup>19</sup> Decisive conditions are campaign building blocks. They should reflect the inter-dependencies between individual decisive conditions and the relationship between each condition, the operational centre(s) of gravity, and campaign objectives. Decisive conditions may relate to the physical conditions of particular people or places (though they need not be geographically bounded), less tangible virtual phenomena such as the control of information (including its reception, transmission or manipulation), and even psychological factors such as levels of comprehension, mutual trust or cohesion between individuals and organisations. Decisive conditions are:

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<sup>19</sup> August 2012 revise of JDP 01 definition: *A decisive condition is a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective* to reflect NATO doctrine on decisive conditions. The revised definition is consistent with the original description of a decisive condition in JDP 01.

- a. Prerequisites for the achievement of campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state. They are derived from analysis of the campaign end-state (or relevant centre(s) of gravity) and then later refined during the estimate process.
- b. Articulated in a way that helps make it clear when they have been achieved. At the same time that he identifies decisive conditions, a JTFC should also plan how to assess progress towards them.<sup>20</sup>

233. Decisive conditions are the criteria against which the achievement of assigned campaign objectives are judged. A JTFC is unlikely to create and sustain all the conditions necessary for success without support from other actors. Moreover, he may be similarly dependent on others for the effective exploitation of decisive conditions. In either circumstance, a JTFC who cannot either create the decisive conditions, or ensure that they contribute to the desired end-state, should either negotiate with others to resolve the situation collaboratively or refer it to his strategic headquarters. As an example, a JTFC may identify an effective indigenous security capability as a decisive condition to contribute to an objective of territorial integrity. He may be able to recruit and train such a force, but be unable to ensure that its members are paid or that adequate governance arrangements are in place to ensure control and accountability. For these aspects, he may rely on other actors (either through direct negotiation or indirect influence via the chain of command). Alternatively, he could seek an extension to his mandate and additional resources.

### **Amiens: Supporting effect, decisive condition and campaign objective**

The German Spring offensive of 1918 pushed the British Expeditionary Force up to 30 miles back on a 60 mile front. Only one main-line railway running North to South behind the front line remained in British hands. The town of Amiens was a major junction on that railway, close to the Allied line and within range of German artillery. The ability to move forces along the front, or to supply an offensive south of Amiens, was dependent on the use of the railway. Allied Commanders-in-Chief met at Bombon on 24 July 1918 to consider a counteroffensive.

<sup>20</sup> For additional clarity, decisive conditions can be expressed as a verb in the past tense (for example, *Warlord A deterred*), to focus attention on outcomes rather than activity (*how Warlord A is deterred* is a matter for subsequent planning).

The first counterattacks were initiated on the Marne by the French on 15 July, and the French and Americans in the Aisne-Marne area on 18 July. The British would start in August, their initial objective to push the Germans back at Amiens to gain unrestricted use of the railway. The attack was a success and a very early example of good air-land cooperation. The British gained nine miles along the whole front and took 16,000 prisoners. The operational objective was obtained and local counterattacks defeated.

Amiens was the beginning of a general British counteroffensive, the 'Hundred Days'. In modern terms, it was fought to protect the British Expeditionary Force's critical vulnerability: the use of the railway system through the area (its security was therefore a supporting effect). However, Amiens also had an unexpected strategic effect. General von Ludendorff, effectively the second-in-command of the German Army, called the 8<sup>th</sup> of August 'the black day of the German Army'. He believed that his Army was beaten and it was. At Amiens, the British Expeditionary Force showed that it could now break through German defensive positions. It would continue to do so throughout the hundred days. While it never achieved an operational-level breakthrough, it demonstrated it could defeat the German tactical defences wherever it chose (a decisive condition). It had also, albeit unexpectedly, broken the determination of the enemy high command (a campaign objective).

## Supporting effects

The intended consequences of actions.


JDP 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

234. Decisive conditions are derived through a top-down analysis of campaign objectives. They are achieved by realising supporting effects; activities are conducted to create these effects. Activities may, of course, have unintended effects as well. Supporting effects are:

- a. Derived through analysis of decisive conditions, an example of which is shown in Figure 2.6 (see Annex 2G for further detail). It may also be appropriate to indicate:

- (1) The domain (physical, virtual or cognitive) in which supporting effects are to be realised.
- (2) The dimension(s) of the battlespace, including time, in which supporting effects are to be created. They may be geographically localised or more widely distributed, be instantaneous or delayed, permanent or transitory.

b. Measurable, either directly or indirectly.




**Figure 2.6 – Deriving supporting effects from analysis of decisive conditions**

235. **Realising supporting effects.** Mission command recognises that events rarely proceed according to a master plan, and while military operations are undertaken to achieve specific effects (in order to improve conditions cumulatively and progressively), experience, intuition and operational art retain primacy. JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution* describes *joint action* in detail; but it is implemented through coordination and synchronisation of: *fires* – physical or virtual means to realise primarily physical effects; *information activities* – to manipulate information or perceptions of information to affect understanding; *manoeuvre* – used to gain advantage in time and space; and *outreach* – including stabilisation, support to governance, capacity building, and regional and key leader engagement.<sup>21</sup> This definition recognises the centrality of influence as an effect, the integration of activities to realise it and that we may seek to influence a range of actors including ourselves, allies, civilian partners and regional audiences in addition to any adversary. Although an integral part of the UK's approach to campaigning, joint action is neither a new capability nor an activity in its own right. It is, instead, a framework for considering the coordination and synchronisation of all military activity within the battlespace.


236. **Unified command.** Joint action is best executed with a unified command so that orchestration can be directed rather than simply invited. It embraces supported and supporting relationships between subordinate commands while delegating the freedom to act, under mission command. In the absence of unity of command, for example, where non-military actors are engaged in activities alongside the military, unity of purpose can help maintain coherence between planned activities. Figure 2.7 illustrates this concept.

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<sup>21</sup> DCDC updated Joint Action Model dated 5 May 2011.



**Figure 2.7 – Realising supporting effects through joint action**



**Legend**

-  Decisive condition achieved through military/joint force activity alone
-  Decisive condition achieved through civil-military cooperation

**Note:** This diagram does not suggest a mechanistic approach to planning. The planning process is a way to deconstruct a complex problem to a level at which elements of it might better be understood. Plans are neither predictable nor likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Campaign planning, like most contemporary operations, is dynamic and not suited to pseudo-scientific approaches.

**Campaign objectives** are expressed using an active verb, for example, ‘**defeat the enemy**’ or ‘**restore essential infrastructure**’.

**Decisive conditions** are vital to achieve campaign objectives, for example, ‘**air superiority gained**’ or ‘**enemy reconnaissance defeated**’.

**Supporting effects** support decisive conditions. Decisive conditions are limited in number to ensure that a campaign is properly focused, and that effort is duly concentrated on that which is truly decisive. Supporting effects are used to expand upon the changes or effects required to create the necessary conditions, for example ‘**enemy AD neutralised**’ or ‘**enemy dispositions identified**’.

Activities are **tasks undertaken for specific purposes, that contribute to or realise supporting effects**, for example ‘gain control of the air for time X over area Y in order to secure a beachhead’ or ‘deploy ISR capabilities in order to identify enemy dispositions’.

**Figure 2.8 – From national strategic aim to activities**

## Lines or groupings of operation

In a campaign or operation, a line or grouping linking decisive conditions, and hence campaign objectives, in time and space on the path to the campaign end-state.

JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

237. Lines or groupings of operation are used to visualise the relationships between decisive conditions, campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state and centre(s) of gravity. Because a campaign is conditions-based and must be adaptive to events, lines of operation indicate a route rather than a timetable of events. They indicate how, and in what order (and with what dependencies), it is envisaged that the activities of the joint force will contribute to the achievement of decisive conditions and desired outcomes, but without stipulating precisely when. For this reason groupings rather than lines of operation, especially in the initial stages of campaign design, may offer a more appropriate means of visualisation. Depending upon the nature of the crisis, lines or groupings of operations may be environmental (for example, air, or maritime), functional (such as, force protection, intelligence, or manoeuvre) or thematic (for example, governance, or security). Environmental lines may be appropriate for bi-polar warfighting; thematic lines may better suit complex crises.

## Sequencing and synchronisation

Sequencing: the arrangement of activities within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.

JDP 0-01 (8<sup>th</sup> Edition)

238. Sequencing is the logical ordering of effects and activities based on their inter-dependencies; that is, effect/activity 'B' is to follow 'A'. Synchronisation addresses time and space; effect/activity 'B' is to occur at a certain time in a specific place that differs from 'A'. Sequencing establishes order and synchronisation establishes feasibility (especially where activities compete for finite resources). Broadly speaking: decisive conditions are

sequenced; supporting effects are sequenced and may be synchronised; activities are sequenced and synchronised. The staff process of sequencing and synchronisation can make a considerable contribution to the successful balancing of ends, ways and means.

## Phases

239. A plan may be expressed in conditions-based phases, characterised by a predominant type of military activity, or a particular set of decisive conditions that bear close relation to one or more campaign objectives. Phasing assists a JTFC to plan his campaign logically; it provides a framework for planning and execution, but should not be seen as prescriptive, over-simplistic or unchangeable.

## Contingency plans

Contingency plan (CONPLAN): A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. The plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options as a basis for subsequent planning.

AAP-06 (Edition 2012, Version 2)

Contingency planning: planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future.

JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

240. Unintended effects (which may be positive or negative) are inevitable and should be planned for. Risk analysis and management (Annex 2H) together with red teaming, wargaming and operational analysis (Annex 2I) identify requirements for contingency plans (CONPLANS). Some activities will have unforeseeable effects; these cannot be planned for in advance, but the possibility that such effects may arise (unexpectedly) requires agility on the part of the JTFC.

241. CONPLANS address both opportunities (which must be seized), and reverses (which must be countered); see Annex 2G for examples. Note the

important difference between CONPLANS and contingency planning. The former are written with clear intent and form part of crisis response planning; the latter are not written with intent, but are an appraisal of potential UK military involvement in future crises that are likely to affect UK interests. Indicators and warnings are an implicit element of contingency planning. A JTFC can execute CONPLANS using elements of his joint force that are already committed, with an attendant opportunity cost, or by using an uncommitted reserve. There are two forms of contingency plan:

- a. A **branch** provides an alternative way (different combination of supporting effects and activity) to achieve a decisive condition within a given phase of the campaign.
- b. A **sequel** provides an alternative option for the next phase of a campaign, based upon the outcome of the preceding phase. The default sequel is the next planned phase, but there may be alternatives, such as the creation of decisive conditions in a different order or sequence.

242. Branches and sequels are usually expressed in terms of alternative, or successive supporting effects, or groups of supporting effects to create decisive conditions in different ways or in different orders. If the situation changes significantly, or an assigned campaign end-state is modified, then a JTFC may also be obliged to consider alternative decisive conditions.

### Campaign fulcrum

The point in a contested campaign where one side starts losing and the other starts winning – where the tide turns and the initiative switches irreversibly.

JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

243. A campaign fulcrum is the point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly; one side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. In practice, reaching a campaign fulcrum is difficult to predict in advance. The very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria,

however, can help to identify opportunities to create the requisite conditions for success.

### **Culminating point**

A military force reaches its culminating point when operations can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage.

JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

244. Making use of the culminating point – either exploiting that of an opponent or responding to that of one’s own force to break a potential deadlock – is intrinsically difficult for two reasons. First, it is often challenging to identify in advance what criteria bring about culmination. During combat, an attacking force culminates when it is unable either to sustain or re-launch an offensive and is limited inexorably to the defence. During stabilisation, a force may culminate if it loses authority. Second, and even if the criteria are known, it is often hard to determine (at the time) when the criteria are met.

Culminating points can be physical or more abstract. Studying historic campaigns, as well as effective and timely assessment, may allow a JTFC to appreciate when and where he should bring his influence to bear. The possibilities are unlimited; it could be through key leader engagement (friendly, adversary or neutral) as much as it might be the timely initiation of a campaign branch or sequel.

245. A JTFC who recognises the imminent culmination of an opponent should act swiftly to exploit the situation and to drive home his advantage against a force that is stalled. If he recognises with sufficient notice his own prospective culmination, then a JTFC may defer or even prevent its onset, by imposing an operational pause, reassigning resources (including his reserve), or executing a relevant contingency plan.

### **Operational pause**

A periodic pause in operations while initiative is retained in other ways.

JDP 0-01 (8<sup>th</sup> Edition)

246. An operational pause can be imposed out of necessity (for example, a change in international mandate) or through choice (for example, to allow time for the orchestration of military and non-military activity, or as part of a deception plan). Although a pause tends to reduce tempo, at least in the short term, it can also provide greater effectiveness and improved tempo later on. Indeed, implicit in the term 'pause' is the ability to re-activate the campaign in order to regain the initiative and re-establish momentum. An operational pause can apply to a whole campaign or to just one line of operation, for example to concentrate effort on another. Therefore, an operational pause should be clearly identified (along with its causes), preferably in advance, and never allowed simply to occur. Regaining the initiative afterwards may require a concerted effort, purposefully planned and clearly directed, to include any necessary reallocation of resources or reassignment of missions and tasks.

## Section 4 – Operational estimate

247. An estimate is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander, faced with an ill-structured problem, decides on a course of action (CoA) to be taken in order to achieve his mission. Commanders at all levels in Defence, and other leaders elsewhere, use estimates of one form or another. They may have different titles (such as appreciation or assessment), and be conducted in different ways, but there is a broad consensus amongst those who adhere to rational planning of the need for formal analysis. In practice, planning is not a strictly linear or sequential process.

248. The estimate described here is designed for a JTFC at the operational level to develop his campaign plan; however, the *principles* apply more widely:

- a. At other levels of planning (such as the higher tactical level).
- b. On multinational operations, subject to the lead or framework nation (JDP 5-00 is consistent with, for example, the thrust of NATO's *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*.<sup>22</sup>)
- c. On multi-agency operations, noting that:

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<sup>22</sup> NATO *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD) interim version 1.0 dated 17 December 2010.

- (1) In most cases, the product of the JTFC's estimate will be a plan for military activity nested within an integrated response.
- (2) The operational estimate is not intended to supplant or subsume other government department planning methodologies (Chapter 3, Supplement 2).

249. An estimate must be command-led; it is the JTFC's decision that the process supports. It encompasses: an understanding of the situation and the problem (both symptoms and underlying causes); ascertaining what it is necessary to achieve and by when; identification of possible courses of action; selection of the optimum course of action; and a decision as to how it should be executed. The format of the estimate, shown in Figure 2.9, is designed to bring order to command-led and staff-assisted planning; a JTFC should view the various steps as depositories for his ideas and findings, rather than as a bureaucratic process.

250. The estimate provides the intellectual underpinning to the commander's insight and vision. It allows both the commander and his staff to think creatively about the achievement of the objectives set. It is enabled by the collective skill, knowledge and experience of the commander and his staff to design and manage the campaign, and to employ military forces. Command-led, the estimate supports the JTFC in developing his theory of change of how the operation will achieve the desired end-state and the information effect that is specified in CDS' Planning and Operational Directives. The theory of change is the commander's big idea of how the operation will change the current conditions to the future desired conditions, and will be guided by the strategic narrative.

251. The theory of change should set out why certain activities are expected to lead, or contribute, to a particular desired outcome from the current conditions; effectively it becomes a 'road-map' to the desired, future condition. A theory of change should:

- a. Identify the overall aim.
- b. Set out the inputs, processes and outputs required to achieve that aim.

- c. Describe the logic that underpins the solution. Effectively it gives an explanation of how and why the proposed actions will change the situation.

252. Although critical for planning and assessment, it is rare for the thinking behind campaign logic to be captured explicitly. Most hypotheses, logical links and assumptions tend to remain undocumented. Yet, recording intervention logic is extremely valuable in campaign/mission planning, and as an enabler for campaign assessment and campaign continuity. Articulating, recording and most importantly critiquing the logic, can reveal hidden assumptions and inconsistencies, and will force planners to think through the purpose and logic of the campaign thoroughly. If left undocumented, different views as to why a series of activities will lead to a desired change will exist, even between members of the same planning team. Misunderstandings between different actors responsible for implementing a plan can also occur, with the higher commander's original intent being diffused. Successor commanders do not always need to develop their own theory of change as this can undermine consistency and continuity. They, and their planners, should first refer back to the original logic to confirm its validity.

253. By the end of step 2, in Figure 2.9, the JTFC must have:

- a. Sufficient understanding of the *true nature* of the operating environment.
- b. Confirmed the *essentials of the military problem*, in terms of the assigned mission, its objectives, information effect and the influence sought: the JTFC's *ends*.
- c. Articulated, in broad order, his *theory of change* from the current conditions to the future desired conditions. This includes his outline operational concept,<sup>23</sup> key themes and messages, and assumptions for the campaign: the JTFC's *ways*.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> The commander will confirm any initial analysis by the staff of campaign planning concepts. Potential phases, lines of operation, decisive conditions and centres of gravity will then be developed into a coherent course of action in step 3 of the estimate.

<sup>24</sup> This may be articulated either verbally, as a draft intent paragraph, or in the form of an effects schematic.

- d. Assessed the *art of the possible*, and articulated any associated risks. In particular he must consider the force's capabilities, resources, sustainability, legitimacy and time and space: the JTFC's *means*.

254. The JTFC's theory of change remains under continuous review. The JTFC must balance the requirement for continuity throughout the planning and execution processes with the need to adapt to the operating environment by reframing the problem or re-designing the solution.<sup>25</sup> Generally the need to conduct a full new estimate is driven by:


- a. A major international, national, host nation or theatre specific event causing a significant change to the operating environment.
- b. Campaign assessment showing a lack of progress.
- c. Key assumptions in the planning process being invalidated.
- d. A scheduled periodic review.

During steps 3 and 4 of the estimate the commander's *theory of change* is formulated, developed and validated into a number of potential courses of action. The courses of action, derived from the commander's *theory of change* and shaped by the narrative, will include potential phases, lines of operation, decisive conditions, supporting effects, communication themes and messages, and centres of gravity. During step 5, alternative courses of action are evaluated for feasibility, likelihood of achieving the operational objectives, and coherence with the narrative; they can then be compared for their relative advantages, disadvantages and associated risks. In step 6 the commander decides on a particular course of action or combination of courses of action that best achieves his *theory of change*. The selected course of action is then translated into a concise statement of the commander's decision – *what* the joint force is to do and why, explaining as appropriate the elements of *when*, *where*, *who* and *how*. This should include a clear articulation of his concept of operations: intent, supporting effects, scheme of manoeuvre, main effort, key themes and messages. Within this must also be the key themes that flow from

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<sup>25</sup> US doctrine draws a distinction between design and planning. In US planning doctrine *design* aids commanders' understanding of the environment and the problem. The US see *design* as an iterative process that complements and primes a planning process that is largely sequential. JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* does not draw such a formal distinction between design and planning as these are complementary and concurrent and the operational estimate encapsulates both design and planning (or command and staff) functions.

the narrative. The purpose of operational design, and the use of narrative, themes and messages, is to establish a dialogue between the tactical level activity and strategy. This is achieved through the commander’s application of the operational art, where tactical execution is framed by strategy but can also feedback to inform its subsequent development. Strategy development may need to be dynamic and iterative.



**Figure 2.9 – Operational estimate as a rational planning process**

## Preparation

255. Mental agility is essential to tackle the realities of carrying out an estimate, which will contain imperfect or incomplete information, in uncertain and changing circumstances, to achieve sometimes ambiguous or ill-defined objectives; all against challenging timelines. Sound preparation, delegation, proven standing operating procedures (SOPs), and concurrent activity at all levels (triggered by timely warning orders) can mitigate some of the friction.

256. **Staff timeline.** The staff timeline, showing what staff actions must be complete by when, is fixed by the time orders and directives need to be conveyed to subordinates. This is different from consideration of time as a factor in the estimate itself, which gives rise to a separate operations timeline. For staffing, the '1/3 - 2/3' rule ensures that sufficient time is allowed for subordinate planning.<sup>26</sup> As a guide, the available planning time (the '1/3') might be allocated:

- a. 30% to understanding the situation and the problem.
- b. 50% to formulating, developing and validating potential courses of action.
- c. 20% to producing and issuing formal direction.

257. **Planning teams.** The size, composition and *modus operandi* of a JTFC's operations planning team should be decided in advance. The team should be trained and practised wherever possible. Human factors research indicates strongly that the composition, experience and degree of collaboration displayed by a planning team is one of the biggest factors determining its ability to plan well. Notwithstanding the dangers of groupthink,<sup>27</sup> the importance of a well practised, efficient planning team is as fundamental as the quality of the information it works with.

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<sup>26</sup> When planning operations with a multinational contribution a 1/4 - 3/4 rule might be considered more appropriate.

<sup>27</sup> JDP 04 *Understanding* describes groupthink as a tendency to adopt majority decisions among group members who are similar in background and share common values.

### **Importance of a cohesive staff team: Command of the German Africa Corps**

In 1940 the Italian Army was defeated by the British in North Africa. Hitler agreed to send a German corps of three divisions to reinforce the Italians. The first element to arrive was Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel's Reconnaissance Staff. The German Army also formed a larger staff, originally called 'General Liaison Staff Italian Army Libya'. It was lead by a highly capable staff officer, Colonel Alfred Gause. Once command relationships had been confirmed, Rommel became commander of 'Panzer Group Africa'. He had the German Africa Corps, the Italian XX Armoured and XXI Infantry Corps under command. Gause became Rommel's Chief of Staff (COS) as COS of Panzer Group (subsequently Panzer Army) Africa.

Before arriving in Libya, Gause's team had spent a month training in Bavaria. They had practiced staff procedures and assessed the situation in Libya in detail. The team was small; 25 officers, including the Political Adviser, but not the attached artillery staff. It contained just four staff trained officers: Gause; Siegfried von Westphal (subsequently Chief of Staff to Rommel, Field Marshal Kesselring, and then Field Marshal von Rundstedt); Friedrich von Mellenthin (subsequently COS of Fifth Panzer Army) and one other. Rommel had not attended staff college. Rommel's staff was extraordinarily efficient. It operated under intense pressure, often with poor intelligence and minimal guidance from its commander. There were probably four factors behind its effectiveness. Firstly, the staff contained very capable individuals. Secondly, it was socially cohesive; the staff all knew each other well. Thirdly, it had trained together before deploying. Finally, and importantly, it had already researched and assessed the situation in North Africa before arrival.


258. **Provision of information and intelligence.** The estimate is command-led but information and intelligence-driven; this presents a dichotomy. It is a JTFC who issues his intelligence requirements during his conduct of the estimate, yet unless the intelligence community correctly anticipate the principal requirements early in the planning process, there is a possibility that they may become detached from it and left behind.

**Practice**

259. The way in which a JTFC conducts an estimate will reflect his own style and preferences. It is a collaborative endeavour, and should exploit expertise drawn from across the headquarters and beyond. Component Commanders (CCs) play a critical part in the process, particularly in the development and validation of courses of action. A range of techniques, illustrated at Annex 2F, is used to support the estimate process:

• Three-column format	• Centre of gravity analysis	• Red-teaming
• Course of action format	• Course of action comparator	• Wargaming
• Analysis format	• Schematics	• Operational analysis
• End-state analysis	• Measures of effect	• Risk analysis

260. **Format.** The three-column format is often used to record the estimate process. It offers a way of ordering the commander’s and staffs’ thought processes, and generates discipline in identifying the outputs of factor analysis. It preserves a written record of the JTFC’s logic, analysis and any key decisions, to use as a subsequent reference point later in the campaign. The audit trail of why things were done the way that they were can help to preserve campaign continuity.




**Figure 2.10 – Three-column format**

### Potential outputs – Three-column format

- Commander's **planning guidance** to his staff, for example, to act upon a particular idea or examine a particular area. A JTFC may use a **focused question** to direct research into a specific issue.
- **Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)** that he deems essential to his decision making and development of the plan.
- Other **information requirements**. Those information requirements that cannot be answered within the headquarters, or by tasking organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, are issued to other headquarters and external organisations as **requests for information (RFIs)**.
- **Constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms** are: imposed on all parties (constraints), self-imposed (restraints) or generated by shortfalls in resources (limitations), as well as providing opportunities (freedoms).
- **Clarification** may be sought on, for example, higher commander's direction.
- Potential **decisive conditions**, and perhaps even initial thoughts on supporting effects, or activities.
- **Risk** identified for analysis and, where necessary, risk management.
- Any **assumptions** on which the plan is based. These should be recorded, along with any implications should they prove incorrect, and responsibilities for monitoring them.

## Section 5 – Conducting the estimate

### Step 1 – Understand the operating environment (framing the problem)



**Figure 2.11 – Step 1 – Understand the operating environment (framing the problem)**

261. While analysis<sup>28</sup> uncovers a range of information, step 1 of the estimate concentrates attention on *framing the commander's problem* in its unique context so that the commander gains sufficient understanding of the true nature of the operating environment. Correct framing of the problem is the essential initiation of the operations planning process; it must not be overlooked. At this stage, engagement with other headquarters and planning bodies should enable the JTFC to understand the concerns of other commanders, and to manage the likelihood and impact of subsequent changes in direction. Such consultation should occur in all three directions: upwards (higher command), sideways (allies and other agencies) and downwards (subordinates).

262. Understanding of the operating environment, including the communications environment,<sup>29</sup> will benefit from an integrated approach involving other government departments and appropriate agencies. These non-military actors will likely have contributed to, and received the output from, analysis. Although there are likely to be a number of considerations mutually applicable to both analysis and step 1, it is important to retain step 1 as a discrete stage in developing a plan. Analysis is an iterative and enduring

<sup>28</sup> Using methodologies that include PEST, PESTLEI, PMESII, STEEPLEM, SWOT, ASCOPE, and others – see Chapter 1, Section 2.


<sup>29</sup> See JDN 1/12 – the context in which strategic communication takes place.

process that requires focus on the precise nature of the crisis, its conditions, circumstances and influences. Focussed analysis in step 1 allows a JTFC to visualise the extent of the problem that he faces, what the current conditions are, the context of the narrative, and how he might shape and alter the environment to his advantage, which will inform his decision making. Similarly it will inform the decisions taken by non-military leaders. This latter point underlines the need for an integrated approach to step 1; it offers the prospects of a more effective comprehensive response to a crisis.

## Step 2 – Understand the problem

263. Having framed the problem, in step 2 the JTFC seeks better to understand it (what are the essentials of the military problem, why, what is his theory of change from the current conditions to the future desired conditions, and what risks are involved). He should also try to anticipate how the problem might change over the course of time and events, and the potential impact on ends, ways and means. The outcome of two parallel and inter-related activities – mission analysis (step 2a – illustrated in Figure 2.12) and object/factor evaluation (step 2b – illustrated in Figure 2.13) – is then articulated by the JTFC as his theory of change as he seeks to confirm a fuller understanding of the problem (step 2c – illustrated in Figure 2.14) prior it being formulated, developed and validated as potential solutions.

### Step 2a – Understand the problem (mission analysis)



**Figure 2.12 – Step 2a – Mission analysis**

264. The JTFC does his own mission analysis, sometimes supported by a commander's planning group, to establish, using four questions, precisely what his mission involves and where it fits into the bigger picture. Though not a final product at this stage, potential decisive conditions and themes and messages may be revealed.


- a. **Question 1.** What is the strategic intent (national, multinational, military, other)? What outcomes are sought, and what objectives are deemed necessary to reach them?
- b. **Question 2.** What is my role? What part do my campaign end-state, objectives and information effect play in the realisation of strategic outcomes? What are the future desired conditions?
- c. **Question 3.** Do I have the freedoms, capability and authority to achieve my campaign end-state and information effect? How does the strategic narrative shape the operation?
- d. **Question 4.** Has the situation changed and, if so, has this affected the overall outcomes sought? Can I make any provision now for how the situation might change in the future?

265. When analysis and assessment indicate a change to the situation, Question 4 is the point at which the estimate is re-entered. The output from Question 4 should be founded on an understanding of *how* the situation has changed, which should deliver new objects and factors for input into a revision of step 2b. Step 2a considers superior command directives (including information strategies and plans); it may also draw upon the declared objectives of military partners and allies, as well as the published intentions of aligned civilian agencies. On completion of his mission analysis, a JTFC should not only understand his mission, but he should also be absolutely clear on his role and that of his joint force within the wider strategic context.

266. Ideally a JTFC will have been given his campaign end-state and the information effect. If not he may have the opportunity to negotiate them in detail with the military strategic commander. While it provides the focus for his military plan, the campaign end-state is not a discrete phenomenon, and the JTFC should explore the relationships between his objectives and those of other actors, to determine inter-dependencies. He should consider how

diplomatic and economic instruments of power, both national and multinational (including international organisations), may contribute to (or unwittingly frustrate) his military campaign, and what requirements may emerge for coordination and/or mutual support. Where there are no formal mechanisms to control a comprehensive response in theatre, a JTFC should take the opportunity at this early stage in his planning to clarify through the chain of command how, for example, supported and supporting relationships are to be managed. As a JTFC comes to appreciate the mission more clearly, it is likely that he will identify potential centres of gravity for subsequent analysis, from which in turn potential decisive conditions may be established.

**Step 2b – Understand the problem (evaluate objects and factors)**



**Figure 2.13 – Step 2b – Evaluate objects and factors**

267. In parallel with mission analysis, a JTFC's staff examine the object(s) on which the mission bears, and other relevant factors. Initially, the staff should address self-evident factors until the JTFC has completed his mission analysis and is able to drive a more applied study. Frequent interaction between those conducting steps 2a (commander) and 2b (staff) will assist tempo and focus.

268. **Objects.** An object is a person, group of people, or things to which a JTFC's action is directed. This may be an opponent, an abstraction of the situation (such as campaign authority), or something physical (in a disaster relief operation this could be the environment). Where the purpose of a

campaign is the defeat of an opponent, then object evaluation should focus on the opponent's capabilities and his likely, or most dangerous, course of action. Multiple opponents should be examined individually and in relation to each other. Object evaluation may help to identify potential centres of gravity.

269. **Factors.** Factors are not arbitrary collections of facts and observations, but judiciously selected issues from which valuable deductions can be drawn and a campaign derived. The JTFC's Chief of Staff has to instil a discipline and drive within the headquarters to focus staff effort on the essentials. The evaluation of factors supplements object evaluation and begins to explore the *art of the possible*. Staff examine circumstances, participants, surroundings and influences within the operating environment, to determine their impact on mission success. While earlier analysis of the situation was intentionally broad, a JTFC should now focus staff effort on specific aspects, facts or conditions, relationships between actors, or the detailed nature of a particular environment,<sup>30</sup> location or resource. Planning factors specific to each component, logistics<sup>31</sup> and information and communication services<sup>32</sup> are critical, and should be thoroughly assessed for strengths and weaknesses.

270. **Command and control.** One factor for detailed consideration is command and control. The mission, size and nature of the force, the extent of collaboration required with other actors, and the preferences of the JTFC are key factors in this aspect of the estimate. They will be used to determine the structure and procedures of a Joint Task Force Headquarters, and its relationships vertically and laterally. The balance between the use of centralised headquarters or more dispersed structures utilising more reach back and fewer forward-deployed personnel, will require careful judgement. Considerations will be enemy activity, human factors, network capacity, bearer security and bandwidth availability. The benefits to command of different

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
<sup>30</sup> Including not only geospatial factors, but also population distribution, industrial and agricultural factors, religious, language and ethnic distribution and centres of cultural importance.

<sup>31</sup> See JDP 4-00 *Logistic Support to Joint Operations*. Logistic planning factors are identified in the *logistics minimum information set*. The key factors are destination, intensity, scale and timings. Destination – what are the likely locations of 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> line and what restrictions are there on strategic lines of communication? Intensity – what is the combat activity profile? Scale - what force elements will be deployed and what is their likely lay-down? Timing – what is the deployment timescale, what is the desired order of arrival and what is the likely duration of the operation?

<sup>32</sup> See JDP 6-00 *CIS Support to Joint Operations*. The information exchange requirement is based on an evaluation of factors that determine the flow of information between organisations participating in and supporting the operation. This requires the identification of: what information the commander needs, in what timeframe (real-time, near real-time or higher latency); how is it presented, to what level of depth or detail, how accurate does it need to be; and who does it need to be shared with (for example, multinational, host nation, or other government departments)? This provides the foundation for developing the required information and communications services architecture and eventual network design.

options will also need to be set against the benefits to be realised in other areas such as force protection, sustainment and exposure to risk.

**Step 2c – Understand the problem (commander’s confirmation)**




**Figure 2.14 – Step 2c – Commander’s confirmation**

271. Step 2c provides the JTFC with an important opportunity to consolidate the results of his analysis (of the mission) and that of his staff (concerning objects and factors), out of which numerous deductions may have emerged (regarding potential centres of gravity and other campaign planning concepts). He should be seeking to confirm: his campaign objectives and end-state (including their relationship to strategic intent); the centre(s) of gravity; the decisive conditions underpinning each objective, which will form the major building blocks of his campaign; the key objects of the campaign, together with those factors that will provide the freedom and constraints for how the joint force and other agencies might influence each object; his key themes and messages; and any factors that impact on the completion of the remainder of the planning process (time, events and so forth). This process could take the form of a cross brief between the command group and the staff culminating in a summary from the JTFC. All this could be usefully summarised as an authoritative record of the output, recording the analysis informing the commander’s theory of change.

272. The completion of step 2 marks the point at which a JTFC assesses that he has sufficient knowledge and information to develop one or more campaign theories of change. He will understand the operating environment, and the *ways* in which he might address the essentials of the military problem. His *ends* are confirmed; his *means* may still be open to negotiation, although he will have a reasonable idea of the constraints in place. At this point he may consider it appropriate to issue a warning order to include the main deductions from planning to date.

### Step 3 – Formulate potential courses of action




**Figure 2.15 – Step 3 – Formulate potential courses of action**

273. In step 3 a JTFC formulates and develops his campaign theory or theories of change. He may, for example, use outline campaign schematics to show the desired outcome, strategic objectives, campaign end-state (and objectives), operational centre(s) of gravity, key themes and messages and various options for decisive conditions. Possible lines or groupings of operation, phases and other campaign planning concepts may also become apparent (different ways of depicting these concepts are shown at Annex 2G). Derived from the JTFC's theory of change and shaped by the narrative, the outcome should be one or more alternative ideas, articulated as distinct concepts of operations (CONOPS) showing *what* has to be achieved in order to reach the campaign end-state. Step 4, the development and validation of alternative courses of action, addresses in detail *how* each concept might be put into practice. In an integrated approach, this is where competing theories of change can be compared and weighed against each other.

274. Unless a JTFC decides there is only one solution to achieving his mission, he is likely to develop a number of potential outline courses of action based on different combinations or sequencing of decisive conditions. The creation of decisive conditions (*all* of them and *only* them) should, by definition, achieve his campaign objectives and, hence, his campaign end-state. The outline courses of action should be distinct from, but consistent with, each other. In order to be practical, and thereby credible, they should also take due account of the various freedoms and constraints identified earlier in the estimate process.

275. Options may be required for an opponent’s worst and most likely courses of action. Potential courses of action may describe wholly different ways of conducting the campaign; a JTFC may, therefore, wish to consult the military strategic commander to ensure consistency with the broader strategic intent. While the desired outcome is always paramount, the ways and means of reaching it (or the military contribution to reaching it) may also influence events in the longer term. Where the outcome is equivocal, for example an uncertain impact on otherwise steady-state geopolitical relations, then the manner in which a campaign is conducted (and perceived to be conducted by others) may be significant. A JTFC’s theory (or theories) of change, normally expressed as outline concepts, stimulate step 4. He may also express direction and guidance for developing supporting effects and activities.

**Step 4 – Develop and validate courses of action**



**Figure 2.16 – Step 4 – Develop and validate courses of action**

276. In step 4 (illustrated in Figure 2.16) staff develop the JTFC's outline concepts. Potential courses of action, previously described in step 3, are transformed into detailed *alternative* courses of action each of which meets the 'feasibility, acceptability, completeness, exclusivity and suitability (FACES) test'. These criteria are:

- a. **Feasibility.** Is the course of action possible given the time, space and resources likely to be available, and the operating environment?
- b. **Acceptability.** Are the likely achievements from the course of action worth the expected costs in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, casualties suffered and levels of risk?
- c. **Completeness.** Is the course of action complete? Does it answer the *when, who, what, why* and *how* questions?
- d. **Exclusivity.** Is the course of action sufficiently varied from other courses of action to clearly differentiate its comparative advantages and disadvantages?
- e. **Suitability.** Does the course of action accomplish the mission and comply with the planning guidance?

277. Different combinations of decisive conditions (the *what*), supporting effects and activities (the *how*) provide the foundation for each alternative course of action – see Figure 2.17.




Figure 2.17 – Generating alternative courses of action

278. **Course of action development.** The development of each course of action should be an iterative process. Subordinate commanders must be engaged; subject to operations security (OPSEC) constraints, so too should those other government departments and agencies engaged in an integrated response. The relationships between decisive conditions, supporting effects and activities, resources, time and space are examined taking account of the likely actions, reactions and influences of the enemy, opponents or other actors. Inclusion of the JTFC's guidance on deception is important.

279. **Course of action validation.** Red teaming, wargaming and operational analysis offer significant value to this step. Risks, notably those resulting from limitations on resources and capabilities, should be captured and incorporated into each course of action.

280. **Course of action description.** Courses of action should be described clearly and in detail for two reasons: first, to enable effective evaluation (in step 5) and second, to facilitate subsequent contingency planning (where an alternative course of action, or part of one, provides a potential branch or sequel). A developed course of action should include:


- a summary of the strategic context – national strategic aim, national strategic objectives, military strategic objectives and the military strategic commander's intent;
- the campaign end-state and the information effect, described as the JTF's mission and campaign objectives;
- the JTFC's theory of change;
- the strategic narrative and the JTFC's key themes and messages;
- identified centre(s) of gravity;
- the intentions of other government departments and other agencies;
- assumptions (including those subject to any outstanding commanders critical information requirements);
- key constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms;

- the JTFC’s concept of operations: intent, supporting effects, scheme of manoeuvre, main effort and key themes and messages;
- risks; and
- the associated command and control requirements.

281. **Course of action tools and techniques.** A JTFC’s staff will employ tools and techniques, in accordance with their respective headquarters’ standard operating procedures, to articulate each course of action.

- Campaign schematics – see Appendix 2G2.
- Decisive condition/supporting effect tables – see Appendix 2G3. (Initial measures of effect may also be formulated at this stage – see Section 7).
- Effects schematics – see Appendix 2G4.
- Joint action tables – see Appendix 2G5. (Initial measurements of activity (MOAs) may also be formulated at this stage – see Section 7).
- Joint action schematics – see Appendix 2G6.
- Joint action synchronisation matrices – see Appendix 2G7.

**Step 5 – Evaluate courses of actions**




**Figure 2.18 – Step 5 – Evaluate courses of action**

282. During step 5 (illustrated in Figure 2.18), alternative courses of action are evaluated for feasibility and likelihood of achieving the specified operational objectives and coherence with the narrative (this may also lead to their refinement). They are then compared for their relative advantages, disadvantages and associated risks. Courses of action may also be compared against specific criteria, such as the principles of war or the operational framework. A JTFC may develop his own questions, based on his understanding of the situation, experience and judgement. It is important to identify and assess risks at this stage, as these may indicate important strengths and weaknesses of particular courses of action (see Annex 2H). Where appropriate, each course of action may be assessed and compared against an opponent's most likely and most dangerous courses of action using, for example, comparative wargaming and operational analysis (Annex 2I).

283. A key aspect of course of action comparison is campaign effectiveness assessment (CEA) and measures of effect. In selecting a course of action, a JTFC will need to be confident that his plan can be subject to assessment. Progress towards decisive conditions and measuring supporting effects is important, albeit a means to an end and not an industry in its own right. Furthermore, it is the 2<sup>nd</sup>/3<sup>rd</sup> order effects, difficult to predict with any degree of certainty and likewise difficult to measure, that may become decisive as the campaign unfolds. This does not preclude the selection of supporting effects and activities that are difficult to measure; it could be, however, a factor in course of action selection. This is a complex but essential aspect of campaign design; it must be incorporated into the operational estimate using sound military judgement and not pseudo-science. Step 5 concludes with the assessment of each validated course of action being presented to the JTFC. In order to make an appropriate selection, it is important that the JTFC understands the assumptions and risks associated with each course of action, as well as the proposed ways and means of achieving (and assessing the achievement of) success.

## Step 6 – Commander’s decision



**Figure 2.19 – Step 6 – Commander’s decision**

284. A JTFC decides upon a particular course of action, or a combination of viable courses of action, and confirms his proposed way ahead with his military strategic commander. The timing of this decision may be explicitly linked to political and cross-governmental deliberations. The selected course of action is then translated into a concise statement of the JTFC’s decision – *what* the joint force is to do and *why*, explaining as appropriate the elements of *when*, *where*, *who* and *how*. A JTFC writes his own concept of operations (CONOPS) (intent, messages, supporting effects, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort) and subordinate mission statements, which may then be disseminated immediately as a warning order. His staff focus on the production of supporting detail for the requisite directives, plans (including operation plans (OPLANs) and contingency plans (CONPLANs)) and orders (including operation orders (OPORDs)). This should include a clear articulation of his concept of operations: within this must also be the key themes and messages that flow from the narrative.

285. The translation of the selected course of action into actionable orders can occur in different ways, depending upon the scale and complexity of the campaign. The initial campaign plan may be immediately actionable, the requisite level of detail (down to component-level missions and tasks) and assurance having been achieved during steps 3, 4 and 5. Alternatively, in more complex situations, a JTFC may direct that a specific OPLAN be developed to action the first phase of his campaign. Steps 3 to 5 would then enable him to generate detailed alternative courses of action and a decision regarding his immediate actions. However, despite the detail that can be

derived even at this stage of planning, a campaign plan is in essence broad direction for a large number of actors and it must never lose its clarity in its subsequent articulation.

286. Courses of action pertinent to the detailed planning of a particular campaign phase (i.e. subject to an OPLAN, for subsequent inclusion within an OPORD), should include:

- a clear description of the period/stage/phase within the wider campaign that is being considered;
- an outline mission and accompanying purpose for the joint task force for this period/stage/phase;
- a concept of operations (CONOPS), supported by effects schematics, to include: intent, supporting effects, scheme of manoeuvre, main effort and key themes and messages;
- component mission statements of task and purpose;
- risks; and
- further information that may, for example, relate to command and control structures, task organisation, supported and supporting relationships, deployment, time and space, logistics concepts and operational-level reserves.

A JTFC's selected course of action can only be implemented successfully if it is communicated clearly and unequivocally to his subordinates. Written direction may be supplemented by mission rehearsals, orders groups, briefs and back-briefs.

## **Section 6 – Campaign planning products**

287. The operational estimate is the principal tool of campaign design; it acts as the foundation for subsequent campaign management. Once initial planning is complete, the campaign plan provides both an expression of campaign design and the means by which it is managed. Campaign management involves actionable directives and orders, the orchestration of capabilities and activities, and the assessment of progress. In much the same

way that an operational estimate is kept under continual or at least periodic review, so too is a campaign plan. Throughout the estimate process a JTFC issues warning orders to the joint force.

## Warning orders

288. Warning orders indicate commander's intent to subordinates, who can then contribute to higher level planning and conduct their own informed planning. A JTFC should strike a balance between providing too little information too late, and inundating subordinates with a succession of evolving, but potentially contradictory, directions. There is no prescribed format; warning orders are likely to become progressively more definitive as the planning process progresses.

## Campaign plan

289. A JTFC should have a single plan, albeit this may be nested within a broader integrated approach, including:

- Analysis of the background to the crisis, as well as its causes, and any assumptions and limitations upon which planning is based.
- The mission and CONOPS.
- The assignment of force elements between components and prioritisation of logistic effort.
- Command and control (C2) and liaison arrangements for the joint force, and arrangements for comprehensive, inter-agency coordination.

290. **Directives, plans and orders.** The campaign plan is more likely to be conveyed in a series of documents rather than just one.

- a. A **campaign directive** produced by J5 provides the joint force mission, and the JTFC's campaign CONOPS. A representative format is at Annex 2J.
- b. An **OPLAN** produced by J5 provides the detailed CONOPS for the near-term phase(s) of a campaign. It provides increased resolution and precision on selected aspects of the overall campaign. An OPLAN

can trigger force preparation and the detailed synchronisation of activities (information activities, fires, manoeuvre and outreach) between subordinate commands and other agencies. The development of an OPLAN should identify any requirement for subsequent contingency plans (CONPLANS). A representative format is at Annex 2K.

c. An **OPORD** is produced by J3 future operations (J35), in collaboration with component commanders and, where appropriate, other government departments, other agencies and partners. It provides detailed direction and authorisation for the execution of a phase, period or stage of a campaign, or a specific operation.

(1) Each OPORD is derived from an OPLAN (or CONPLAN) and includes: component missions and tasks (with associated purposes directly related to supporting effects); and a comprehensive CONOPS. A representative format is at Annex 2L.

(2) A fragmentary order (FRAGO) is produced by J3 current operations (J33) to achieve a specific purpose. Each one is related to and serves to amend a particular OPORD; a FRAGO cannot stand in isolation. An OPORD may remain extant for several weeks, or even months, during which time a series of FRAGOs may be issued to refine and alter it to address emerging issues and challenges.

d. A **Force instructions document** (FID) provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the joint force; it complements the campaign directive, and subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs. A representative format is at Annex 2M.

291. **Concept of operations.** The JTFC's CONOPS is the most important aspect of his campaign plan; it provides an enduring reference point to which subordinates can refer in order to confirm their understanding of commander's intent and to orientate themselves to their role in his overall scheme. In setting out his vision to subordinates, a JTFC should also indicate to them what lies ahead, including the likely nature and scope of subsequent orders and plans. Clarity is vital. As a guide, a JTFC's CONOPS should run to no more than a side or two of A4 paper. While a JTFC should have engaged with his superior

commander throughout the planning process, he may nonetheless wish to confirm his proposed concept prior to promulgation, giving him an opportunity to endorse the plan formally and, if necessary, obtain political approval. A JTFC's CONOPS is described at various levels: campaign directive (the *what*), OPLAN (the *how*) and OPORD (*task and purpose*). Each should include:

- a. **Commander's intent.** This is a concise and precise statement of how a JTFC intends to achieve his assigned campaign end-state. It should demonstrate the enduring logic underlying the campaign. A JTFC can usefully reinforce his intent by re-stating it on each occasion that he provides direction to his subordinates. Commander's intent should be broadly enduring, unless there is a significant change to the situation or the mission.
- b. **Supporting effects.** The JTFC will articulate the intended consequences of his actions; these are derived through the analysis of decisive conditions and are measurable, either directly or indirectly.

### **Commander's intent – US Marines in Iraq 2003**

1 Marine Expeditionary Force history indicates that US Marines in 2003 fought by widely understood commander's intent; a statement that reflected the commander's personality, intuition and sense of purpose, which was delivered to every marine and sailor in the Division. General Conway and his subordinates made distinct efforts to communicate their intent in person, wherever possible to every member of their command. Conway generally stayed forward to keep his finger on the operational pulse, but also to communicate directly. General Mattis worked similarly, but where he could not communicate directly, he also exploited daily postings on the Division's classified website. Short, plain English messages, one or two pages long, outlined the situation as Mattis saw it and the messages stated unequivocally what he intended to accomplish. Many officers began their day by reviewing the website. They felt properly empowered and the headquarters was efficient. Staff had a clear appreciation of how their commanders were thinking and, crucially, what they wanted to achieve.

c. **Scheme of manoeuvre.** A scheme of manoeuvre describes how a JTFC sees his campaign unfolding; it sets the missions assigned to subordinate component commanders in a broader (and potentially multi-agency and multinational) context. It explains where, when and how the joint force is to achieve its purpose, so that subordinate commanders can understand their role in the overall plan.

d. **Main effort.** A JTFC declares his main effort to direct the concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. Main effort indicates what a JTFC considers to be crucial to the success of his campaign. This is given substance in a variety of ways:

- (1) Additional resources may be allocated to the component assigned to the main effort.
- (2) Other components may be assigned specific tasks to support the main effort either directly or indirectly.
- (3) Other steps may be taken, such as the changing of boundaries or economy of effort elsewhere, to concentrate fighting power.

e. **Subordinates priorities.** Cognisant of the JTFC's main effort and priorities, subordinates can use their initiative to take timely and independent decisions and action, thereby optimising tempo. A subordinate commander may declare his own main effort to support that of the JTFC.

f. **Key themes and messages.** The key themes are the key ideas in the JTFC's concept or intention that have been derived from the narrative. They are designed for broad communication across all target audiences and explain the overarching operations plan. They are supported by messages that are more narrowly focussed on specific target audiences.

292. **Mission statements.** A JTFC should write a mission – a clear concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose – for each of his subordinate commanders. There are three broad types of mission statement: single task; multiple task; and (usually for reserves) a list of contingent or *be prepared to* tasks.

- a. Each mission statement contains task, purpose, and unifying purpose (the *in order to* or effect required in relation to the CONOPS). Subordinates' freedom of action and scope for initiative is made clear.
- b. The sum of the purposes, of all the JTFC's mission statements, covers all the scheme of manoeuvre (otherwise some aspect has been left unresourced).
- c. Mission statements are expressed precisely and unequivocally, using defined language. This is particularly important in multinational operations, where orders are translated, and in multi-agency situations where military terminology has to be interpreted.
- d. Abbreviations and jargon should be omitted.

293. **Missions for reserves.** A JTFC should distinguish between his reserve and echelon forces. Echelon forces are those that, while not committed initially, have an explicit role in the plan; they have a given mission. Reserve forces are uncommitted in the plan but retained to deal with unforeseen circumstances, to exploit unexpected success or guard against setbacks. They should be given planning tasks or options, rather than a mission within the plan. Once committed, they should be given a specific mission; and a further reserve generated.

## **Section 7 – Planning throughout the campaign**

294. A campaign plan should be kept under review throughout its execution. This may be done by dedicated staff on a continuous basis or by a bespoke group or forum on a periodic basis. In either event, the JTFC will wish to appraise campaign progress formally with a frequency that matches the tempo of his operations and meets the reporting requirements of superior commanders (i.e. dictated by the strategic level battle rhythm).

### **Plans that survive first contact**

Moltke the Elder wrote that 'no plan of action reaches with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main force'. Yet military planners have continued to try to plan in detail for events beyond first contact, and continued to be unsuccessful. War and conflict are inherently complex and unpredictable. The unpredictability increases as an adversary reacts to the situation. Successful armed forces tend to show the same pattern: they stop planning in detail; they do not expect the enemy to behave in a given way; and their orders become significantly shorter.

The US VII Corps landed in France on D-Day in June 1944. It and one of its divisions (9<sup>th</sup> Infantry) then fought continuously for several months. An analysis of its orders and records show this pattern. However, they also show how the two headquarters coped with the complexity and uncertainty of war.

Corps headquarters assessed and analysed the situation continuously. It produced periodic assessments roughly every second day. By September 1944 it and its divisions had a good working knowledge of the situation. Divisional staff also assessed and analysed the situation. At times, Divisional assessments varied from the Corps'; any such variance was noted and explored. These assessments were independent of orders and contained no estimation of the enemy's likely or most dangerous courses of action. They merely listed the enemy's capabilities and the courses of action open to him. Attempting rigidly to predict a course of action had left staffs unprepared when the enemy did something else.

As a result, the orders which the Corps/Division produced were not documents to be scrutinised and analysed. The deep analysis had already been done. Instead they were just a page or two of concise instructions. A Corps or Divisional operation order was typically two pages long, with a few annexes.

VII Corps and 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division fought a highly competent enemy, but were generally successful. They did not win every battle and engagement. They had, however, learned that long and detailed orders simply did not work. In such cases, failure was often written into the plan: it did not arise out of the situation or the enemy. The key to the production of short, timely and above all effective orders was the continuous assessment and analysis which their staffs conducted.

## Rationale for assessment

295. A JTFC reviews and adjusts his initial planning based upon the results of assessment, designed to: evaluate the execution of activities by the joint force, the effectiveness of those activities, and whether the situation is developing favourably. On this basis, he adjusts his plans and issues further direction. Assessment is covered in more detail in JDP 3-00, but it is also an important aspect of planning; assessment cannot be left as an adjunct or after-thought to the campaign plan. Defining the nature of success, and judging progress towards it, is a fundamental stage in any decision-action cycle. Reasons why judgements on the design of an assessment regime are important aspects of campaign planning include:

- a. **Validity of tasking.** Determining how or whether the creation of particular conditions and effects can be measured may dictate whether aspirations can be translated into actionable objectives. A JTFC should avoid tasking a subordinate to act in order to achieve an effect that is ill-defined or so imprecise that he cannot know when or whether he has succeeded.
- b. **Decision making.** Adversaries are invariably adaptive, and a JTFC should expect to adjust his plan as events unfold. In order that this process of iterative decision making can have some structure, he needs to have an idea of what information is required by when. This will help the JTFC to anticipate rather than respond to events.
- c. **Practicality of assessment.** Finally, a JTFC needs to plan *for* assessment. There is a significant difference between recognising the potential benefits of assessment and designing and implementing a practical means of realising those benefits, within time constraints, staff resources and information available. In seeking the most efficient solution, a JTFC should consider:
  - (1) The minimum requirement for assessment, weighing up the need to inform short-term decisions (principally regarding activities and current supporting effects) and to gather longer term trend information to inform broader aspects of his campaign (such as the achievement of the more fundamental decisive conditions).

(2) Not everything can be assessed all the time, but a JTFC should be alert to the possibility of fruitless activity, wasting time and resources for no apparent effect, or even being counter-productive. Assessment contributes to the maintenance of the aim; lack of assessment undermines economy of effort.

### **Conduct of assessment**



296. Assessment performs three functions: *measurement of activity*, the assessment of the performance of a task and its associated purpose; *measurement of effectiveness*, the assessment of the realisation of specified effects; and *campaign effectiveness assessment*, the evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision making. Guidance on the derivation of appropriate measures, and the gathering of evidence, is contained in JDP 3-00.

297. Assessment is a means to inform decisions rather than being an end in itself. It draws upon military judgement to interpret events and to make sense of data. It is not a precise science. While assessment should draw upon a range of expertise and techniques, ideally from both within and outside the headquarters, an appropriate balance should be maintained between art and science, between subjective and objective factors. If possible, a JTFC should meet the requirement in an integrated approach to have an assessment process that brings together the various agencies.

298. A JTFC should be clear about what assessment can do for him; not least because its utility will influence the priority and resources afforded to it. Active assessment can be a potential force multiplier, enabling the most effective use of time and resources, but it may also be a prerequisite for success (or at the very least enable a JTFC to ascertain what remains to be done). Identification of a JTFC's measures of campaign progress and eventual success must therefore be an integral element of campaign design. Assessment – both *what* to measure and *how* to measure it – should be incorporated (and kept under review) as part of the estimate process.

## **Iterative planning**

299. Figure 2.20 provides an illustrative campaign rhythm, whereby a JTFC can draw upon assessment to inform his decision-making, develop successive plans, and disseminate orders. This process is enacted through a series of boards and meetings. In a UK Joint Task Force Headquarters, they include: the Joint Force Planning Group (JFPG); Operational Planning Teams (OPTs); the Joint Coordination Board (JCB); and Joint Effects Meetings (JEMs) (see JDP 3-00). It is crucial that a JTFC does not get tunnel vision when considering the detail of an assessment process. While retaining an ability to put important detail quickly in its correct context, he must principally stand back and identify the major movements and trends, avoiding the temptation to micro-manage all detail. In considering the outputs of the process illustrated at Figure 2.20, he should focus on the shaded areas, namely the near term decisive conditions, which will indicate whether the campaign is travelling in the right direction on the right road, without trying to determine which lane he is manoeuvring within. A key insight will always be who has the initiative and whether an enemy is adapting to events faster than the JTFC.



Legend	
CoG	Centre(s) of gravity
DC	Decisive condition
MOE	Measurement of effectiveness
SE	Supporting effect
▽	Branch
○	Sequel

1. A JTFC may review campaign progress on a rolling basis. Each review cycle begins with the selection of those decisive conditions and supporting effects potentially relevant to the next phase of the campaign (1a). Plans are then developed to achieve them (1b), and orders issued for the conduct of operations (1c). Thereafter, associated measurement of effectiveness and, where appropriate, measurements of activity indicate how that phase of the campaign is progressing, informing future decisions (1d) – to continue as planned, or plan a variation.

2. A JTFC may seek to create and maintain some conditions, such as cumulative effects upon one or more actors' will and/or understanding, over an extended period. Consequently, plans and orders may be developed, alongside the approach described above (1), to cover discrete aspects of the campaign (for example, relating to activities that endure between phases). Relevant measures of effect need to be both sophisticated and persistent, to generate accurate and credible information.
3. On occasions, individuals or supporting effects may merit specific assessment; for example, effects sought on an opponent's physical capability through high tempo, often largely lethal, means.

### **Figure 2.3 – Objectives and end-states**

#### **Maintaining agility and initiative**

2100. The key tenets of a campaign plan – the JTFC's intent, campaign end-state (and objectives), centre(s) of gravity and associated decisive conditions – are likely to endure, subject to changes in policy and/or strategy. Campaign effectiveness analysis provides an opportunity to review their validity, and reaffirm or adjust as necessary. Meanwhile, the scheme of manoeuvre (including supporting effects and planned activities) and main effort are likely to be refreshed more frequently as the campaign progresses and the JTFC seeks to maintain the initiative. The operational estimate, and the audit trail of decisions made in the past, provides the framework for subsequent adjustment.

2101. 'Failing to plan is planning to fail' may be true, but a JTFC will use his judgement to decide how much planning is required in what level of detail. In multi-faceted crises, it may be counter-productive to over-regulate what is inherently complex and uncertain. JDP 01 describes some of the risks associated with reverse engineering success, based upon unrealistic assumptions of causality and predictability (including the compliance of other actors). Placing absolute faith in pre-determined and closely sequenced plans is unlikely to prove successful against an agile opponent. A JTFC should maintain a balance between proactive contingency planning and timely adaptation to unforeseen events. Assessment-led decision making and adaptive planning is underpinned by a mindset that seeks to exploit

opportunities and reverse set-backs; the essence of mission command and the manoeuvrist approach. The flair and imagination of a JTFC, coupled with a profound understanding of the situation, are core attributes of an operational-level commander. A JTFC should encourage initiative amongst his staff, such that opportunities to exploit unexpected changes in the situation are not overlooked or ruled out. Recognising how a situation is changing, identifying the implications, and exploiting the opportunities as they arise, is the key to campaign success.

## Section 8 – Campaign continuity

‘We don’t have twelve years’ experience in Vietnam. We have one year’s experience twelve times over.’

John Paul Vann<sup>33</sup>

### The problem

2102. The relative importance of the principles of war<sup>34</sup> vary according to context. For enduring campaigns commanders should give special consideration to *selection and maintenance of the aim* and *economy of effort*. Selection and maintenance of the aim, the cardinal principle of war, provides the focus for coordinated effort and a reference point against which to gauge progress. The single aim selected should deliver unity of purpose across subordinate operations. Economy of effort guides the commander in the use of manpower, material and time in relation to achievement of his objectives. It is best expressed as *the right tools, in the right place, at the right time, leading to the right result*.<sup>35</sup> In practice, uncertainty, inadequate understanding of a situation, politics, individual personalities, force structures and equipment, tour rotations and staff turnover all generate risk against these principles. This risk is further exacerbated in multinational and multi-agency operations by different national and departmental ambitions and perspectives.

<sup>33</sup> *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, by Neil Sheehan, New York 1988, Random House.

<sup>34</sup> JDP 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition) page 2-3.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

## **Campaign continuity**

2103. Campaign continuity seeks to mitigate these risks. It is defined as the combination of strategy, campaign planning, force generation and training to deliver sustained, consistent and efficient campaign effort, and deploy effective capability in-theatre in order to achieve campaign objectives. Campaign continuity seeks to build and deliver operational effectiveness to support the achievement of national, host nation and coalition strategic objectives (ends) throughout the campaign. This is achieved by: generating continuity of strategic purpose and command; generating understanding through developing operations and environmental knowledge; effective force preparation; ensuring a consistent approach and appropriate structures; enabling the delivery of coherent effects over an extended period; and sustainment of the campaign in the most efficient and effective manner. Over time this minimises the negative effects of formation and unit tour rotation, staff or equipment turnover and operational procurement (ways). Campaign continuity is delivered by a combination of institutional agility, and organisational leadership. These must be enacted across all defence lines of development, but in particular doctrine, personnel, equipment, training and financial resources. Campaign continuity may also include resources committed both in-theatre and those committed out of theatre as part of the direct, prepare and sustain effort (means).

## **Command requirements**

2104. Commanders should consider the threats to campaign continuity during the planning process. Measures to mitigate the risks should be built into campaign design and management, operational plans and their execution. Commanders must provide clear military advice that informs the political decisions regarding the conditions on the ground and the feasibility of achieving the political aim given the military means available. Commanders will also need to balance organisational agility with durability within the force in order to maintain operational effectiveness.

2105. On enduring operations commanders should appreciate that their period of command covers only a proportion of a longer campaign; one that cannot be broken down into discrete six to 12 month segments. Successful command in an enduring campaign should be judged in the longer term, and a

degree of humility, collective rather than self-interest, and an understanding of the purpose and context for individual contributions is required. It should not be routinely necessary to re-design a campaign, operation or even tactical actions every time commanders and staffs change over or troops are relieved. Commanders must understand not just the output but also the original thought process that led to plans they inherit. This requires that assumptions and decisions that shaped the planning process be recorded to allow subsequent reviews to take place. Campaign continuity does not imply that changes of the operational concept, tactics, techniques or procedures should be avoided; not adapting to realities of the operation is likely to result in defeat. Whilst reviews and adaptation are crucial tools for the commander to retain or gain the initiative, they must be planned and based on the commander's understanding of the wider operational context. This ensures that any adjustments are coherent with overall campaign progression.

2106. In a short campaign the most effective method for harmonising national and multinational aims, intents and chains of command is likely to be by appointing a Senior British Military Representative or Adviser (SBMR or SBMA). In many cases this will be in addition to the tactical formation commander. In an enduring campaign the requirements of continuity and consistency are likely to be met most effectively by appointing a National Contingent Commander; with clear divisions of responsibilities between the National Contingent Commander, PJHQ and MOD.

## **Headquarters**

2107. Headquarters structures can support campaign continuity. In an enduring operation the establishment of a campaign headquarters within the theatre of operation is usually desirable, but must be conditions based. The relative merits of a campaign headquarters must be judged against the intensity of operations, the phase of the campaign and whether the headquarters is managing a specific geographical area rather than being engaged in continuous manoeuvre. A principal advantage of a campaign headquarters is that it enables the development of a deep understanding of the operating environment, adversaries and partners. If this understanding<sup>36</sup> and intelligence is fused and synthesised, operations become more coherent and training for operations can be tailored in a more consistent way. However,

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<sup>36</sup> See JDP 04 *Understanding*.

these structures can take time to develop, are difficult to establish in a non-permissive environment, and are dependent on a clear political appreciation of the likely longevity of a campaign. In less permissive environments, or without agreement on the enduring nature of a campaign, headquarters can be drawn on a rotational basis from standing deployable formations. This requires individuals and units to understand their place in, and contribution to, the overall campaign. To achieve this, consideration must be given to: the lessons process; intelligence sharing;<sup>37</sup> availability of classified communication systems; information management and exploitation;<sup>38</sup> doctrine; pre-deployment training; the use of continuity appointments; reconnaissance; and the conduct of the relief-in-place.

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<sup>37</sup> See JDP 2-00 *Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

<sup>38</sup> See JDP 6-00 *CIS Support to Joint Operations*.

## **Annex 2A – Political/military interface and defence crisis management**

### **Cross-government crisis management**

‘The first change was to make sure the Government takes decisions properly. That is why we set up a National Security Council on the very first day of the new Government, and appointed a National Security Adviser. The National Security Council brings together key Ministers, and military and intelligence chiefs. It meets weekly and is driving a culture of change in Whitehall, placing a powerful structure right at the heart of government to make sure our limited resources are deployed to best effect. It has already made a significant impact, giving clear direction to our huge national commitment in Afghanistan’.

The National Security Strategy –  
A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty  
October 2010

**This content of this Annex is extracted from *The New Operating Model – How Defence Works Version 3.0* dated December 2012 produced by the MoD’s Transformation Defence Reform Team.<sup>1</sup>**

### **National Security Council**

2A1. The National Security Council (NSC) is the main forum for collective discussion of the Government’s national security objectives and of how best to deliver them. It integrates at the highest level the work of the departments of state and other arms of Government contributing to national security. The NSC meets weekly and is chaired by the Prime Minister. It brings together all of the senior Ministers with an interest in national security, including the Secretary of State for Defence (SofS). As the Government’s principal military adviser, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) attends as required. The NSC is supported by NSC (Officials), chaired by the National Security Adviser.

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<sup>1</sup> The *New Operating Model* Version 3.0 December 2012 is available through the defence intranet at: <http://defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/Policy/HowDefenceWorks/Pages/HowDefenceWorks.aspx>. and through the internet at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-new-operating-model-how-defence-works>.

2A2. The Prime Minister and NSC, advised where appropriate by the MOD, set the strategic and political priorities and the requirements and direction for Defence and security, which include:

- a. **Developing and implementing the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)**, which together set the Government's national security priorities and determine how they will be delivered – including identifying the contribution the Government may ask Defence and the Armed Forces to make;
- b. **Providing strategic direction to overseas operations**, including the political decision to commit the Armed Forces to operations overseas.

### **The conduct of operations**

2A3. The decision to commit the Armed Forces to operations rests with the Prime Minister, informed by the Cabinet and NSC and advice from the Secretary of State and CDS as the Government's principal military adviser. Military Operations within the UK additionally require formal authorisation by the Defence Council. The Secretary of State is a member of the Cabinet and NSC and chairs the Defence Council. As the Government's military advisor CDS provides military advice to the Cabinet and NSC as required.

2A4. The Secretary of State is responsible for the direction and conduct of all operations and is accountable to Parliament for their resourcing. In particular, he provides strategic direction, endorses the allocation of resources and sets the constraints on the use of force. Force levels and rules of engagement are subject to policy decisions that will be made by Ministers, taking into account legal advice: these decisions will be recorded in the Chief of Defence Staff's Directive.

2A5. CDS, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) are responsible for the provision of sound and timely advice to Ministers to inform these decisions. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), which coordinates input from the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, Head Office, Joint Forces Command, Permanent Joint

Headquarters, Director Special Forces and the Service Commands, is the focus for the provision of Defence advice within the Government's overall management and resolution of crises. It provides the conduit for all briefing to Ministers and for the dissemination of strategic direction to the operational level of command.

2A6. Following Secretary of State's direction, CDS as the military strategic commander is responsible for the planning, direction and conduct of all military operations. PUS provides policy advice to Ministers on current and potential operations. CDS, advised by VCDS (his deputy for operational matters) and the Service Chiefs, is responsible for the formulation of the military strategy and its coherence with Government policy. Through a CDS Directive, he:

- appoints the operational commander;
- provides strategic direction;
- identifies the military conditions for success;
- designates the theatre and joint operations area;
- specifies forces levels and resources;
- promulgates the constraints on the use of force; and
- sets the strategic intelligence requirements.

2A7. Both individually, and through the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Service Chiefs provide professional advice to CDS on the conduct of current and future operations, in particular on the environmental aspects of the employment of their Service.

2A8. As the Military Strategic Headquarters, Head Office supports CDS and the Chiefs of Staff Committee in developing policy informed military advice for Ministers on current and potential military operations and directs the military chain of command. As a Department of State, Head Office also ensures the conduct of the operation reflects Secretary of State's direction and consistent with wider government policy. Its focus is at the strategic level: to define the ways in which military force will contribute to the achievement of the Government's current and future security objectives and to determine the military means required to deliver them. The 3\* Director General Security Policy (DG Sec Pol) and DCDS Military Strategy and Operations (DCDS(Mil

Strat & Ops)) lead the development of: security policy; strategic relations and planning with allies, other nations and international organisations; and the strategic aspects of operations involving UK Armed Forces. They also lead interaction with other government departments at the strategic level to ensure Defence activity is coordinated with the delivery of national security objectives (the integrated approach). Their priority is the provision of clear military strategy and Defence policy advice to Government and clear direction to the Armed Forces.

2A9. The Head Office, as a rule, does not command forces directly or involve itself in the day-to-day running of operations. However, it retains responsibility for the conduct of strategic level operations with global impact (including counter proliferation, nuclear deterrence, strategic influence and strategic targeting). The Head Office will delegate to Commander Joint Forces Command some specified activities which do not relate directly to the strategic level. In the new Operating Model,<sup>2</sup> greater discipline is required to ensure Head Office does not become drawn into the business of the operational and tactical levels. This will be enabled by a programme of activity to drive the right behaviours and improve business effectiveness. The Head Office and the Permanent Joint Headquarters have discrete and supporting roles in the governance of operations which are currently under review<sup>3</sup>: a team has been formed in the Security Policy and Operations area to improve military planning at the strategic level.

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<sup>2</sup> *The New Operating Model – How Defence Works*, version 3.0, December 2012.

<sup>3</sup> Reference Governance and Ops mandate implementation due April 2013.

## **Annex 2B – Representative Chief of Defence Staff’s Planning Directive**

**The Annex forms an illustrative example of the content of a CDS Planning Directive. It does not constitute a template which is controlled by MOD staff.**

Issued by: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Chiefs of Staff (COS)

Issued to: MOD Directorates

Single Service Chiefs

Joint Forces Command (JFC)

Permanent Joint Headquarters UK (PJHQUK)

Director Special Forces (DSF)

.....

.....

Copy to: Other government departments (OGDs) as required

**Directive to be completed through parallel staffing chain to 3 star level**

**For operational directives this is normally through CJO and DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) chains of Command. The process culminates when DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 forwards the Directive to SECCOS for approval. Until the draft leaves DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 – or equivalent – the document is being drafted for the appropriate 3 Star’s approval. On leaving the 3 Star’s office, the Directive is ‘confirmed ready in all respects for signature by CDS’.**

***This example is for guidance only. Deviations, where appropriate, are permitted. It is not necessary to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to maintain the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is maintained. Where headings are inappropriate or not needed, this should be stated.***

## CDS' Planning Directive Op [\*\*\*\*]

### Preface

1. **Review.** *[Who will review the directive (usually Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)) and when eg 6/12/18 months hence].*
2. **Scope.** *[Indicates the bounds of the directive and whether it supersedes a previous version].*

### Situation

3. *[Brief description of the nature of the problem, the current political/military situation and what has been/is being done to address it. This may be broken down into background and current situation, if required].*

### Appointment

4. *[If determined at this time] CDS has confirmed the appointment of [\*\*\*\*] [Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) or 4\* as appropriate] as Joint Commander (Jt Comd) [or designate] for this operation [potential operation].*

### Theatre of operations

5. *[If determined at this time] Defined as the land, sea and air space of .... [A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Task Force Commander (termed the joint operations area (JOA), within which he conducts operations].*

### Direction

6. **National strategic aim.**<sup>1</sup> *[the Government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome'. The desired outcome is 'a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a*

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<sup>1</sup> This may be referred to as Her Majesty's Government's (HMG's) strategic aim.

*result of some other form of influence'. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations].*

7. **National strategic objectives.** *[a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. Note the difference between a desired outcome being reached and objectives being achieved; there can be no assumption of necessary causality. Not the effects, nor conditions, nor the outcome ultimately sought, can necessarily be created as desired – although the achievement of specific objectives can contribute].*

8. **Military strategic end-state.** *[the successful completion of the military contribution to the desired outcome, reached when all the allocated military strategic objectives have been achieved].*

9. **Military strategic objectives.** *[goals to be achieved by the military instrument of power in order to contribute to the achievement of the national strategic aim'. Their successful completion indicates the achievement of the military strategic end-state].*

10. **Strategic narrative.** *[the compelling storylines designed to resonate in the mind of its audiences that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan'].]*

11. **Information effect.** *[the resultant attitude and behaviour of audiences produced by the combination of words, images and deeds'].*

12. **CDS' Intent.** *[A succinct articulation of CDS' military strategic intent, including the strategic effects military forces are to realise, or contribute to, in collaboration with other government departments under an integrated approach].*

## **Planning**

13. You are to work with MOD Staff [*Military Strategic Planning (MSP) Staff or the Strategic Planning Group (SPG)*] to prepare a military strategic estimate for...

## Planning

14. In consultation with MOD HQ, Joint Forces Command and the single Services, you are to recommend:
  - a. What, if any, immediately available forces should be directed to move to the likely area of operations *[operational command (OPCOM) arrangements of these forces to be considered prior to the issue of the CDS Directive]*.
  - b. The appropriate level of Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).
  - c. The size and shape of the joint force.
15. You are to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) to *[region/country]* in order to *[purpose of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team – see Chapter 3]*.
16. **Assumptions.** *[The strategic assumptions on which military planning is to take place]*.
17. **Constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms.** *[To include legal, political, diplomatic, cultural, military (if known)]*.
18. Further instructions to follow.

## Execution

19. In your capacity as Jt Comd you are to....
20. **Coordinating instructions.** *[This paragraph may be issued separately if required]*. To include:
  - a. **Legal.**
  - b. **Political/rules of engagement.**
  - c. **Intelligence.**
  - d. **Targeting.**

- e. **Information strategy.** *[Issued here or separately by the Information Strategy Group. This should include media policy as appropriate].*
- f. **Force protection.**

## Resources

- 21. **Task organisation.** *[If known at this stage].*
- 22. **Impact on current commitments and future availability of forces.** *[This section records the MOD HQ decision on the regeneration of capacity and adjustments in readiness to meet future contingencies].*

## Logistics

- 23. **Statement of logistic capability.** *[To state any sustainment and training requirements, and provide indication of the availability of critical assets (if known)].*

## Command and signal

- 24. **Command.** The Jt Comd is to exercise command from Permanent Joint Headquarters *[or other designated headquarters].*
- 25. **Codeword.** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET.
- 26. **Signals.** All message traffic on Op [\*\*\*\*] is to bear the SIC [XXX], in addition to subject SICs.

## Reporting

- 27. An executive summary of the military strategic estimate and proposed strategic options is to be submitted by [\*\*\*\*].

Planning

DTG Z

Chief of the Defence Staff

[Original signed]

Authenticated

DOps

## **Annex 2C – Representative Chief of Defence Staff’s Directive**

**The Annex forms an illustrative example of the content of a CDS Directive. It does not constitute a template which is controlled by MOD staff.**

This document is the property of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government and is not to be reproduced without the permission of the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

CDS No/Year

Copy No.....of.....Copies

**The CDS Directive No. is obtained from the CDS-Desk Clk1 (Ext 87690)**

**The final document for CDS signature should be in Arial – Font 12. Acronyms are to be avoided as this document is circulated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.**

**Formats and font size for signals should be as required by the signal software.**

**Experience has shown that, when drafting a directive, it is often better to draft as per the rules and conventions of Defence writing and then convert to signal format.**

**Ministry of Defence**

**Chiefs of Staff Committee**

**CDS [operational] directive [Cat 1, 2 or 3] [to] for [subject]**

**Operation [\*\*\*\*]**

**[A very short abstract paragraph outlining the scope of the directive to be drafted by the author. This is used by the registry for filing purposes].**

Signature Block  
COSSEC – ASec(Cts)  
for SECCOS  
MOD HQ, Floor 5, Zone F  
82019MB  
DII: COSSEC ASEC (CTS)

Ministry of Defence  
WHITEHALL  
SW1A 2HB  
Date: DD/MMM/YY  
CDS No/Yr

**Directive to be completed through parallel staffing chain to 3 star level**

**For operational directives this is normally through CJO and DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) chains of Command. The process culminates when DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 forwards the Directive to SECCOS for approval. Until the draft leaves DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)-MA2 – or equivalent – the document is being drafted for the appropriate 3 Star’s approval. On leaving the 3 Star’s office, the Directive is ‘confirmed ready in all respects for signature by CDS’.**

***This example is for guidance only. Deviations, where appropriate, are permitted. It is not necessary to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to maintain the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is maintained. Where headings are inappropriate or not needed, this should be stated.***

***In order to generate tempo for an immediate response to short notice crises, it may be recommended to CDS, through DOps, that a number of paragraphs or annexes are deferred until a later date. This will be initiated by the Strategic Planning Group team leader in consultation with the Joint Commander.***

**CDS' [operational] directive [Cat 1,2 or 3] [to] for [subject]**

**Operation [\*\*\*\*]**

References:

A. *[Only include References referred to within main body]*

## **General**

1. **Review and responsibility.** This directive supersedes [previous directive] and gives my direction to you, [the Joint Commander (Jt Comd)/as required], for planning the UK's future military commitment [to / in ...]. This directive will be reviewed by [author] no later than [date].<sup>1</sup>
2. **Appointment.** *[Nomination of Jt Comd and broad illustration of responsibilities. Example: You are appointed Jt Comd for Op [\*\*\*\*] and you are to exercise operational command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to the operation from Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Northwood. Within your area of responsibility (AOR), you are responsible to me for the conduct of operations of all assigned UK naval, land, and air forces, including their intelligence, logistics, communications, administrative, and medical support].*
3. **Direction.** I shall provide strategic direction for operations through Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)) *[or alternative commander].*

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<sup>1</sup> The review date will be retained against the directive for monitoring purposes by COSSEC/CDS Registry, but it is the responsibility of the author to review the document and to propose any changes/updates required. The author may also propose the directive to be cancelled.

4. **Task organisation.** UK forces assigned to this operation are detailed at Annex xx. Any recommendations for proposed change should be made to MOD where appropriate.

5. **Military options.**

6. **Consultation and management of expectation.**

### **Current situation**

*[A brief description of nature of the problem and what has been/is currently being done in mitigation. This section is often broken into political and operational paragraphs but could be broken down into sub-headings of background and current situation, if required].*

7. **Political.**

8. **Military.**

9. **Humanitarian.**

### **HMG's strategic aim**

10. *[National intent and position as articulated by Cabinet Office in consultation with other government departments (OGDs)]*

### **HMG'S objectives**

11. HMG's objectives are as follows:

a. **Political objectives.**

b. **Military strategic objectives.** *[Derived from national strategic objectives, these objectives define criteria for success – their successful achievement indicates the military strategic end-state].*

- c. **Information effect.** *[Derived from the strategic narrative, this defines the resultant attitude and behaviour of audiences produced by the combination of words, images and deeds].*

## **CDS intent**

12. My intent is to *[This is the part in which CDS will take the greatest interest, therefore it must accurately reflect what the military is expected to have to achieve.*

- *It should be succinct, clear and offer subordinates an understanding of their role to enable them to achieve his intent.*
- *It must reflect military-strategic level intent avoiding, where possible, operational and tactical level direction, be in effects based language and incorporate the integrated approach if required.*
- *With directives dealing with major campaigns there may be benefit in articulating intent through a CDS' military strategy paragraph, which should include intent, approach and main effort.]*

## **Execution**

13. *[This specifies the detailed effects to be achieved by the Jt Comd and subordinate commands as appropriate. The Strategic Planning Directive and summary of options from the military strategic estimate will form the basis for this paragraph and should reflect the mission statement and tasks generated by the Jt Comd].*

- a. Main effort.
- b. Specified tasks.

### **Constraints and/or assumptions**

14. The following are additional constraints:
  - a. Joint area of operations.
  - b. International and domestic law.
  - c. *[as required] – could include: UN instructions or protocols, detention, other operations, political*

### **Coordinating instructions**

15. The following instructions apply:
  - a. Rules of engagement (ROE).
  - b. Intelligence and security.
  - c. Key themes and messages.
  - d. Training.
  - e. Force protection (FP).
  - f. UK Special Forces (SF).

### **Service and administrative support**

16. *[Detail should be kept to a minimum and if necessary reflected in the appropriate Annex]. Headings might include:*
  - a. Logistic planning – logistic governance – sustainability.
  - b. Movement.
  - c. Medical.

- d. Financial accounting and host nation support.
- e. Welfare and personnel.
- f. Management of casualties.
- g. Repatriation of the dead.
- h. Welfare and personnel.

### **Command and signal**

17. The following arrangements will apply: *[Layout below is illustrative and could be used for a multinational operation]*

- a. **Relationships.**
  - (1) **National.**
    - (a) **Strategic.**
    - (b) **Operational.**
  - (2) **NATO/EU/UN.**
- b. **Command and control.**
  - (1) **National command.** All UK forces remain under national command.
  - (2) **Full command.** CINCs retain full command of all forces assigned. Director Special Forces (DSF) retains full command of all assigned SF.
  - (3) **Operational command.** You are to exercise OPCOM of UK assigned naval, land, and air forces.

(4) **Operational control.** You may delegate operational control (OPCON) of UK assigned forces in theatre to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), once the JTFHQ is established. OPCON of submarines will remain with CTF311. OPCON of SF forces will remain with DSF unless D Ops directs otherwise.

(5) **National Contingent Commander.** Usually embedded within a joint task force headquarters when the UK is a contributing nation to a multinational force. The relationship and division of responsibility between the National Contingent Commander and the Permanent Joint Headquarters must be made explicit.

c. **Signals.** All message traffic on OP XX is to bear the SIC XXX/XXX in addition to subject SICs.

d. **Information management/information exploitation plan.** DII(HO) is the MODUK Information System (IS) of choice for the transfer, publishing and filing of strategic information up to UK SECRET. Documents will be published by the Current Commitments Team (CCT), Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) or PJHQ on the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) website under OP XX using the team site hosted on DII.

e. **Communications security (COMSEC)/computer security (COMPUSEC).**

## Reporting

18. *[Reflect strategic and military strategic battle rhythm requirements: example -until further notice; you are to keep MODUK HQ informed by Daily Brief at 0600z.]*

## Codeword

19. The codeword for [subject] is [Op Name] in response to. Its meaning is [CLASSIFICATION].

Day/Month/Year

Chief of the Defence Staff

CDS No/Yr

Annexes:

*[Example only - Requirement to be determined by the author – list below is illustrative]*

- A. Task organisation
- B. Rules of engagement
- C. Intelligence
- D. Targeting
- E. Information (covering all information activities including Information Operations and Media Operations)
- F. Logistics
- G. Communications and Information Systems (CIS)
- H. Special Forces
- I. Personnel and administration
- J. Medical
- K. Strategic movement



## Annex 2D – Representative Joint Commander’s Mission Directive

### The Joint Commander’s Mission Directive

*This example is for guidance only. Deviations, where appropriate, are permitted. It is not necessary to keep to paragraph numbers – for example there may be one or more paragraphs per heading. It is, however, essential to maintain the order of the paragraph headings so that an auditable and recognisable logic chain is maintained. Where headings are inappropriate or not needed, this should be stated.*

**Issued by:** [*The Joint Commander (Jt Comd)*]

**Issued to:** [*The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), National Contingent Commander (NCC), or other subordinate commander as appropriate*]

**and, in conjunction with other directives to:** [*Reference to other extant directives to subordinate commanders within the same joint operations area*]

References:

#### Situation

1. [Describes the generic circumstances leading to the requirement for the operation including:]
2. **The legal basis for Operation [\*\*\*\*].**
3. **Operational situation.**
4. **Her Majesty’s Government’s strategy.**
  - a. Strategic aim.
  - b. Strategic end-state.

## Planning

- c. Political objectives.
  - d. Strategic narrative.
  - e. Information effect.
5. **Coalition strategy.**
- a. Coalition strategy.
  - b. Coalition strategic centre of gravity.
6. **UK's military strategy.**
- a. **Chief of Defence Staff's intent.**

## Concept of operations

*The Jt Comd may provide an outline concept for the deployment, sustainment and recovery (DSR) of a Joint Task Force (JTF), or more detailed instructions as appropriate].*

- 7. **Joint Commander's intent.**
- 8. **Joint Commander's interim operational end-state.**
- 9. **Joint Commander's operational end-state.**
- 10. **Joint Commander's key themes and messages.**
- 11. **Scheme of manoeuvre.** [*As appropriate, covering deployment, sustainment and recovery*].
- 12. **Main effort.**

13. **Policy context.** [*The concept of operations will be directed by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) within a developing policy context articulated by MOD UK through*]:

- a. Strategic guidance.
- b. Engagement with the other nations' governments [*as required*].
- c. Engagement with UK other government departments.
- d. Engagement with a coalition chain of command
- e. Strategic presentation.

## **Mission**

14. [*A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose*].

## **Specified tasks**

15. [*Listed by component commander*].

16. **Command of forces assigned.** [*The UK command and control architecture is described here with the detail usually reflected in an Annex, with forces assigned listed in the Theatre Reference Document (TRD)*].

## **Coordinating instructions**

17. **Operational timings.**

18. **Intelligence.** [*Chief of Defence Intelligence will retain overall direction for Defence Intelligence. Specific instructions are contained in the TRD*]

19. **Information strategy.** [*Adheres to UK information strategy and covers information operations, psychological operations, media operations and civil-military cooperation*].

## Planning

20. **Force protection.** [*Direction at Annex D*].
21. **Rules of engagement and targeting directives.** [*Guidance at Annex D*].
22. **Training.** [*Direction at Annex D*].
23. **Financial accounting and policy advice.** [*Financial accounting instructions and policy advice are detailed in the TRD*].
24. **Detainees and prisoners.** [*Direction at Annex D*].
25. **Deployment of civilians.** [*Details of all civilians and MOD employees deploying on operations are passed to PJHQ. Instructions for deployed contractors are contained in the TRD*].
26. **Status of forces.** [*Reference to legal status is governed by the Annex to relevant United Nations Special Representatives*].
27. **Lessons identified.** [*As directed by PJHQ SOP 7033*].
28. **Media.** [*Contained in the TRD*].

## Logistics

29. **Logistic direction.** [*Contained in the TRD*].
30. **Personnel.** [*Personnel issues are contained in the TRD*].
31. **Medical.** [*Medical instructions for UK forces deployed are contained in the TRD*].
32. **Visitors.** [*Theatre visits policy*].

## UK command and control

33. **Command and control.** [*UK command relationships are shown at Annex B, with tabulated command relationships at Annex C. This paragraph will specify the supported command*].

- a. **National command.** [*All forces remain under national command or otherwise as determined here*]
- b. **Full command.** [*Single Service Chiefs retain full command of UK assigned forces*].
- c. **Coalition management.** [*PJHQ, working within MODUK's policy direction, has the responsibility for operational liaison with national capitals on coalition force levels and operational matters*].
- d. **Maritime forces.** [*Outlines the promulgation method for changes of OPCOM of Maritime forces between Chief of Naval Staff/First Sea Lord and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)*].
- e. **Senior British Military representative.** [*OPCOM CJO or as otherwise directed in CDS' Directive*].

34. **COMBRITFOR.** [*Nominated here*].

35. **National veto.** [*CJO's direction on national veto policy*].

36. **Liaison.** [*Assigns a coordinating authority and guidance for matters that cannot be resolved in theatre*].

37. **Reporting.** [*Timing and issues of importance requiring report*].

- a. **Routine reporting.**
- b. **Incident reporting.**
- c. **Post-operation reporting.** [*Including the requirement to capture lessons*].

## Planning

38. **Codeword/SIC.** [*The codeword is usually RESTRICTED; however its meaning is SECRET*].

39. **Communications and Information Systems plan.** [*Outlines the responsibilities for UK national and coalition communications and information systems*].

40. **Information management.** [*Details the requirements to keep records. Specific Information Management instructions are contained in the TRD*].

Jt Comd [*Name*].

Date

Annexes:

- A. Legal basis for Op [\*\*\*\*].
- B. Op [\*\*\*\*] - UK National C2.
- C. UK command state table.
- D. Supplementary coordinating instructions.

Enclosures:

- 1. Op [\*\*\*\*] Theatre Reference Document.

## Annex 2E – Centres of gravity

### Centre of gravity identification

2E1. Identifying centres of gravity is complex. A detailed understanding of the causes of conflict, the parties to that conflict, their ability to affect the outcome, and the nature of their relationship with each other is necessary to ensure that the right centres of gravity are selected. Potential centres of gravity should exhibit most or all of the following characteristics. They should be:

- identifiable;
- critical to the ability of a party to a conflict to achieve its aims;
- susceptible to change (one form of which might be defeat);
- able to effect change in others; and
- related to the conditions of that conflict.

2E2. Whilst a centre of gravity need not always be an object or group, it usually will. For example, 'coalition unity' might appear to be a viable centre of gravity, but would be inappropriate. 'A united coalition' would be more suitable because it is the coalition itself that is the source of strength; its unity is simply one of its features which will in turn lead us to possible vulnerabilities that might be exploited.

2E3. The following steps can be followed to assist with identification of centres of gravity.

- a. List the entities that are party to a conflict. These will often be states, but not always.
- b. For each entity, summarise its aims and objectives and the means that it has available at its disposal to achieve them.
- c. List all the possible sources of strength which might enable each entity to achieve its aims and objectives within the means that it has available. These are the possible centres of gravity.

d. For each possible centre of gravity answer the question, 'Can the entity achieve its aims without this object (or influencing force) intact?'

(1) If the answer is yes, it is not a suitable centre of gravity.

(2) If the answer is no to only one of the possible options, then by default that is the centre of gravity.

(3) If there is more than one 'no', it is necessary to establish how directly each of the remaining options is related to the achievement of the end-state. For example, two options may remain; the enemy air defence force and the enemy air force. Defeating the air defence forces might open the path to the enemy's collapse, but only because it would enable the destruction of its air forces which would then force the outcome. The air forces would therefore be a more appropriate centre of gravity than the air defence forces. The enemy cannot achieve its aims without either, but the destruction of one is only necessary to set the conditions for the destruction of the other, and it is this which unlocks the end-state.

e. Answering this question needs to be more than a simple intuitive process. Historical precedent, analysis of relative strengths, strength of motive and political influences are among the considerations to be addressed. However, the most important is the relationship between cause and effect. There must be sufficient evidence (or at least the basis of evidence) to indicate that effecting a change to the proposed centre of gravity will have the predicted effect.

### **Centre of gravity analysis**

2E4. It is through analysis of the selected centres of gravity that we derive objectives or decisive conditions. It is a method of ensuring that we attack weakness rather than strength and that we consider the indirect approach. It also allows us to identify and protect our own vulnerabilities.

2E5. For each centre of gravity, there are three areas that must be understood.

- a. **Critical capabilities.** Critical capabilities are what the centre of gravity can do or cause to be done, either to us or to other parties. For example, the centre of gravity might have the capability to defeat our forces, seize our capital, hold the opposing army together, or turn the population away from the local government.
  
- b. **Critical requirements.** Critical requirements are those resources, facilities, or competencies required to generate or apply critical capability. They are therefore what the centre of gravity needs to be effective.
  
- c. **Critical vulnerabilities.** Critical vulnerabilities are the notable areas of weakness relating to the centre of gravity. They therefore point to ways that the centre of gravity might be defeated or altered. They may relate to either critical capabilities or critical requirements. One way of representing centre of gravity analysis is to use the matrix format shown below in Table 2E.1.0

<b>Centre of gravity analysis matrix</b>	
<b>Assessed aim and desired outcome</b>	
What is the actor's main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions.	
<p><b>1 – Centre of gravity</b></p> <p>...is the principal source of strength or power for achieving one's aim.</p> <p>What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his strategic objectives?</p> <p>To be targeted in an opponent; ones own to be protected.</p> <p>For each centre of gravity there will be a number of critical capabilities and critical requirements.</p> <p>A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing.</p>	<p><b>2 – Critical (cap)abilities</b></p> <p>...is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the centre of gravity its strength.</p> <p>What can the centre of gravity do or cause to be done? What are the primary means that enables the centre of gravity to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation?</p> <p>To be influenced/denied to an opponent; one's own to be exploited.</p> <p>The key word is the verb; the ability to....</p>

<p><b>4 – Critical vulnerabilities</b></p> <p>...exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss.</p> <p>What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships and influences through which the centre of gravity may be influenced or neutralised?</p> <p>Critical vulnerabilities should be used to generate campaign objectives, decisive conditions or supporting effects.</p> <p>To be attacked in an opponent and ones own protected.</p> <p>Critical vulnerabilities can relate to either capabilities or requirements.</p> <p>A noun with modifiers</p>	<p><b>3 – Critical requirements</b></p> <p>...are the specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining the critical capabilities.</p> <p>What does the centre of gravity need to be effective? What are those key systems, elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships and influences required to generate and sustain the centres of gravity critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors?</p> <p>To be denied to an opponent and one’s own provided.</p> <p>Nouns, things.</p>
<p><b>Conclusion</b></p> <p>Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships and influences could be exploited in an opponent and must be protected if owned. Which of these change the capabilities, relationships and behaviours that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space to support a theory of change.</p>	

**Table 2E.1 – Centre of gravity analysis matrix**


2E6. Continuing the example from paragraph 2E3, for the coalition to exist as a united body it will have certain critical requirements, one of which might be political agreement between coalition members. This may expose a vulnerability, such as differing tolerance of casualties. An adversary may therefore choose to attack the coalition by attempting to cause as many casualties amongst the less tolerant nations so as to drive the members apart.

2E7. The example would therefore be represented as below in Table 2E.2 (noting that this is only a representation of one thread of the centre of gravity analysis).

<p><b>1 – Centre of gravity</b></p> <p>A united coalition</p>	<p><b>2 – Critical capabilities</b></p> <p>Ability to impose the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution on two warring factions</p>
<p><b>4 – Critical vulnerabilities</b></p> <p>Coalition member state A will withdraw from the coalition if it sustains significant casualties.</p>	<p><b>3 – Critical requirements</b></p> <p>Political agreement between coalition members.</p>

**Table 2E.2 – Types of operational-level centre of gravity**

2E8. As described in Chapter 2, at the strategic level a centre of gravity might be an abstract concept, at the operational level a dominant capability while at the tactical level it is usually a capability or strength. The simplest model might be a bipolar centre of gravity, but other types are indicated in Figure 2E.1.



**Figure 2E.1 – Types of operational-level centre of gravity**

2E9. **Bipolar centres of gravity.** Each side engaged in a bi-polar conflict should identify, and then attack and protect respectively, their enemy’s centre of gravity and their own. Force is applied offensively against an opponent’s vulnerabilities (in order to undermine his centre of gravity, restrict his freedom of action and frustrate his aims) and defensively (to safeguard one’s own centre of gravity against reciprocal attack).

2E10. **Multiple centres of gravity.** In other situations, there may be no simple bi-polar construct. The identification and analysis of centres of gravity may nonetheless help a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) to understand the critical aspects of the situation, most notably the characteristics of key actors.

2E11. **Non-opponent centres of gravity.** In situations where there is no particular enemy, and no obvious value to be gained by focusing effort on any one actor, a more abstract centre of gravity may be useful. For example, during peace enforcement operations where a range of belligerents may be

fighting each other, defeat of one or more of them may not be appropriate, but fostering support for a peace agreement may be. Similarly, during peacekeeping or disaster relief operations in an otherwise benign environment, there may simply not be a discernible centre of gravity. In such circumstances other analytical tools, such as adapting the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) model may assist planners. An example of this, set in a peacekeeping context, is shown below in Figure 2E.2.

2E12. **Focal centres of gravity.** These may be applicable in particularly complex situations involving a multitude of actors engaged in a hybrid of major combat, security operations to enable stabilisation, and other peace support activity. In such cases a JTFC may seek to encapsulate as a centre of gravity, to be influenced decisively, either:

- the most significant factor preventing him from reaching his end-state, or
- a factor that appears predominant amongst (or common to all) other participants in promoting their own contrasting aims – for example, the support of the local population.

This may prove a useful focal point for his subsequent planning.

Planning


**Notes:**

1. Unlike centre of gravity analysis, this model keeps the fundamental peacekeeping principles in mind at all times, for example, there is no enemy to conduct pre-emptive offensive operations against. The focus must be on deterrence.
2. The model will require in-depth intelligence utilising all sources within the peacekeeping mission.

		Assess capabilities and capacity of the party to achieve its objective	
		Strengths	Weaknesses
		<p><i>What internal strengths does a party have to fulfil its objective? For example:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group ideology</li> <li>• Leadership</li> <li>• Weaponry</li> </ul>	<p><i>What internal weakness does a party have that would hamper its ability to fulfil its objective? For example:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fractured command/ideology</li> <li>• Lack of mobility</li> <li>• Lack of funds</li> </ul>
		Integrated planning considerations	
Opportunities	<p><i>What factors from an analysis of the external environment, for example, political, military, economic, social and infrastructure (PMESI), can be exploited by the group to fulfil its objective? For example:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certain areas inaccessible by peacekeepers</li> <li>• Host-government forces ineffective</li> <li>• Regional political actor supportive of spoiling behaviour</li> <li>• Safe havens available in certain communities that support the political motives of the party</li> </ul>	<p><b>Strengths/Opportunities analysis</b></p> <p>Analysis of strengths and opportunities will provide insight into where the threat is most dangerous.</p> <p>Risks should be identified and deterrence measures taken to mitigate them where possible. For example, warning systems and reaction forces.</p>	<p><b>Weaknesses/Opportunities analysis</b></p> <p>Weaknesses should be exploited by the peacekeepers wherever possible, in a way to deter violent activity.</p> <p>Indicators could be initiated that monitor whether weaknesses become strengths over time.</p>
	Threats	<p><i>What factors from an analysis of the external environment, for example, PMESI, can threaten the group from fulfilling its objective? For example:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certain areas dominated by credible peacekeepers</li> <li>• Host-government forces operating in the area</li> <li>• Lack of political support from regional actors</li> </ul>	<p><b>Strengths/Threats analysis</b></p> <p>Perpetrators will most likely avoid these areas.</p> <p>Be cautious when considering the re-distribution of peacekeeping resources. Diluting the environmental threats may make them future opportunities.</p>

**Figure 2E.2 – Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats analysis in the absence of a centre of gravity**

## Annex 2F – Operational estimate techniques and processes





## Appendix 2F1 – Example operational estimate

### Three-column format

Factor	Deduction	Output
<p>Oilfields on Island ‘Y’ provide main source of economic wealth</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Must capture/retake the oilfields intact – oilfields must not be ‘blown’</li> </ul>	<p><b>Commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR)</b>                      Enemy presence on/around oilfields? What are the enemy intentions on the oilfields in the event of an attack? How could I mitigate the risk of oil-wells being ‘blown’?</p> <p><b>Planning guidance (PG)</b>                      Look at planning options to retake the oilfields intact?</p> <p><b>Supporting effect (SE)</b>                      Oilfields secured</p> <p><b>Risk (Ri)</b>                      Toxic hazard from burning oil-well</p>
<p>Known threat from a subversive group (YLP) sympathetic to ‘X’ Country’s intent</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential irregular activity (IA) threat</li> </ul>	<p><b>Commander’s critical information requirement</b>                      Is there a militant wing to the YLP? If so, what are their intents and capabilities?</p> <p><b>Supporting effect</b>                      Threat from YLP diminished</p>

Factor	Deduction	Output
Country 'X' has known strategic and operational reserves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Democratic/political stability must rapidly follow military intervention</li> </ul>	<p><b>Commander's critical information requirement</b> What reserve forces? – At what readiness? – Where (back in Country 'X')?</p> <p><b>Clarification (CLR)</b> Extent of the joint operations area (JOA)?</p> <p><b>Focused question (FQ)</b> How might I mitigate the potential for Country 'X' to deploy its reserve?</p>
Majority of roads across the island are impassable to vehicles over one ton	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Movement restricted to support helicopters (SH) and foot</li> <li>Logistics supported (distribution) reliant on support helicopters</li> </ul>	<p><b>Constraint (C)</b> Mobility, and firepower, rely on SH and air</p> <p><b>Limitation (L)</b> Sustaining combat supplies for the Logistics Component Commander (LCC) likely to be key factor throughout early phases</p>
'X' Land Forces dominate major ports and airfields	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Presents difficulties in establishing a point of entry for ground forces</li> </ul>	<p><b>Commander's critical information requirement</b> What are the enemy's strengths and dispositions around the ports and airfields?</p> <p><b>Focused question</b> Where is the enemy vulnerable across Island Y's ports and airfields? Where might he be attacked in order to establish a point of entry for joint forces?</p>

Factor	Deduction	Output
<p>Killing of President 'Y' – no obvious party nor leader to fill vacuum</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military activity to remove threat from 'X' conventional forces may be succeeded by political, and perhaps tribal, power struggle – threat to longer term stability</li> </ul>	<p><b>Clarification</b>                      What diplomatic efforts are planned to address the political stability on Island 'Y'?</p> <p><b>Restraint (R)</b>                      Initial military engagement in governance</p> <p><b>Decisive condition (DC)</b>                      'Y' Governing authority reinstated</p>
<p>'X' Land Forces are light and airmobile – equipped with large number of SH</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SH are the enemy's potential centre of gravity (CoG)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Planning guidance</b>                      Conduct centre of gravity analysis on 'X' SH</p>
<p>Country 'X' backed by neighbouring nations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Both diplomatic and, potentially, military threat that will reassure Country 'X'</li> </ul>	<p><b>Risk</b>                      Military intervention from neighbouring 'other' nations</p> <p><b>Supporting effect</b>                      Guard against military intervention from neighbouring 'other' nations</p> <p><b>Clarification</b>                      Rules of engagement against 'other' nations</p>

Factor	Deduction	Output
<p>'X' naval forces have notable naval gunfire support</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threat to own ground forces operating across the island</li> </ul>	<p><b>Supporting effect</b> Early control of the seas around Island 'Y'</p>
<p>Notable disruptions to key infrastructure – particularly water and power</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Winning consent, and mitigating impact of political power vacuum, will be reliant on limited, yet effective, military reconstruction activities</li> </ul>	<p><b>Decisive condition</b> Potable water provided and electric power restored</p> <p><b>Commander's critical information requirement</b> Where is key infrastructure relating to water and power?</p> <p><b>Focused question</b> What resources are required to conduct reconstruction on power and water?</p>

## Appendix 2F2 – Example operational estimate

### Course of action formats

#### Option 1

Step 4 - Develop and validate course(s) of action	
<p><b>Course of action (Number/Name):</b></p>	<p><b>Decisive condition(s)/supporting effect(s)</b> (as appropriate to aspect of campaign covered by course of action):</p>
<p><b>Mission(s):</b></p>	
<p><b>Concept of operations</b></p> <p><b>Key themes and messages:</b></p> <p><b>Scheme of manoeuvre:</b></p> <p><b>Main effort:</b></p>	<p><b>Other campaign planning concepts</b> (phase, etc):</p>
	<p><b>Joint action:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fires</li> <li>Manoeuvre</li> <li>Information activities</li> <li>Outreach activities</li> <li>Influence activities</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Supported/Supporting Commanders:</b></p>
	<p><b>Logistic/deployment concept:</b></p>
	<p><b>Operational reserve:</b></p>

**Option 2**

Step 4 - Develop and validate course(s) of action					
Campaign end-state: Information effect: Mission:	Strategic risks:	Object operational centre(s) of gravity	Critical capabilities	Own operational centre(s) of gravity	Critical capabilities
Concept of operations Key themes and messages: Scheme of manoeuvre:  Main effort:	Operational risks:	Critical requirements	Critical vulnerabilities	Critical requirements	Critical vulnerabilities
		Deployment concept:	Deception plan:	Course(s) of action measure(s) of effect:	Staff validation check: Feasibility:  Acceptability:  Completeness:  Exclusivity:  Suitability:
Logistic concept:	Force levels:	Operational reserve:	Spare:		

## Appendix 2F3 – Example operational estimate

### Comparative format

Step 5 - Evaluate course(s) of action			
Comparative criteria	Course of action (Number/name)	Course of action (Number/name)	Course of action (Number/name)
Comparative criteria 1			
Comparative criteria 2			
Comparative criteria 3			
Comparative criteria 4			
Comparative criteria 5			



## Annex 2G – Schematics/tables/matrices

2G1. Throughout the planning process, a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his staff need to clearly communicate and comprehend intent and scheme of manoeuvre (both in course of action (CoA) development and for the selected plan). There are a number of tools and techniques, many using the campaign planning concepts, which offer effective ways to present aspects of a course of action or plan.

### Tools and techniques

2G2. A common set of campaign planning concept *symbols*, for use in schematics, is an essential aid to understanding – Appendix 2G1.

2G3. Various options for drawing up *campaign schematics*, describing the course of action (or plan) through a series of decisive conditions that will achieve the campaign objectives (and hence the campaign end-state), are offered at Appendix 2G2.

2G4. Analysis of decisive conditions lead to the supporting effects necessary to create them. *Decisive condition/supporting effect tables*, an example of which is at Appendix 2G3, provide a useful means of depicting these relationships and visualising the contribution required, by both the joint force and other non-military organisations.

2G5. Supporting effects are an important part of the planning process and the development of courses of action; they also form the foundation of a JTFC's scheme of manoeuvre included within operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs). One or more *effects schematics* are a useful technique to describe, by time and/or space, the intended effects – Appendix 2G4.

2G6. A vital yet complex part of the planning process is the identification of activities that will support the achievement of each supporting effect. The use of *joint action tables*, to determine the range of activities across the joint force and, where appropriate, by multiple agencies to meet each supporting effect not only captures the extent of the effort required; it also stimulates alternative

activities and is key to the early identification of risk. An example joint action table is at Appendix 2G5.


2G7. Clarification of intended activities is aided through the use of *joint action schematics* to describe one particular aspect of the course of action (or OPLAN/OPORD) – see Appendix 2G6.

2G8. Synchronising activities is key to mission success. The joint action table will drive the development of joint action synchronisation matrices – see Appendix 2G7.

### **Using schematics/tables/matrices**

2G9. Any single schematic, table or matrix can only communicate a finite amount of information. A combination of several of the tools and techniques listed above, and described in greater detail at the appendices to this annex, may be necessary to convey the complete picture of what might be planned. These tools and techniques are not prescriptive; selection and adaptation of one or more to best suit the context, and predominant types of military activity, faced by a JTFC is encouraged.

## Appendix 2G1 – Campaign planning concepts – symbols






## Appendix 2G2 – Campaign schematics

2G2.1. The campaign planning concepts provide a ‘toolset’ from which campaigns can be planned and communicated. Whilst there is an agreed and defined set of campaign planning concepts, there is no similarly finite rule to campaign schematics. A campaign schematic is used to aid better understanding in the planning and execution of a campaign. It is of use to a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) in the development and expression of his theory of change. It is of use to the staff in transforming ideas into viable courses of action (CoAs). Finally it is of use in the monitoring and review of campaign progression. Hence, its utility extends across operational design and operations management.

2G2.2. Creativity in the use of campaign schematics is encouraged and variations will emerge dependent upon the nature of the crisis and the personal preferences of key commanders and staff. This Appendix provides a number of examples of campaign schematics. They serve to offer alternative options and to stimulate the development of schematics best suited to a particular set of circumstances.


- Schematic option 1 – Lines of operation/bi-polar centres of gravity (CoGs).
- Schematic option 2 – Groupings of operation/bi-polar centres of gravity.
- Schematic option 3 – Lines of operation/focal centre of gravity.
- Schematic option 4 – Lines/groupings of operation/focal centre of gravity.
- Schematic option 5 – Groupings of operation/focal centre of gravity.

### Option 1 – Lines of operation/bi-polar centres of gravity



Campaign end-state: Information effect			
Country 'X' rejects aggressive acts and obeys the norms of international relations			
Campaign objective A	Campaign objective B	Campaign objective C	Campaign objective D
Defeat 'X' conventional forces	Secure 'X' withdrawal	Restore essential services	Re-establish HN ('Y') authority
<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 neutralised <b>DC 2</b> Air superiority gained <b>DC 3</b> Seas denied <b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land forces defeated	<b>DC 5</b> Air control established <b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land forces repatriated	<b>DC 7</b> Potable water provided <b>DC 8</b> Electric power restored	<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed forces and police reasserted <b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing authority reinstated


### Option 2 – Groupings of operation/bi-polar centres of gravity



Campaign end-state: Information effect Country 'X' rejects aggressive acts and obeys the norms of international relations			
Campaign objective A	Campaign objective B	Campaign objective C	Campaign objective D
Defeat 'X' conventional forces	Secure 'X' withdrawal	Restore essential services	Re-establish HN ('Y') authority
<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 neutralised <b>DC 2</b> Air superiority gained <b>DC 3</b> Seas denied <b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land forces defeated	<b>DC 5</b> Air control established <b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land forces repatriated	<b>DC 7</b> Potable water provided <b>DC 8</b> Electric power restored	<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed forces and police reasserted <b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing authority reinstated

<b>Legend</b>
C2 Command and control
CoG Centre(s) of gravity
CV Critical vulnerability
DC Decisive condition
HN Host nation


### Option 3 – Lines of operation/focal centre of gravity




Campaign end-state: Information effect		
Security conditions in which the threat of violence and civil war has been curtailed and effective infrastructure developed. Country 'X' generating mature political structures to enable effective and representative governance		
Campaign objective A	Campaign objective B	Campaign objective C
Provide security across Country 'X'	Establish governance across Country 'X'	Restore Country 'X' infrastructure
<b>DC 1</b> Secure environment maintained <b>DC 2</b> Self-sustaining security established	<b>DC 3</b> Interim governance provided <b>DC 4</b> Self-governance established <b>DC 5</b> Electoral process reformed <b>DC 6</b> Elected government empowered	<b>DC 7</b> Key infrastructure restored <b>DC 8</b> Sustainable infrastructure established

**Legend**  
 CoG Centre(s) of gravity  
 DC Decisive condition(s)

### Option 4 – Lines/groupings of operation – focal centre of gravity



### Option 5 – Groupings of operation/focal centre of gravity



Campaign end-state: Information effect		
Security conditions in which the threat of violence and civil war has been curtailed and effective infrastructure developed. Country 'X' to generating mature political structures to enable effective and representative governance		
Campaign objective A	Campaign objective B	Campaign objective C
Provide security across country 'X'	Establish governance across country 'X'	Restore country 'X' infrastructure
<b>DC1</b> Secure environment maintained <b>DC2</b> Self-sustaining security established	<b>DC3</b> Interim governance provided <b>DC4</b> Self-governance established <b>DC5</b> Electoral process reformed <b>DC6</b> Elected government empowered	<b>DC7</b> Key infrastructure restored <b>DC8</b> Sustainable infrastructure established

**Legend**  
 CoG Centre(s) of gravity  
 DC Decisive condition(s)

## Appendix 2G3 – Decisive conditions/supporting effects tables

### Option 1 – Summarised tables


<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 neutralised	<b>SE 1.1</b> 'X' Air defence neutralised	<b>SE 1.2</b> Key 'X' communication nodes destroyed	<b>SE 1.3</b> 'X' radar/early warning nodes destroyed	<b>SE 1.4</b> 'X' Operational level C2 nodes destroyed	
<b>DC 2</b> Air superiority gained	<b>SE 2.1</b> 'X' Airfields denied	<b>SE 2.2</b> 'X' Air defence neutralised	<b>SE 2.3</b> Air policing established	<b>SE 2.4</b> Own airfields protected	
<b>DC 3</b> Seas denied	<b>SE 3.1</b> 'X' Ports blockaded	<b>SE 3.2</b> Sea control established	<b>SE 3.3</b> Own SLOCs protected		
<b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land forces defeated	<b>SE4.1</b> 'X' ISR destroyed	<b>SE4.2</b> 'X' Lt Bde contained	<b>SE4.3</b> 'Y' Capital city seized	<b>SE4.4</b> <i>Amphibious assault 'Y' capital port</i>	<b>SE4.5</b> <i>Interdict 'X' LOCs</i>
<b>DC 5</b> Air control established	<b>SE 5.1</b> Air policing maintained	<b>SE 5.2</b> Air space control measures established	<b>SE 5.3</b> Own airfields protected	<b>SEs related to dormant CONPLANS</b>	
<b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land forces repatriated	<b>SE 6.1</b> 'X' Land forces disarmed	<b>SE 6.2</b> 'X' Land forces redeployed			
<b>DC 7</b> Potable water provided	<b>SE 7.1</b> Sufficient water sourced	<b>SE 7.2</b> Filtration systems established	<b>SE 7.3</b> Appropriate water storage established	<b>SE 7.4</b> Water distribution system established	
<b>DC 8</b> Electric power restored	<b>SE 8.1</b> Sufficient electric power generated	<b>SE 8.2</b> Electricity grid storage established	<b>SE 8.3</b> Power distribution established		
<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police re-asserted	<b>SE 9.1</b> 'Y' Armed Forces regrouped	<b>SE 9.2</b> 'Y' Police Force regrouped	<b>SE 9.3</b> C2 of Armed Forces and Police re-established	<b>SE 9.4</b> 'Y' Armed Forces equipped and trained	<b>SE 9.5</b> 'Y' Police Force equipped and trained
<b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing authority re-instated	<b>SE 10.1</b> 'Y' Ministries empowered	<b>SE 10.2</b> 'Y' Presidency regained	<b>SE 10.3</b> 'Y' Democratic process re-established	<b>SE 10.4</b> International community re-engaged	

Joint Force only
  Joint Force supported / OGD supporting
  OGD only
  OGD supported / Joint Force supporting

**Option 2 – Supporting effects sequenced over phases**

DC	SE	Phase 1 – shape	Phase 2 – attack	Phase 3 – transition
<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 neutralised	SE1.1 'X' Air defence neutralised			
	SE1.2 Key 'X' communication nodes destroyed			
	SE1.3 'X' Radar/early warning nodes destroyed			
	SE1.4 'X' Operational level C2 nodes destroyed			
<b>DC 2</b> Air superiority gained	SE2.1 'X' Airfields denied			
	SE2.2 'X' Air defence neutralised			
	SE2.3 Air policing established			
	SE2.4 Own airfields protected			
<b>DC 3</b> Seas denied	SE3.1 'X' Ports blockaded			
	SE3.2 Sea control established			
	SE3.3 Own SLOCs protected			
<b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land Forces defeated	SE4.1 'X' ISR destroyed			
	SE4.2 'X' Lt Bde contained			
	SE4.3 'Y' Capital city seized			
<b>DC 5</b> Air control established	SE5.1 Air policing maintained			
	SE5.2 Air space control measures established			
	SE5.3 Own airfields protected			
<b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land Forces repatriated	SE6.1 'X' Land Forces disarmed			
	SE6.2 'X' Land Forces redeployed			
<b>DC 7</b> Running water restored	SE7.1 Sufficient water sourced			
	SE7.2 Filtration systems established			
	SE7.3 Appropriate water storage established			
	SE7.4 Water distribution system established			
<b>DC 8</b> Electric power restored	SE8.1 Sufficient electric power generated			
	SE8.2 Electricity grid storage established			
	SE8.3 Power distribution established			
<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police re-asserted	SE 9.1 'Y' Armed Forces regrouped			
	SE 9.2 'Y' Police Force regrouped			
	SE 9.3 C2 of Armed Force and Police re-established			
	SE 9.4 'Y' Armed Forces equipped and trained			
<b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing Authority re-instated	SE10.1 'Y' Ministries empowered			
	SE10.2 'Y' Presidency regained			
	SE10.3 'Y' Democratic process re-established			
	SE10.4 International community re-engaged			

### Option 3 – Supporting effects synchronised over time



**Legend**


- C2      Command and control
- ISR     Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
- OPLAN   Operation plan
- SE      Supporting effect
- SLOC    Sea lines of communication



## Appendix 2G4 – Effects schematics

2G4.1. Supporting effects (SEs) make up a Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) scheme of manoeuvre; they form the foundation of the operation plan (OPLAN). Effects schematics provide a useful means to visualise and communicate the scheme of manoeuvre, or at least one aspect, by time or space, of it. They can be generated throughout the planning process, in the development, evaluation and selection of courses of action (CoAs). They can also be included within OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs) in order to aid subordinate understanding.

2G4.2. The supporting effects included on campaign schematics need not be confined to those from the physical domain; a schematic is enriched by inclusion of supporting effects to be achieved in the virtual and cognitive domains.





## Appendix 2G5 – Joint action table

Partially complete to demonstrate the tool and reinforce the relationship between decisive conditions (DCs), supporting effects (SEs) and activities, and the importance behind establishing supported/supporting command relationships.

Decisive condition	Supporting effect	Fires	Manoeuvre	Information activity	Outreach activity	Supported	Supporting
<b>DC 1</b>  'X' C2 neutralised	<b>SE1.1</b> 'X' Air defence neutralised	Conduct SEAD				JFAC	JFMC
	<b>SE1.2</b> Key 'X' communication nodes destroyed						
	<b>SE1.3</b> 'X' Radar/early warning nodes destroyed						
	<b>SE1.4</b> 'X' Operational level C2 nodes destroyed						
<b>DC 2</b>  Air superiority gained	<b>SE2.1</b> 'X' Airfields denied						
	<b>SE2.2</b> 'X' Air defence neutralised						
	<b>SE2.3</b> Air policing established						
	<b>SE2.4</b> Own airfields protected						
<b>DC 3</b>	<b>SE3.1</b> 'X' Ports blockaded						

Planning

<b>Decisive condition</b>	<b>Supporting effect</b>	<b>Fires</b>	<b>Manoeuvre</b>	<b>Information activity</b>	<b>Outreach activity</b>	<b>Supported</b>	<b>Supporting</b>
Seas Denied	<b>SE3.2</b> Sea control established						
	<b>SE3.3</b> Own SLOCs protected		Interdict 'X' naval forces			JFMC	JFAC
<b>DC 4</b>  'X' Land Forces defeated	<b>SE4.1</b> 'X' ISR destroyed						
	<b>SE4.2</b> 'X' Lt Bde contained						
	<b>SE4.3</b> 'Y' Capital city seized			Reassure indigenous population		JFLC	JFAC
<b>DC 5</b>  Air control established	<b>SE5.1</b> Air policing maintained						
	<b>SE5.2</b> Air space control measures established						
	<b>SE5.3</b> Own airfields protected						
<b>DC 6</b>  'X' Land Forces repatriated	<b>SE6.1</b> 'X' Land Forces disarmed						
	<b>SE6.2</b> 'X' Land Forces redeployed						
<b>DC 7</b>	<b>SE7.1</b> Sufficient water sourced		Secure key water sources			JFLC	DFID

Decisive condition	Supporting effect	Fires	Manoeuvre	Information activity	Outreach activity	Supported	Supporting
Running water restored	<b>SE7.2</b> Filtration systems established						
	<b>SE7.3</b> Appropriate water storage established						
	<b>SE7.4</b> Water distribution system established				Develop infrastructure and potable water		
<b>DC 8</b>  Electric power restored	<b>SE8.1</b> Sufficient electric power generated						
	<b>SE8.2</b> Electricity grid storage established						
	<b>SE8.3</b> Power distribution established						
<b>DC 9</b>  'Y' Armed Forces and Police re-asserted	<b>SE 9.1</b> 'Y' Armed Forces regrouped						
	<b>SE 9.2</b> 'Y' Police Force regrouped						
	<b>SE 9.3</b> C2 of Armed Force and Police re-established						
	<b>SE 9.4</b> 'Y' Armed Forces equipped and trained						


Planning

<b>Decisive condition</b>	<b>Supporting effect</b>	<b>Fires</b>	<b>Manoeuvre</b>	<b>Information activity</b>	<b>Outreach activity</b>	<b>Supported</b>	<b>Supporting</b>
<b>DC 10</b>  'Y' Governing Authority re-instated	<b>SE10.1</b> 'Y' Ministries empowered			Broadcast ministerial announcements		FCO	JFLC
	<b>SE10.2</b> 'Y' Presidency regained						
	<b>SE10.3</b> 'Y' Democratic process re-established				Support development of governance structures		
	<b>SE10.4</b> International community re-engaged						

## Appendix 2G6 – Joint action schematics

2G6.1. A Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) uses joint action as a framework with which to plan, coordinate and synchronise, and then execute activities to realise supporting effects. He should exploit the full range of available capabilities, joint and multinational, and orchestrate fires, information activities, outreach activities and manoeuvre together to optimise their coherent impact. He should consider, where appropriate, those multi-agency activities which, while not under his control, might be coordinated with his own military activities in order to better achieve his supporting effects. He may establish supported/supporting relationships between his Component Commanders for each effect, while delegating the maximum practicable freedom of action as to how these activities are conducted.


2G6.2. Joint action schematics are a useful means by which planned activities can be described and communicated. It is unlikely that a single schematic could depict the entirety of a campaign. More likely is that respective operation orders (OPORDs) (and associated fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)) will use joint action schematics to depict the key activities involved in a particular phase or period of a campaign.



Legend	
C2	Command and control
Lt Bde	Light Brigade
SEAD	Suppression of enemy air defences

## Appendix 2G7 – Joint action synchronisation matrix

Partially complete, using those limited activities derived in previous appendices, to demonstrate the tool.





## Annex 2H – Military risk

2H1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 *Campaigning* provides a commander's perspective on military risk, defined as *the probability and implications of an event of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences, taking place*. Risk indicates the *likelihood* of something going right or wrong, and the *impact*, good or bad. The potential adverse consequences of any event (or risk) are generally referred to as threats, and potentially beneficial consequences as opportunities; many events present a combination of the two.<sup>1</sup> Risk has different implications at different levels of warfare:


- a. **Strategic risk.** Events that impact upon or change the overall strategic context may have strategic implications, in the worst case jeopardising the achievement of desired strategic outcomes. Strategic risks are often associated with national standing, and the ability to exert influence at home and abroad. There may, for example, be an overly optimistic assessment of what the military instrument can achieve, undermining the credibility and potentially even the feasibility of (continuing) military intervention. Alternatively, any perceived lack of legitimacy may undermine political and domestic resolve, and support from the international community, including any necessary approval or cooperation from an indigenous population. Amongst partners in a coalition, any lack of cohesion – whether political or military – may also give rise to the risk of discord and, potentially, to dysfunction.
  
- b. **Operational risk.** Risk at the operational level is associated with the characteristic gearing between strategic objectives and tactical activity. It may manifest itself in at least two different ways. First, the risk may arise due to an act of campaign planning – such as the selection of an inappropriate centre of gravity or decisive condition. Mis-planning of this sort may threaten a Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC's) achievement of his campaign end-state. Alternatively, creating a particular decisive condition – even an initially ill-judged one – may present an unforeseen opportunity that can be turned to a JTFC's advantage. Secondly, even a JTFC's best-laid plans may not

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<sup>1</sup> The expression 'risk' will be used to encompass both threats and opportunity, unless it is relevant to distinguish between them.

preclude risk arising during campaign execution, either through external events or influences (such as a change in political circumstances) or through the performance of the joint force (which may include unexpected successes as well as unwelcome reverses). The most likely consequence of operational risk is that a JTFC's freedom of action is curtailed (or an opportunity presented for it to be exploited), thereby causing the joint force to pause or culminate (or, alternatively, to gain tempo).

c. **Tactical risk.** Tactical risk arises from the effects of both planned activity, and other anticipated events, and the entirely unplanned and unforeseen (events of chance). That which is planned or foreseen may have both intended and unintended (foreseen and unforeseen) effects, which may be favourable or unfavourable. The former, whether intended, unintended or even unforeseen, represent opportunities to be seized. The latter, in turn, represent potential threats. Clearly some of these risks can be addressed through contingency planning, but those that are unforeseen, or arise from activities or events that are themselves unforeseen, are the most difficult to mitigate. Figure 2H.1 illustrates how activities, events and resulting effects may give rise to opportunities and threats:



**Figure 2H.1 – Tactical risk**

d. **Linkage between levels of risk.** In the same way that tactical events can have strategic repercussions, and strategic decisions can have tactical implications, so too, risks at the tactical level can have consequences at both the operational and strategic levels. Those managing risk (described below) should always be aware of this broader perspective, when assessing likelihood, impact and ownership in particular. Indeed, it may be appropriate for strategic, operational and indeed tactical commanders to compare their assessments of risk, to identify those that are likely to cascade down the chain of command, as well as those that could percolate up.

2H2. **Risk appetite.** Military commanders have always practised risk management in military decision making, but their appetite for risk and their approach to it may vary widely depending on their level of training and experience. Recognising the factors that affect his own and others' perceptions of risk is an important aspect of a JTFC's leadership. The perceived level of risk is often related to potential losses and gains, and a JTFC should apply his judgement to weigh, in so far as is possible, the estimated cost against the potential benefits with regards to achievement of the end-state. The right attitude of mind is important; one that sees risks not only as threats, but also as potential opportunities to be exploited. Risk analysis and management supports the taking of calculated risks, rather than gambles, while avoiding unduly cautious decision-making, and missed opportunities.

2H3. **Multinational operations.** In multinational operations the difficulty of risk assessment is compounded as a result of the number and range of potential variables. Two common areas of risk often associated with multinational operations are:

a. **Strategic cohesion.** Just as the UK's national strategic aim and objectives are sometimes difficult to discern, so too establishing a multinational aim and associated objectives can prove challenging. Unless there is a clear collective purpose, such as provided by a NATO Article V, different national interests, domestic politics (including changes of government), and interpretations of international propriety and obligation, are all likely to impinge. In such a dynamic strategic context, perhaps devoid of an agreed strategy, a JTFC should navigate

through a series of national interests and 'red cards'. Accordingly, some of the most significant risks a JTFC may encounter are those associated with multinational cohesion at the strategic level.

b. **Multinational risk appetite.** Each nation determines how its personnel are employed, normally based upon their own acceptable levels of risk. Moreover, as the threat is unlikely to be uniform across the joint operations area (JOA) and may be subject to frequent change, risk reduction and mitigation measures are unlikely to be uniform across a joint force.

2H4. **Multi-agency operations.** While other government departments (OGDs) and other civilian partners<sup>2</sup> can, and do, work in highly hazardous situations, they may withdraw their personnel if they judge that a lack of security is preventing them from working effectively. Accordingly, a JTFC should appreciate the risk appetite of civilian partners, determine their commitment of resources and personnel, and address as an integral part of his planning the consequences of their support being periodically or conditionally unavailable.

### **Risk analysis and management**


2H5. Military risk analysis is complementary to the operations planning process. It seeks to identify and quantify expected risks, and to pursue those that maximise the potential for military advantage without prejudicing the overall military position. While subordinate commanders should also conduct local reviews, ultimate responsibility for assessment and coordination of risk resides with a JTFC, who dictates the overall risk posture accordingly. Risk analysis is an ongoing process, subject to continued review and adaptation in response to the constantly changing situation.

2H6. Risk analysis identifies those activities and events that may give rise to significant risk, assesses their likelihood, potential impact and ownership. Risk management implements plans and activities to reduce the possibility of the events occurring, to mitigate their consequences should they occur, and exploit the opportunities they may present. Risk analysis and management

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<sup>2</sup> For example, non-military departments of multinational partners, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

form a continuous process (Figure 2H.2), and one that cannot be addressed separately or in isolation from operational design. They are intrinsic to planning as their results lead to refinement and adjustment of the campaign plan, and to a series of indicators to be monitored and contingency plans that may be implemented, requiring ongoing operations management. Risk analysis and management techniques are described in Appendix 2H1.



**Figure 2H.2 – Risk analysis and management**



## Appendix 2H1 – Risk analysis and management

2H1.1. Military planning is invariably based on the premise that things will, as a rule, go according to plan – that is to say that planned activity will have (at least) the favourable effects intended. Consequently, risk analysis and management tends to focus on the ‘what if’ things do not go to plan, or unplanned things go off, to unfavourable effect. While the rest of Appendix 2H1 addresses this aspect of risk, an equally important consideration is how best a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) can capitalise upon activities or events whose effects are more favourable than anticipated. An appetite for risk is as much to do with identifying fleeting opportunities as it is about preparing for possible setbacks.

### Identify risk

2H1.2. Risk identification generally involves recognising what could go wrong, and how it could happen, and should begin from the onset of campaign planning. All the steps of the operational estimate can be used to identify risk (see Chapter 2, Section 5), however:

- a. Steps 1 (understand the situation) and step 2a (mission analysis) may be used to identify strategic risk, and any consequent operational risks.
- b. Steps 2b (evaluate objects and factors) and step 2c (Commander’s analysis and guidance) may be used to identify operational and tactical risks.
- c. Further risks may also be identified during step 3 (formulate potential courses of action (CoAs)), step 4 (develop and validate courses of action) and step 5 (evaluate courses of action).

### Assess risk

2H1.3. Having identified risks, the next stage is to assess them, which should be conducted in parallel with the operational estimate and especially the development of courses of action. Risk assessment seeks to understand the likelihood of the activity or event occurring, the potential severity of the

outcome, and to ascertain who owns each risk (that is to say, who is impacted upon). While risks should be analysed individually, it is also important to understand their collective impact across all levels of command. For instance, an activity may be deemed to have minimal impact at the tactical level but to have significant implications at the strategic level. Even though the likelihood of its occurrence may be small, measures of mitigation should be put in place.

**2H1.4. Likelihood and impact of risk.** Any potential risk should be assessed, in terms of its *likelihood* and its *impact*, using all available objective and subjective methods and techniques. The importance or weighting attributed to each risk assists the prioritisation of measures to mitigate or reduce their impact, and aids the development of potential exploitation options:

- a. **Risk matrix.** The risk of any particular event occurring may be plotted on a matrix, such as that at Figure 2H1.1, showing likelihood versus impact. An activity or event may, for example, be classified as high likelihood of occurrence, and high impact – overall, a high risk score. To aid his subsequent management, a JTFC may draw his own risk tolerance line, to provide broad guidance rather than a prescriptive ‘rule’ to be followed. In particular, the acceptable threshold may need to be adjusted to the political situation or context. For example, in non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and similar operations, there may be political imperatives that require the risk to UK citizens and forces to be reduced to a greater extent than might be necessary in warfighting. However, no matter what the nature of the operation, the threshold should not be set to such an extreme that the plan itself becomes risk averse. Casualties, deliberate or accidental, are a reality of military operations and the desire to avoid them totally may well impact adversely on the achievement of the mission; a JTFC should always balance the level of acceptable risk with the context of the campaign.


Impact	Likelihood				
	Very high	High	Medium	Low	Very low
Very high	E	E	H	H	M
High	E	H	M	M	M
Medium	H	M	M	L	L
Low	M	M	L	L	L
Very low	M	L	L	L	L

Legend	
	Risk tolerance line
E	Extremely high risk; Mission likely to fail
H	High risk; Inability to accomplish all parts of the mission
M	Moderate risk; Mission accomplishment likely but possibility of reduced capability
L	Low risk; Little or no impact on accomplishment of the mission


**Figure 2H1.1 – Risk assessment matrix**

b. **Probability impact graph.** Risk may also be plotted using a probability impact graph, an example of which is at Figure 2H1.2. This builds on the matrix approach, by plotting each risk in terms of its impact and likelihood, within environmental or thematic areas. This allows the most severe risks to be highlighted, and predictions of trends to be forecast.



**Figure 2H1.2 – Probability impact graph**

c. **Risks as opportunities.** While these analytical approaches treat risk predominantly as a threat, they can also be used to better understand any opportunities that might present themselves. Each risk can be analysed both for adverse outcome, but also for the likelihood and impact of favourable advantages that might be gained. For example, weather may present a threat to friendly forces, but may present an even greater threat to potential opponents, thereby providing an opportunity to be exploited. Figure 2H1.3 illustrates one such approach, whereby each event is plotted for both the threat it could represent, as well as the opportunity it might generate, using side-by-side matrices. A JTFC is likely to be particularly interested in events that present the greatest opportunity, or a threat to his plans (denoted by the triangular area).



**Figure 2H1.3 – Threats and opportunities**

d. **Risk analysis and decision making.** The techniques described above provide a JTFC with some potential frameworks for his deliberations on risk and risk taking. There are other risk models available, many software based. While a JTFC is free to use any process which aids his thinking, he should be wary of placing too much stall in their outputs. As in all aspects of campaigning, it is a JTFC’s skill and judgement that remains of absolute importance when decision making in relation to risk.

**2H1.5. Ownership of risk.** Identifying where risk consequences are likely to be felt, and the most appropriate level of ownership and management, is an important aspect of risk analysis, but not necessarily a straightforward one – even if a risk impacts most severely at one level of command, its effects may also be felt at others. A JTFC should gain an understanding of the relationship between risks at the tactical, operational and strategic level, and how the

impacts of each may cascade down or percolate up the chain of command. Tactical risks generally deal with the physical cost in terms of life and equipment. While these risks clearly impact upon component commanders and their subordinates, they may also have operational, or indeed strategic, implications. Under democratic systems, military operations are necessarily linked to political decisions, with a natural tendency for risk to migrate upwards, particularly in complex, multinational or multi-agency operations. Consequently, a JTFC should assess whether, and to what extent, tactical risks (whether singly or compounded) could unduly constrain his freedom of action, and therefore where the 'ownership' of such risks best lies. Equally, political risks – a feature of adversarial, democratic systems – are owned by the Government, but their impacts may cascade down to a JTFC. He may not necessarily exercise any control of events associated with them, but they may nonetheless affect the conduct of his campaign.

### Plan for risk

**2H1.6. Risk reduction, mitigation and exploitation.** Having identified and assessed likely risks, a JTFC and his staff should develop measures to reduce their likelihood, mitigate unfavourable outcomes, and exploit opportunities that may arise. This occurs throughout the operational estimate, and specifically during the formulation, development and validation of courses of action (steps 3 and 4). Associated risks should be amongst the comparative criteria when evaluating differing courses of action (step 5), and feature in the decision brief given to a JTFC (step 6). Operational risks should be prioritised, so that attention can be focused on mitigating the most severe first. A JTFC may decide to deal with risks in a variety of ways:

- a. **Terminate.** Removing a risk entirely is always the preferred option wherever possible. Termination may be achieved by changing the plan so the risk no longer presents itself, or through treatment (see sub-paragraph b) to the point where the risk no longer represents a threat. Alternatively, the situation may change such that the risk is overtaken by events.
- b. **Treat.** Treating a risk to reduce its impact, or mitigate likely adverse outcomes, is the next best option. Balancing, or trading-off, the various constituent elements of each risk requires considerable skill

on the part of a JTFC, for military risk-taking can never be considered an exact science. Risks may have arisen through uncertainty, which may be reduced through the answering of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), or through the development of Indicators and Warnings to enable timely decision-making. The better the situational awareness and control of the variables, the more precisely a risk can be assessed and treated. A JTFC may also direct his staff to prepare and issue contingency plans to address any consequences associated with foreseeable risk. At its most extreme, risk treatment may lead to a change in the existing plan. Risk treatment should always consider the opportunities to be exploited by any risk situation.

c. **Tolerate.** Provided a risk falls below his personal tolerance line (see Figure 2H1.1), a JTFC may decide to tolerate it without attempting treatment, by changing plans or re-directing resources.

d. **Transfer.** Where a risk cannot be treated, and a JTFC is unwilling to tolerate it, he may seek to transfer the risk up the chain of command, or sideways to partners; both require considerable negotiation.

## Manage risk

2H1.7. Once a course of action has been selected for development into a plan (step 6), risk mitigation options are further refined to a point where they may be managed effectively during the campaign. Each risk should be articulated clearly in the staff work (directives, plans, and orders). It is essential that ownership, potential impacts, assessed likelihood, indicators and warnings, and any plans to reduce, mitigate and/or exploit them, are clearly understood by subordinates. The implications and impact of each risk are likely to vary through the course of the campaign. Revisiting risk assessments and plans, included as part of campaign effectiveness assessment, is an important ongoing remit.



## Annex 2I – Red teams, wargaming and operational analysis

### Introduction

2I1. A Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his planning staff focus on determining potential solutions to their perceived problem and developing plans to execute the selected courses of action (CoAs). In so doing, they should be alert to the possibility of planning becoming distorted through human and organisational fallibility. Probably most significant in this respect is 'groupthink', described as a 'a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action'.<sup>1</sup> To that end, the Chief of Staff (COS) should consider nominating a separate red team, with responsibility for developing alternative (red) perspectives to that of the main (blue) planning team. This approach culminates in traditional wargaming, to help develop, select or refine a JTFC's courses of actions. Both red teaming and wargaming are intrinsically adversarial techniques; their purpose is to deliberately pitch planners and their ideas against each other, with the objective of scrutinising planning assumptions, discovering weaknesses in the plan, and thereby improving the validity of the final campaign plan. Course of action development and wargaming should also be supported by modelling techniques such as operational analysis (OA), wherever possible, as a means to better quantify potential outcomes.

### Red teams

2I2. **Red Teaming Guide.** DCDC's Red Teaming Guide is designed to introduce and guide those who wish to practise or use red teaming.<sup>2</sup> It describes the concept of red teaming and its core ideas, the roles of those using and participating in red teaming, guidelines for good red teaming and a 'how to' guide in terms of applying red teaming to a specific problem. It supersedes the previous (first) edition of the *Guide to Red Teaming* published in February 2010. It is available in hard copy and on DCDC's internet and intranet sites.

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<sup>1</sup> Janis, I. J. *Victims of Groupthink*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1972), Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin.

<sup>2</sup> DCDC *Red Teaming Guide* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) dated January 2013.

213. **Purpose of red teams.** A red team is ‘an enabled cell, discrete from the main staff, which develops opponent, neutral, and other contextual perspectives in order to challenge the perceived norms and assumptions of the commander and his staff’. Traditionally, red teams have represented the opponent, his tactics, doctrine and culture, and likely actions and reactions. This remains entirely apposite for major warfighting. In other types of military activity, however, consideration should be given to not only an opponent(s), but also to any other actor or group who could influence completion of a JTFC’s mission.<sup>3</sup>


214. **Structure of red teams.** Accordingly, there can be no prescription regarding the exact composition of a red team, which should instead be determined on a case-by-case basis to reflect the nature of the situation. If a red team has already been established (see JDP 2-00 ‘*Intelligence*’), it should logically form the core of the red team for planning, suitably enhanced with J5 and other planning staff. As no headquarters has a surfeit of staff, however, the COS should allocate numbers as appropriate to the perceived benefits of red teaming. Ideally, members should be dedicated to a red team and have no other staffing responsibilities, which might detract from, or conflict with, their core task. Where appropriate, a red team should draw upon any external subject matter experts affiliated to the headquarters, as well as other government departments’ (OGD) representatives.

215. **Red team process.** Drawing on the same analysis data as the main (blue) planning team, the red team should conduct their own red estimate in parallel with the operational estimate, and produce a discrete red plan.<sup>4</sup> Where there is more than one significant actor to consider, it could be appropriate to conduct a number of red estimates, time and resources permitting. Figure 2I.1 indicates the approximate sequencing of a red estimate, and production of a red plan, in relation to an operational estimate. As the figure implies, careful synchronisation between the two is essential.

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<sup>3</sup> Indeed, some multinational partners employ not only red, but also, white and green teams in acknowledgment of the range of perspectives they seek to consider. The UK has retained the single title, broadened to encompass more than one view.

<sup>4</sup> Where feasible, a red team should use opponent doctrine, and apply culturally relevant planning assumptions.



**Figure 2I.1 – Sequencing of red and blue planning**

2I6. The degree of interaction between a red team and the rest of the staff needs careful management. While a red team should be aware of the general nature of a JTFC's potential courses of action in order to respond to them, this should not colour their own thinking to the point where they cease to provide an independent red function. Accordingly, it is generally appropriate to

coordinate the interaction of red and main planning teams at specific points in the estimate process. Thus, a red team may be called upon to offer views and question deductions during step 1 (Understand the situation), step 2c (Commander's analysis and guidance), and step 5 (Evaluate courses of action), as a JTFC or COS deems fit. A red team should also be involved in wargaming as required from completion of step 3 (Formulate potential courses of action) onwards (see paragraph 2I10).

2I7. Experience has shown that a red team leader needs to execute his role with tact and sensitivity, particularly if he is less experienced than the JTFC.<sup>5</sup> While there is general agreement that red teaming adds value, few enjoy the criticism, explicit or implicit, that it brings. A red team should, therefore, focus on significant issues to materially improve the JTFC's planning (that is to say that a red perspective is not an end in itself). The COS should select the red team leader carefully, bearing in mind that the views of junior staff may be ignored by a JTFC, while an overly robust approach may also prove unhelpful. Equally, however, having elected to use a red team, a JTFC and COS should remain open to the alternative perspectives that they bring.

### **Wargaming**

2I8. Wargaming is used to examine courses of action during the operational estimate. It is focused on the coordination of capabilities and activities at component level and, in particular, with the orchestration of their respective efforts to realise combined effects. It addresses all the various facets of Joint Action (information activities, fires, manoeuvre and outreach), as well as the activities of other military and civilian actors, within the operating space. Due to the potential number of manoeuvring elements at the operational level, a JTFC, or more likely his COS, should consider the degree of aggregation, and consequently the span of activity, that can practically be wargamed (see Appendix 2I1).

2I9. As an adversarial technique, wargaming plays friendly, neutral and hostile elements together to identify any shortcomings in potential or selected courses of action. The interaction between friendly elements can be represented from within a JTFC's staff, supported by components, while the

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<sup>5</sup> Increasingly, the UK is using mentors, usually previous military commanders, to assist JTFCs. It may be appropriate, at times, for such figures to act as spokesmen for the red team.

actions and reactions of opponents require a duly enabled red cell. Wargaming at the operational level should also identify any broader implications of military activity, across the international community for example, which should then be notified to the appropriate national or multinational military strategic commander. Wargaming can vary in scope and complexity, from informal discussions around a map to the use of sophisticated computer simulations; time and availability of resources are likely to limit what can be done. Regardless of which techniques are employed, wargaming should provide:

- a thorough understanding of the likely actions and reactions of friendly, neutral and hostile actors within the joint operations area (JOA) and, where appropriate, beyond;
- an indication of the likely effects of military activity, and the associated risks – threats and potential opportunities – that such activity might generate;
- a specific assessment of any friendly courses of action versus those of an opponent;
- refinement and development of courses of action, including the detailed determination of relevant timings, force (re-)deployments and logistic implications; and
- ‘bullet-proofing’ of a JTFC’s chosen course of action.

2I10. Wargaming can be used as part of the planning process, to ensure that staff resources are used in the most efficient and effective manner and to highlight issues for further analysis. The time and level of effort devoted to wargaming depends upon the priority assigned by a JTFC. Thus while it might be desirable to compare fully all courses of action under consideration, this may be unrealistic. At the very least, however, the selected course of action should be tested and refined through wargaming.<sup>6</sup>

2I11. **Wargaming methodology.** The conduct of wargaming is described at Appendix 2I1. A JTFC or his COS decide when during the operational estimate wargaming should occur. Three potential points, illustrated in Figure 2I.1, are:

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<sup>6</sup> This is separate and discrete from mission rehearsal (the US refer to ROC Drills (review of concept)), undertaking to check and confirm subordinates’ understanding of a JTFC’s plan, prior to implementation.

a. **Step 4 – Develop and validate courses of action.** Wargaming can help to visualise an embryonic course of action, indicating in particular the art of the possible and enabling impractical courses of action to be discarded at an early stage. Early wargaming should yield a better understanding of a proposed course of action (see paragraph 3E8), including any relevant planning considerations, such as correlation of forces, relative strengths and synchronisation.

b. **Step 5 – Evaluate courses of action.** Wargaming can be used to compare each friendly course of action with appropriate opponent courses of action, and any other relevant factors, to determine the likelihood of success. Wargaming at this stage provides information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each individual course of action, for evaluation against a JTFC's course of action selection criteria, but such comprehensive wargaming requires a considerable commitment of time and staff resources to be conducted effectively.

c. **Step 6 – Commander's decision.** Once the JTFC has selected his course of action, wargaming can contribute to its refinement, including identifying his key decisions, and any further commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). In addition, wargaming assists in the production of coordinating instructions (such as the joint action synchronisation matrix), indicates specific requirements for battlespace management, and highlights potential tasks and associated readiness for an operational reserve. Wargaming may also identify potential unplanned or unfavourable effects, and hence the requirement for Contingency Plans (CONPLANS). It is arguably at this stage in the planning process that detailed wargaming can add most value.

2I12. **Participants.** Potential wargaming participants include:

a. **Blue team.** The blue team, who have developed the JTFC's plan, should include key J5 or J3/5 planners, J1/J4, J6, component headquarters staffs, J3 operations support staff and other contributors to joint action, such as Joint Force (JF) Engineers, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) staff and the Political Adviser (POLAD).

- b. **Red team.** Either the full red team (see paragraph 2I3) participates or, if preferred, the team leader or a mentor represents their views (see paragraph 2I6).
- c. **Chairman/referee and secretary.** The chairman/referee, empowered to exercise authority during the game, should have had little part to play in the conduct of either the operational or the red estimate. He can, therefore, act impartially, as well as providing an honest broker in situations where opposing sides lose sight of the purpose of the event – namely, to test the JTFC's plan, not to beat each other. A secretary records the output of the game and should be sufficiently familiar with all of the plans to catch the emerging issues logically and succinctly.
- d. **Subject matter experts and other government department personnel.** Available subject matter experts and other government departments personnel should support wargaming, sharing their time between red and blue teams where necessary.
- e. **Supporting staff.** Depending upon the wargaming technique(s) being employed, a variety of specialist staff may be required. Some, such as operational analysis staff, provide substantive input (see paragraphs 2I13 and 2I14), while others, such as computer simulation experts, simply enable the wargaming process to run smoothly.
- f. **Joint Task Force Commander.** A JTFC may wish to attend the wargame personally for the greater insights he can bring. These benefits, however, should be balanced against other effects that may be realised by his presence; for example, his staff may be uneasy about criticising those elements of the plan they assess as unsatisfactory. A JTFC may, however, judge that for reasons of efficiency (when time is short) or effectiveness (when his personal perspective is vital) he should attend the wargaming. Under these circumstances, he may provide guidance, reject unwanted concepts, and assist in keeping the staff focused. If a JTFC attends the wargaming of multiple courses of action, he may rapidly identify which course of action he favours.

2I13. **Approach to wargaming.** Wargaming may require considerable time and staff resources, at a point when the headquarters is already under pressure to confirm and disseminate a plan. It may also be seen as a protracted and cumbersome process, of only marginal benefit. If prepared for fully, trained for regularly and resourced appropriately, however, wargaming should form an essential part of a JTFC's planning repertoire. As with other aspects of the operational estimate process, how it is done is very much up to a JTFC. He may wargame with a small team (as he might conduct his mission analysis) or he may involve a wider group (for their mutual benefit).

### **Operational analysis**

2I14. **Purpose and characteristics.** Operational analysis is 'the use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision makers to resolve problems'. Operational analysis delivers quantitative rigour and objectivity to operations planning and decision-making. Operational analysis specialists draw on mathematical techniques and modelling to: examine or test a developing plan; estimate or simulate assumptions regarding likely changes as a consequence of a plan; and present data and information to realise better-informed decisions. Operational analysis is characterised by its:

- a. **Independence.** Operational analysis is impartial, and analysts should not have a vested interest in any aspect of the plan or its implementation.
- b. **Credibility.** Operational analysis provides a JTFC with justifiable advice, based on quantitative, systematic examination.
- c. **Clarity.** Operational analysis should be presented in a way that is meaningful, comprehensible and useful to a JTFC and his staff.

2I15. **Tasks.** During the planning process, operational analysis may provide:

- **Course of action evaluation.** Assistance to risk analysis, wargaming support, and calculations of relative probability of success.


- **Correlation of forces.** Assessments of relative capability and force ratios.
- **Combat resolution.** Estimates of combat duration, personnel casualty, combat equipment losses and remaining combat effectiveness.
- **Logistics planning.** Support to deployment, sustainment, movement, equipment support, medical and other logistic planning.
- **Campaign assessment.** Support to the identification and development of measurements of activity (MOA) and measurements of effectiveness (MOE).
- **Scientific and technical advice.** Technical advice, for example, on equipment capabilities, and a conduit for further assistance from the scientific research community and industry.



## Appendix 2I1 – Wargaming

### Stage 1 – Select the event to be wargamed

2I1.1. The first task is to identify the event(s) to be wargamed, based on what a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) wishes to achieve, or needs to know, in the time available. As Figure 2I1.1 illustrates, when deciding what to wargame, a JTFC should consider both the aggregation of forces (or resolution), and scope of the event(s). There is no preferred approach, and indeed it is important to be flexible and to adjust the wargame to the issues to be resolved. For example, a JTFC may wish to take an overview of the campaign, or a phase thereof; he may look at single or grouped decisive conditions or supporting effects or instead, concentrate on specific activities requiring detailed synchronisation between components. The event(s) should be those a JTFC believes to hold most risk, either due to vulnerability to opponent action, or perhaps the complexity of coordination required. Opponent courses of action (CoAs), usually the most likely or most dangerous, should also be considered.



**Figure 2I1.1 – Wargame options**

## **Stage 2 – Structure the wargame**

2I1.2. **Stage 2a – Determine the time available.** The Chief of Staff (COS) should use the staff timeline to ascertain the time available for the wargaming.

2I1.3. **Stage 2b – Select the technique(s) and format of the game.** The COS, in conjunction with the chairman/referee, should select the wargame technique(s) to be used, the number of game turns possible within the time allocated, and thus the length of each turn. In addition, he should specify the (notional) start time for the wargame in terms of the operations or activities under review.

2I1.4. **Stage 2c – Choose the method to record and display game results.** The output of the wargame should be captured as a narrative, a work or record sheet, or as a joint action synchronisation matrix (see Appendix 2G7), the timescale of which is determined by the length of the game turns.

2I1.5. **Stage 2d – Identify the players.** The structure of the wargame determines the extent of player participation, this being dependent on the stage of the operational estimate during which wargaming is being carried out.

## **Stage 3 – Gather the tools, materials and data**

2I1.6. The wargaming area should be formally arranged, with seats designated for players, usually with the blue team on one side and the red team on the other, with an additional seating area made available for other participants. The chairman/referee should direct the assembly of appropriate aids, and, depending upon the complexity of the game, conduct rehearsals (especially where heavy reliance is placed upon computer support).

## **Stage 4 – Brief staff to allow preparation**

2I1.7. The chairman/referee's pre-brief is key to enabling the necessary preparation by players and participants. It should cover:

- the technique(s) and format of the game;
- timings (including breaks);

- player appointments and other participants;
- aids required and responsibilities for their preparation;
- recording system, wargame output, and responsibilities;
- final staff products and responsibility for their delivery;
- wargame rules;
- red team review and update (as required); and
- blue team review and update (as required).

## Stage 5 – Conduct wargame and assess results

2I1.8. **Stage 5a – Review.** The chairman/referee should open with a review<sup>1</sup> of the strategic guidance, the JTFC's direction, any assumptions, and the conduct of the wargame. Players then confirm that their forces have been set-up in accordance with their course of action at the game start time.

2I1.9. **Stage 5b – Wargame 1 (red courses of action versus blue course of action 1).** Comparison of courses of action should proceed using an action, reaction, counter-reaction methodology:

- a. **Red force start-state.** The red team opens with a short explanation of the opponent(s) strategic and operational intent and force dispositions. Their detailed scheme of manoeuvre should be left for the game turn itself. They should also outline any key neutral or other actors, their dispositions and any critical issues.
- b. **Blue force start-state.** Components, followed by joint force enablers, open with a short explanation of their intent, capabilities and initial dispositions.
- c. **Game turn 1.**
  - (1) **Action.** The side holding the initiative, which is designated by the chairman/referee, describes the intended activities of its forces, including missions, tasks, and coordinating measures, within the time period specified for that

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<sup>1</sup> The depth of this scene-setter will depend upon what was covered during the pre-brief, to whom and how long ago.

game turn. Players, having spoken, move pertinent units (or aggregates thereof).

(2) **Reaction.** The side without the initiative then describes its reaction, whilst moving the pertinent forces.

(3) **Counter-reaction.** The side with the initiative describes its counter-reaction.

(4) **Remainder of players.** Other players analyse the game turn within their area of expertise, providing comment as appropriate.

(5) **Judgement.** Based on the different actions, attrition is applied and players agree to the new unit locations and strengths to be used in the next game turn. Operational analysis (OA) may inform this process, and the chairman/referee's judgement is final should there be any disagreement. Although the most likely outcome should be accepted, a possible worst case should also be examined if the outcome may influence subsequent actions or decisions.

(6) **Recording.** Capturing data, decisions, coordination or synchronisation instructions and subordinate missions/tasks and groupings is essential to extract full benefit from the wargame. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) should be captured as they emerge. The chairman/referee should continuously assess the feasibility of the course of action and begin to compile its advantages and disadvantages. Key issues and points should be submitted, as they arise, to J5 and J3 staffs, but should not be resolved during wargaming; instead, they should be captured for subsequent refinement of the plan. The secretary compiles the wargame record sheet. In particular, he should note any requirement for contingency plans (CONPLANs) (whether branches or sequels), any amendments or additions to the decision support matrix (DSM) (see JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*), any changes to the Joint Force Task Organisation

(TASKORG), or the composition, tasks, location, and notice to move (NTM) for the reserve. In addition, the secretary should consider the accuracy of time and space considerations, and coordination measures, and capture amendments to the Joint Action synchronisation matrix, highlighting areas of particular risk.

- d. **Game turn 2.** The wargame continues through as many turns as required for the wargame's purpose to be achieved. When completed the chairman/referee summarises the results, and associated staff actions.

2I1.10. **Stage 5c – Wargame 2 (red course of action versus blue course of action 2/3).** If necessary, forces should be relocated and start states identified for the next set of courses of action. The cycle, described above, is repeated as many times as necessary.

2I1.11. **Stage 5d – Conclusion.** At the conclusion of the wargame, the chairman/referee, or if appropriate the COS, highlights the key points and issues that have arisen, and the required follow-on staff actions, including:

- a. For all wargaming:
  - (1) Generation of additional commander's critical information requirements.
  - (2) Implications for intelligence requirements management, including adjustments to the Intelligence Collection Plan (see JDP 2-00 *Intelligence*).
  - (3) Identified risks requiring further analysis and management (see Annex 3D).
  - (4) Preparation of contingency plans.
  - (5) Adjustments to campaign schematics.

b. For evaluation wargaming (conducted as part of step 5 of the operational estimate):

(1) Completed evaluation sheets for a JTFC's subsequent course of action selection.

c. For refinement wargaming (conducted at and after step 6 of the operational estimate):

(1) Adjustments to joint action synchronisation matrices and timelines.

(2) Adjustments to component missions, tasks and coordinating instructions.

(3) Adjustments to decision support matrix.

## Annex 2J – Representative Joint Task Force Commander’s Campaign Directive

*[Document reference]*

See distribution

*[DTG]*

### Op [\*\*\*\*] Campaign Directive

References:

- A. UK National Cross-Government Strategy.
- B. CDS’ Directive(s).
- C. Jt Comd’s Mission Directive.
- D. Multinational Commander’s Directives.
- E. Jt Comd’s [theatre] Reference Document.
- F. UK National Information Strategy and Regional Information Plan.
- G. Multinational Information Strategies/Plans.
- H. OPORD 001/XX *[often the first OPORD is issued concurrently]*.
- I. Force Instructions Document for Op [\*\*\*\*] *[if issued in parallel; more often it follows]*.
- J. INTSUM.
- K. JSP 465.

Time zone used throughout this directive: [ZULU]

### Preface

1. The Campaign Directive: describes the nature of the crises from both strategic and operational level perspectives; sets out the strategic intent for the campaign; and provides the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC’s) intent in terms of what is to be achieved in order to successfully reach the campaign end-state and information effect. The Campaign Directive is ‘owned’ by the JTFC although it will be influenced by others, particularly the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) and the Military Strategic Commander. It is the core document from which should stem all subsequent planning and execution by the joint force.

2. The Campaign Directive provides the JTFC's concept of operations (CONOPS); this is founded on those decisive conditions deemed necessary to achieving the campaign objectives. Subsequent operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) will address the supporting effects and activities (missions, tasks and purposes) that are required to achieve each of the decisive conditions.
3. The campaign directive is supported by a Force Instructions Document (FID), which contains supplementary instructions and supporting information – an example of which is at Annex 2M. **[J5 to complete]**

## **Situation**

*[This section is derived from the analysis executive summary (see Chapter 1) and Step 1 of the operational estimate – analysis products may be included as Annexes].*

4. **Geo-strategic background.** **[J2/J5 to complete]**
5. **Critical actors.** **[J2 to complete]**
  - a. **Opponents.**
  - b. **Neutrals.**
  - c. **Friendly.** *[Including multinational forces and any aligned indigenous forces].*
  - d. **Current postures.** *[Including capabilities and dispositions (orders of battle (ORBATs) for conventional forces, organisational structures for irregular actors) and status of neutrals. This may be deferred to OPORD 001 or a separate intelligence summary (INTSUM) and simply referenced here].*
  - e. **Assessed strategic intent.**
  - f. **Assessed operational intent.** *[Opponent operational courses of action (CoAs) can be described in a table (as below – repeated for each*

*major group or amalgamated as appropriate) or in free text. If lengthy, it may be decided to include the detail as an annex with only ‘most likely course of action’ included in the main body. If already issued as an INTSUM/warning order, reference here].*

	<b>CoA A – Most likely</b>	<b>CoA B – Least likely</b>	<b>CoA C – Most dangerous</b>
<b>Outline concept</b>			
<b>Opponent’s operational end-state</b>			
<b>Land</b>			
<b>Maritime</b>			
<b>Air</b>			
<b>Time and space</b>			
<b>Indicators and warnings</b>			

**Appointments**

6. The following appointments have been confirmed by..... **[J5 to complete]**

- a. **Joint Commander.** The Jt Comd is *[Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)]*.
- b. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC is *[name]*.
- c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) is *[name]*.
- d. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is *[name]*.

- e. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is *[name]*.
- f. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** The Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC) is *[name]*.
- g. **Joint Force Logistics Component Commander.** The Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC) is *[name]*.
- h. **Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems.** The Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems (Comd JFCIS) is *[name]*.
- i. **Commander Joint Force Engineers.** The Commander Joint Force Engineers (Comd JFEngr) is *[name]*.
- j. **Force elements/troops.**

## Direction

- 7. The following direction has been received: **[J5 to complete]**.
  - a. **Strategic context.** *HMG's overall strategy is to ....*
  - b. **National strategic aim.**
  - c. **National strategic objectives.**
  - d. **Military strategic end-state.**
  - e. **Military strategic objectives.**
  - f. **Strategic narrative.**
  - g. **Information effect.**
  - h. **Chief of Defence Staff's intent.**

- i. **Campaign end-state** *[described through campaign objectives, if known at this stage].*
- j. **Joint Commander's intent.**

### Joint operations area

- 8. **Operations.** Depicted at Annex A. The joint operations area (JOA)<sup>1</sup> for Op [\*\*\*\*] is the territory, territorial waters out to XX nm, and airspace of XXXX.
- 9. **Intelligence.**
  - a. The Jt Comd's area of intelligence interest (All) is [....].
  - b. My area of intelligence responsibility (AIR) is [....].

### Mission

- 10. The JTF is to....*[a clear, concise statement of the task of the force and its purpose]* [J5 to complete].

### Planning

- 11. **End-state analysis. [J5 to complete]** End-state analysis is at Annex B. *[End-state analysis should clarify and confirm a JTFC's understanding of the direction he has received, validate his campaign objectives, and establish the foundations on which to determine military activities].*
- 12. **Centre of gravity (CoG) analysis. [J5 to complete]** Centre of gravity analysis is at Annex B. *[Detail critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities as appropriate].*
  - a. Opponent centres of gravity.
    - (1) Strategic.

---

<sup>1</sup> 'An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission'. (JDP 0-01.1)

- (2) Operational.
- b. Friendly centres of gravity.
  - (1) Strategic.
    - (a) UK.
    - (b) Coalition partner(s).
  - (2) Operational.
    - (a) UK.
    - (b) Coalition partners.

13. **Multi-agency.** *[Outline overall multi-agency context of the campaign and intentions of key partners. This should be linked with end-state analysis where appropriate].*

a. **Other government departments.**

(1) **UK.** *[Intention/plans of UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID), Stabilisation Unit etc, intentions for coordination/collaboration, role/authority of any deployed cross-government planning/coordination bodies].*

(2) **Other nations.** *[Intentions/plans of governmental organisations from other nations, including intentions for coordination/collaboration].*

b. **International organisations.** *[Stance/reaction of UN/NATO/EU, regional organisations such as the African Union].*

c. **Non-governmental organisations.** *[Stance/position of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)].*

- d. **Private military and security companies.** *[Role/status of private military and security companies (PMSCs), including prevailing policy on recognition and interaction].*
14. **Assumptions. [J5 to complete]** *[Including details of any outstanding commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) that may affect assumptions on which plan is based].*
- a. UK forces will be deployed for up to [?] months.
  - b. Other....
15. **Constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms. [J5 to complete – to include those imposed by superior commanders and those deduced during the operational estimate].**

### **Concept of operations [J5 to complete]**

16. **Joint Task Force Commander's intent.** My intent is .... *[This should focus on what it is that the joint force is to achieve in order to reach the campaign end-state – set in the context of the desired outcome. It should be a concise and precise statement, and should not be a synopsis of the operation. It provides the enduring logic behind all subsequent products of campaign design].*
17. **Joint Task Force Commander supporting effects.** I intend to realise the following supporting effects..... *[Developed from the top down analysis of campaign directives. These are the intended consequences of the JTFC's actions.]*
18. **Scheme of manoeuvre.** See Annex B. *[This should describe how the JTFC sees the campaign plan unfolding, in terms of 'what' it is that is to be achieved; the 'how', directing activities to achieve supporting effects, is provided in subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs. In this manner, component commanders can anticipate their role inside the campaign plan and play an active role in developing appropriate OPLANs and OPORDs. The scheme of manoeuvre within the JTFC's Campaign Directive should be enduring; it will be subject to periodic campaign effectiveness assessment. Campaign*

*schematics (see Annex 2G) provide a useful means to articulate campaign schemes of manoeuvre].*

- a. **Campaign end-state.**
- b. **Relationship of centre of gravity to campaign end-state.**
- c. **Decisive conditions.** Decisive conditions and their associated supporting effects are tabulated at Annex C.
- d. **Lines/groupings of operation.**

19. **Main effort.** *[Main effort is the concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. It is the principal method by which a JTFC makes his overall intent clear to his subordinates and is usually supported by the allocation of resources in order to give substance to that which he considers crucial to the success of his mission. Aware of a JTFC's main effort and priorities, subordinate commanders can take timely and independent action in fast-moving and changeable operations, thereby optimising tempo. A JTFC's main effort is likely to change over time. In his Campaign Directive, a JTFC may wish to highlight those decisive conditions that, above others, will attract 'main effort' status].*

20. **Joint Task Force Commander's key themes and messages.** *[Developed from the information effect this focuses on what the joint force uses as its overarching concept of intention, designed for broad communication application, and the more narrowly focussed communications directed at specific target audiences. It ensures that the words of the information strategy are matched by the deeds of the joint force].*

## **Risk**

21. **Risk analysis and management. [J5 to complete]** The details of risk analysis and management are at Annex 2H.

- a. **Identified strategic, operational and tactical risks.**
- b. **Risk analysis.** Ownership, impact and likelihood.

- c. **Risk management plans.**
- d. **Risk indicators and warnings.**

## **Execution**

*[See JDP 3-00, Campaign Execution – Joint action].*

- 22. **Joint action targeting. [J3 Tgts to complete]** Targeting is to be conducted in accordance with the Targeting Directive at Section xx of the FID.
- 23. **Information strategies and plans. [J3 Ops Support to complete].**
  - a. **Information strategy – target audiences, themes and messages.** *[Relevant extracts from the National Information Strategy and Information Plans].* Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.
  - b. **Multinational information strategies/plans.** *[Key deductions].*
- 24. **Information activities. [J3 Operations Support to complete]** General detail for the synchronisation of component information activities, including deception planning, is detailed in Section xx of the FID *[JDP 3-00 gives further details].*
- 25. **Outreach activities. [J3 Operations Support to complete]** General detail for the synchronisation of component outreach activities is detailed in Section xx of the FID *[JDP 3-00 gives further details].*
- 26. **Battlespace management. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.

## **Assessment**

- 27. **Measurement of activity. [J3 Ops Support/Tgts to complete]** General descriptions of measurement of activity (MOA) are at Section xx of the FID. Procedures for collation of battle damage assessment (BDA) are contained in the Targeting Directive at Section xx of the FID.

28. **Measures of effect. [J3 Ops Support to complete]** Details of measures of effect (MOE), including associated metrics and subjective data sources, baselines, success criteria and threshold levels, are at Section xx of the FID.
29. **Evidence gathering. [J5/J3 Ops Support to complete]** Evidence gathering is to be conducted collaboratively with components, civilian and military partners. The range of evidence to be used for assessment *[as required from J2, battle damage assessment, J3 reporting, human factors research (HFR) and media output analysis]* is described at Section xx of the FID. The evidence gathering plan, including allocated resources and supporting liaison architecture, is detailed in the measurement of effectiveness assessment sheet at Section xx of the FID.
30. **Evaluation. [Operational Analyst to complete]** Statistical, human factors research and other analytical techniques are detailed at Section xx of the FID.
31. **Campaign effectiveness assessment. [J5 to complete]** The timetable and mechanisms for campaign and OPORD review are at Section xx of the FID.
32. **Multinational assessment.** Assessment procedures of multinational commands, and any associated UK responsibilities, are at Section xx of the FID.

### **Coordinating and supplementary instructions**

*[As required from the following headings]*

33. **Legal. [J9 LEGAD to complete]** Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.
- a. **Use of force.** *[Including law of armed conflict, guiding direction, applicable UNSCRs (mission specific and general)].*

- b. **Status of deployed personnel.** *[Regular and reserve forces under Law of Armed Conflict, medical and religious personnel, civilian contractors, other government department staff)].*
  - c. **Jurisdiction.** *[UK Service Discipline Acts and domestic law, relevant host nation law, responsibilities and arrangements for investigation, charge and disposal of offences].*
  - d. **Liability.** *[Relevant Status of Forces Acts (SOFA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and other arrangements/agreements in place].*
  - e. **Captured persons.** *[Prisoners of war, internees and detainees].*
  - f. **Coalition partner legislation.** *[Any differences of domestic law and interpretation of International laws or mandates exercised by coalition partners].*
34. **Political/rules of engagement.** The rules of engagement (ROE) profile is at Section xx to the FID.
35. **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. [J2 to complete]** Further detail, including areas of intelligence interest and responsibility, is at Section xx to the FID *[including details for language and translation capabilities].*
36. **Operational level reserve. [J5 to complete]** *[Units, notice to deploy/move, location, committal authority, and potential options if known although more likely to be in OPORD 001].* As the campaign develops, adjustment in the size and provision of the operational reserve are directed by the JTFC.
37. **Force protection. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Further detail, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN), and combat identification, is at Section xx of the FID.
38. **Engineer. [Joint Force Engineer to complete]** General description including priorities. Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.

39. **Financial accounting. [J8 to complete]** Financial accounting instruction is at Section xx of the FID.
40. **Joint personnel recovery, conduct after capture, and escape and evasion. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Procedures and policy are detailed at Section xx of the FID.
41. **Deployment of civilians. [J1 to complete]**
42. **Personnel, administration, honours and awards.** *[Including procedures for operational location (OPLOC) tracking and the provision of an operational welfare package (OWP)]*
43. **Visitors. [J1 to complete]**

## Resources

44. The following forces ....*[This is written to include forces assigned to the JTFC, and may therefore exclude strategic forces (such as SF) and SSNs, and arranges forces in accordance with the TASKORG].*

**Logistics. [J1/4 to dictate headings and complete – reference relevant Annexes of Section xx of the FID].**

45. **Logistic scheme of manoeuvre.** *[Note that there should not be a separate logistic intent but that this should reflect the JTFC's intent above. The logistic concept is based on the logistic estimate conducted by the Logistic Planning Team (LPT)].*

46. **Logistic main effort.** *[Derived from the logistic estimate to support that of the JTFC].*

47. **Deployment and recovery of the force.** *[Produced by the J4 Joint Mounting Cell].*

48. **Reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI).** *[This involves the J4 led reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM) process together with the J3 led integration process].*

49. **Sustainment.** *[Based on the Sustainability Statement (SUSTAT) produced for the campaign.]*

50. **International cooperative logistic support.** *[Including the appointment of a logistic lead nation (LLN) or logistic role specialist nation (LRSN) and any contributions made by Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs) or as a result of other multilateral or bilateral logistic arrangements].*

51. **Medical.** **[Med to complete]**

### **Command and signal**

52. **Locations.** **[J5 to complete]**

- a. **Joint Commander.** The Jt Comd will exercise command from the *[PJHQ]*.
- b. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC will command the force from a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) located in ..., which will include liaison officers from....
- c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The JFMCC will be established at *[location]*.
- d. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The JFLCC will be established at *[location]*.
- e. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The JFACC will be established at *[location]*.
- f. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** The JFSFCC will be established at *[location]*.
- g. **Joint Force Logistics Component Commander.** The JFLogCC will be established at *[location]*.
- h. **Force elements/troops.**

53. **Alternate Joint Task Force Commander/Joint Task Force Headquarters. [J5 to complete]** *[Appointment (name)/HQ].*

54. **Command and control. [J5 to complete]** An overview of the force command and control (C2) arrangements, along with the detail of component C2, is at Annex ....

a. **Joint Commander.** *[CJO]* will exercise OPCOM of all assigned UK forces less...

b. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC will exercise OPCON of all assigned UK forces less.....

c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements, for example, TACOM of the forces at paragraph ... to Annex ... are delegated to the MCC/MCC is to exercise TACOM over the assets listed at ...]*

d. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*

e. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*

f. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*

g. **Joint Force Logistics Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*

h. **Force Elements/Troops.** *[Detail command arrangements for, for example, Joint Force Engineers, JHC and Jt CBRN Regt].*

55. **Alliance, coalition and national responsibilities and relationships. [J5 to complete]** *[Including national command issues and responsibilities (NCC/COMBRITFOR)].*

56. **Liaison. [J35 to complete]** The liaison matrix is at Annex G.

57. **Communications and Information Systems. [J6 to complete – detail how Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems (JFCIS) staff intend to support the campaign].** Further detail, is at Section xx of the FID.

58. **Codeword/SIC. [J5 to complete]** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC [XXX] is to be used on all signals relating to Op [\*\*\*\*].

Acknowledge:

[NAME]  
[Rank]  
JTFC

Authenticate:

[NAME]  
[Rank]  
COS

Annexes:

- A. Joint operations area.
- B. Campaign schematics, centre of gravity and end-state analysis.
- C. Decisive conditions tabulation and analysis.
- D. Risk analysis.
- E. Forces assigned to Joint Task Force Commander.
- F. Command and control.
- G. Liaison matrix.
- H. Geospatial information.

Planning

Distribution:

Action:

JFMCC

JFLCC

JFACC

JFSFCC

JFLogC

Force elements/troops

Copy to:

MOD - Op XXXX SPG Leader

- Op XXXX CCT Leader

Joint Forces Command

PJHQ - Op XXXX OT Leader

- Op XXXX CPT Leader

Single Service Chiefs

DSF

CDM

[Allies/Coalition Command HQ]

[HH Mil HQs]

[Other government department representatives as appropriate]

## Annex 2K – Representative Operation Plan

Document reference

See distribution

*[Date]*

### OPLAN 00X/AA (Year) – Operation [\*\*\*\*]

References:

- A. Campaign Directive.
- B. Force Instructions Document.
- C. OPORD 00X/BB *[detail of current operation order (OPORD) in force if not the first operation plan (OPLAN) of the campaign]*.
- D. Current Intelligence Summary.
- E. OPLAN 00X/CC and/or CONPLAN 00X/DD *[detail of any related OPLANs and contingency plans (CONPLANs) also in development]*.

Time zone used throughout: ZULU.

### Preface

1. **Scope.** Overarching direction for the campaign is provided in the Campaign Directive and Force Instructions Document (FID) (Refs A and B respectively). This OPLAN provides notification of intentions for *[the forthcoming period, stage or phase of the campaign]*, subsequent to the execution of OPORD 00X/BB (Ref C). In particular, OPLAN 00X/AA provides:
  - a. The effects the Joint Task Force (JTF) will focus upon in the next *[period/stage/phase]* of the campaign.
  - b. Any specific direction regarding the development of joint action plans to realise these effects. Executive direction for the conduct of operations will follow as a sequential OPORD.

2. **Period.** The *[period/stage/phase]* covered by this OPLAN is.....*[it may not be possible to give an exact time period covered by the OPLAN. Instead, the OPLAN should articulate the nature of the period, stage or phase (for example, ‘this OPLAN covers the period of Joint Task Force deployment to region A, and subsequent establishment of a secure operating base in country B’)].*

### **Situation**

3. The current situation is.....*[or refer to the latest Intelligence summary (INTSUM) (Ref D)].*

### **Missions**

4. **Joint Task Force.** During this *[period/stage/phase]* the Joint Task Force will ... in order to ...*[a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose].*

5. **Initial and outline component missions.**

- a. **Joint Force Maritime Component.** ... in order to ...
- b. **Joint Force Land Component.** ... in order to ...
- c. **Joint Force Air Component.** ... in order to ...
- d. **Joint Force Logistics Component.** ... in order to ...
- e. **Joint Force Special Forces Component.** ... in order to ...

### **Concept of operations**

6. **Joint Task Force Commander’s intent.** During this *[period/stage/phase]* my intent is to ...*[if specific to the period or phase, or in any other way different from the JTFC’s intent provided in the Campaign Directive].*

7. **Joint Task Force Commander's messages.** During this *[period/stage/phase]* my messages are ...*[if it requires a more narrowly focussed communications directed at specific target audiences specific within the period or phase, or in any other way different from the JTFC's key themes and messages provided in the Campaign Directive].*
8. **Supporting effects.** I intend to realise the following supporting effects during this *[period/stage/phase]* *[list supporting effects chosen to be the focus of this period/stage/ phase of the campaign and their priority/order].*
9. **Scheme of manoeuvre.** My scheme of manoeuvre for the forthcoming *[period/stage/phase]* is...*[how supporting effects will be sequenced in time and space. Can be done in the main body of the OPLAN or in an Annex. Supporting effects schematics can be used to illustrate this (see Appendix 3C3 and 4)].*
10. **Main effort.** My main effort for the forthcoming *[period/stage/phase]* is ... *[for example, priority supporting effects he wishes to realise].*

## Execution

11. **Information activities.** Information activity target audiences, themes and messages supporting this *[period/stage/phase]*, including deception plans, are at Annexes B.
12. **Outreach activities.** Outreach activities supporting this *[period/stage/phase]* are at Annex C.

## Logistics

13. **Logistic concept of operations.**

## Command and signal

14. **Command and control.**
15. **Liaison.**

Planning

16. **Communications and information systems.**

17. **Codeword/SIC.** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC [XXX] is to be used on all signals relating to Op [\*\*\*\*].

[NAME]

[Rank]

JTFC

Annex:

- A. Op [\*\*\*\*] – Supporting effects synchronisation *[including supporting effects schematics]*.
- B. Information activities – target audiences, themes and messages.
- C. Outreach activities

Distribution:

PJHQ	JFACC	JF elements/troops
JFMCC	JFLogCC	
JFLCC	JFSFCC	

Copied to:

Other government department representatives *[as appropriate]*.

## Annex 2L – Representative Operation Order

Document reference

See distribution

*[Date]*

### OPORD 00X/AA (Year) – Operation [\*\*\*\*]

References:

- A. Campaign Directive.
- B. Force Instructions Document.
- C. Originator OPLAN 00X/AA *[the operation plan (OPLAN) from which the operation order (OPORD) derives]*.
- D. Current INTSUM.
- E. Extant OPORDs (if campaign underway).

Time zone used throughout the order: ZULU

### Preface [J35 to complete]

1. **Scope.** This OPORD gives executive direction for the conduct of operations during the immediate and forthcoming *[period/stage/phase]* of the campaign. It describes the totality of effects the Joint Task Force (JTF) is to focus upon, and the details of synchronised fires, information activities, outreach activities and manoeuvre (joint action) to realise those effects, as well as supporting and coordinating considerations. The OPORD also describes how the Joint Task Force will operate with allied and coalition forces, and with relevant civilian partners. This OPORD updates the Campaign Directive (at Reference A) and is supported by the Force Instructions Document (FID) (at Reference B).

2. **Period.** The *[period/stage/phase]* covered by this OPORD is.....*[it may not be possible to give an exact time period covered by the OPORD. Instead, the OPORD should articulate the nature of the period, stage or phase (for example, ‘this OPORD covers the period of Joint Task Force deployment*

*to region A, and subsequent establishment of a secure operating base in country B’)].*

## **Situation**

3. The current situation is ....*[or refer to the latest Intelligence summary (INTSUM) (Ref D)].*

- a. **Updated geo-strategic situation. [J2 / JF Engr]**
- b. **International/regional.**
- c. **Political.**
- d. **Opponent/friendly/neutral actors.**

4. **Threat assessment.** A detailed assessment of the Op [\*\*\*\*] threat is at Annex A. Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) pertinent to this *[period/stage/phase]* are at Annex B.

## **Mission**

5. During this *[period/stage/phase]* the Joint Task Force will ... in order to ...*[a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose].*

## **Execution**

6. **Joint Task Force Commander’s intent.** During this *[period/stage/phase]* my intent is to .....*[if specific to the period or phase, or in any other way different from the JTFC’s intent provided in the Campaign Directive. This is developed from originator OPLAN].*

7. **Supporting effects.** I intend to realise the following supporting effects during this *[period/stage/phase]* *[list supporting effects chosen to be the focus of this period/stage/ phase of the campaign and their priority/order, transferred/updated from originator OPLAN].*

8. **Scheme of manoeuvre.** My scheme of manoeuvre for the forthcoming [period/stage/phase] is [how the Joint Task Force’s activities, synchronised in time and space, and coordinated with multinational and multi-agency partners, will realise the desired effects. Can be done in the main body of the OPORD or in an Annex. Joint action schematics and synchronisation matrices can be used to illustrate the detail (as shown at Appendix 2G6 and 7)]. See Annexes C and D.

9. **Main effort.** My main effort for the forthcoming [period/stage/phase] is ... [e.g. priority supporting effects he wishes to realise].

10. **Joint Task Force Commander’s messages.** During this [period/stage/phase] my messages are to .....[if specific to the period or phase, or in any other way different from the JTFC’s Intent provided in the Campaign Directive or if narrowly focussed communications directed at specific target audiences].

11. **Component missions and tasks. [J3 to complete]**

a. **Component commands.**

(1) **Mission.** [copied/updated from OPLAN]

a. **Joint Force Maritime Component.** ... in order to ...

(2) **Tasks.**

Tasks	Supporting effect
BPT...	
BPT...	
BPT...	

b. **Supported and supporting relationships.**

12. **Other activity. [J3 to complete]**

a. **Other government departments.** Activities conducted by other government departments (OGDs) will contribute to the realisation of supporting effects by...

Activity	Supporting effect

13. **Coordinating Instructions. [J3 to complete]**

a. **Timings.**

b. **Rules of engagement.** See Annex E.

c. **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).** [J2 to complete]

d. **Information activities.** See Annex F.

e. **Outreach activities.** See Annex G

f. **Battlespace management.** See FID Section 9. Specific measures required for this phase are at Annex H. Geospatial information is at Annex I.

g. **Operational reserve.**

h. **Force protection.** See Annex J.

i. **Engineers.** See FID Section 3.

j. **Inter-agency coordination measures.** See Annex K.

## Resources

14. See Annex L.

## Logistics *[J1J4 to complete]*

15. **Logistic intent.**

16. **Logistic scheme of manoeuvre.** *[including medical]* See Annex M.

17. **Logistic command.**

## Command and signal

18. **Command and control concept.** See Annex N. *[J3 to complete]*

19. **Communications and Information Systems.** *[J6 to complete]* See Annex O.

20. **Liaison.** See Annex P.

21. **Codeword/SIC.** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC [XXX] is to be used on all signals relating to Op [\*\*\*\*].

*[NAME]*

*[Rank]*

JTFC

Annexes:

- A. Threat assessment.
- B. Commander's critical information requirements.
- C. Joint action schematics.
- D. Joint action synchronisation matrix.
- E. Rules of engagement.

## Planning

- F. Information activities
- G. Outreach activities
- H. Battlespace management.
- I. Geospatial information.
- J. Force protection.
- K. Inter-agency coordination measures.
- L. Forces assigned.
- M. Logistics and medical.
- N. Command and control.
- O. Communications and information systems.
- P. Liaison matrix.
- Q. Spare.

## Distribution:

PJHQ	JFACC	JF elements/troops
JFMCC	JFLogCC	
JFLCC	JFSFCC	

## Copied to:

Other government department representatives (as appropriate)

## Annex 2M – Representative Force Instructions Document

Document reference

See distribution

*[Date]*

### OP [\*\*\*\*] – Force Instructions Document

Reference:

A. Campaign Directive for Op [\*\*\*\*].

1. This document provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the Joint Task Force. It therefore complements the Campaign Directive issued to Component Commanders for Op [\*\*\*\*] (Ref A), and subsequent operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) issued by the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) hereafter. It is subject to reviews and updates, as required, in order to ensure that all components receive the appropriate instructions and information required to fulfil their responsibilities.

*[NAME]*  
*[Rank]*  
COS

## Contents of Force Instructions Document

Section	Subject	Where issued <sup>1</sup>	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
LM	Cover note, contents and distribution.				
1.	Task organisation.		A. Maritime command and control (C2). B. Land C2. C. Air C2. D. Logistic C2. E. Special Forces (SF). F. Joint force elements/ troops.		
2.	Intelligence.		A. Analysis executive summary. B. Specific analysis studies and systems analysis products. C. Intelligence estimate. D. Joint intelligence preparation of the environment (JIPE). Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP).		1. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Intelligence Directive. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Such as: Attached; Not to be issued; To follow; Limited distribution (LIMDIS).

<sup>2</sup> The term Intelligence Directive has replaced Intelligence and Security Management Plans.

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
3.	Targeting Directive.				
4.	Strategic communication		A. Strategic narrative, information effect extract, including target audiences, themes and messages.		
5.	Information activities.		A. Information activities.		-
6.	Outreach activities.		A. Outreach activities		
7.	Theatre Engineer Directive.		<p>B. Engineer intelligence.</p> <p>B. Geographic (GEO) support.</p> <p>C. Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD) Policy.</p> <p>D. Infrastructure support.</p>	<p>1. UK GEO structure.</p> <p>2. Authorised mapping.</p> <p>3. Standard digital geographic dataset matrix.</p> <p>4. GEO Task Requisition Form.</p> <p>5. GEO SITREP format.</p> <p>1. Infrastructure Management Policy Statement (IMPS).</p>	

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
			E. Engineer logistics.	1. Engineering Unit operational UINs.	
8.	Force protection.		A. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence. B. Combat identification. C. Operations security (OPSEC).		
9.	Logistics.		A. Division of logistic responsibilities. B. Logistic concept of operations (CONOPS) schematic. C. Detailed deployment plan.  D. J1 (Pers). E. J4 Medical.	1. Joint Force Element Table/joint desired order of arrival. 2. Coupling bridge directive. 3. Strategic movement instruction. 4. Load allocation table.  1. Medical force protection issues. 2. Med Log	

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
			F. Sustainability Statement. G. Priority Progression Instruction. H. International cooperative logistic support.  I. J8 (Finance). J. Logistic Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Instruction. K. In-transit visibility instruction. L. LOGASSESSREP.	schematic. 3. MEDSITREP format.  1. Host-nation support 2. Contractor support to operations 3. In country resources  1. Weekly Log sustainability SITREP.	
10.	Joint Communications Information Systems Instructions (JCISI).		A. JTF C2. B. JTF liaison matrix. C. Joint Information Exchange Requirement.	1. J6 ASSESSREP.	

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
	<p>Covering note to include apportionment of Key CIS responsibilities, Force EMCON Policy, JFCIS – reports and returns (R2), and incident reporting procedure.</p>		<p>D. Task organisation.                      E. Core network laydown.                      F. Services delivery plan.                      G. Interoperability matrix.                      H. JFCIS risks.                      I. Restoration priorities.                      J. Engineering recovery plan.                      K. Formal messaging plan.                      L. Joint Mission essential and critical CIS equipment.</p>		
<p>11.</p>	<p>Legal.</p>		<p>A. Rules of engagement (ROE) profile.                      B. ROE zone map.                      C. Specific legal issues.</p>	<p>1. Instructions on handling PWs, Internees and detainees.                      2. Investigations policy statement, instructions for handling of disciplinary cases.</p>	<p>Where specific differences need to be highlighted multinational partner ROE should be included.</p>

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
12.	Escape and evasion, conduct after capture, and joint personnel recovery.				
13.	Assessment.		A. Measurement of activity. B. Measures of effect. C. Assessment evidence.  D. Operational analysis techniques. E. Review cycles. F. Multinational assessment.	1. Measurement of effectiveness assessment sheet.  1. Campaign rhythm.	
14.	Battlespace management.				
15.	Special Forces.				
16.	Lessons identified.		A. Format for reporting lessons Identified.		
17.	Language capabilities and requirements.				
18.	Spare.				



## Chapter 3 – Defence crisis management

Chapter 3 addresses, as part of UK Defence crisis management, the development of strategic direction and the planning and management of the military contribution to national, multinational and multi-agency operations:

- Section 1 – Introduction
- Section 2 – Crisis response planning
- Section 3 – Contingency planning
- Section 4 – Current operations planning
- Section 5 – Multi-agency crisis management
- Section 6 – Multinational crisis management

Annexes are used to illustrate the relevant processes and planning outputs; the summary at Annex 3A may usefully be studied in conjunction with the main text.

### Section 1 – Introduction

301. As part of the process of crisis prevention, containment and, where necessary, resolution, the Ministry of Defence's (MOD's) Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) (described in Chapter 2) conducts three types of planning, invariably as part of a cross-government or integrated approach and, very often, in concert with alliance or coalition partners:

- a. **Contingency planning** based on a mixture of intelligence and assumptions regarding potential involvement in future crises. This does not though imply an endorsed intent by Her Majesty's Government (HMG)/MOD. It may be impractical to gauge with any certainty the likelihood of a contingency plan being enacted but, especially where resources need to be expended to reduce or mitigate risk, the potential impact of a crisis should be assessed to inform prioritisation.
- b. **Crisis response planning** to determine, often at short notice, an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis.
- c. **Current operations planning** to manage a current operation, to prevent escalation, and to sustain military activity. Such planning tends

to follow crisis response planning, when military activity is (or is envisaged to be) prolonged. It may also involve elements of contingency planning to address potential changes in the situation, including termination or transition planning in anticipation of the achievement of the desired, or acceptable, outcome.

302. Because crisis management cuts across organisational structures, in the MOD and elsewhere, a variety of task-organised, multifunctional groups are used to monitor potential and emerging crises, plan appropriate responses, and then manage those responses through to their conclusion. The principal crisis management groups are described at Annex 3A (with their detailed procedures being covered in Defence Crisis Management Organisation Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)).

303. The next three sections describe the functions of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation, and associated crisis management groups and forums, in relation to: crisis response planning; contingency planning; and current operations planning, including campaign termination and transition. The key players involved at each stage and for each type of planning, together with their main outputs, are summarised at Annex 3B.

## **Section 2 – Crisis response planning**

304. Crisis response planning is invariably complex and requires a process that is sufficiently agile to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity and change. Appendix 3B1 provides guidance on how the principal players and groupings interact dynamically to produce, often under significant time pressure, the major planning outputs required.

### **Planning at the strategic level**

305. **Political-military estimate and political strategic analysis.** A crisis can arise, or change in nature or seriousness, at short notice; or it can develop more slowly, with time for a Current Operations Group (COG) to form and deliberate (and may, therefore, be the subject of contingency planning). The MOD engages in cross-government political strategic analysis to consider options for how the UK might respond (a political decision, ultimately for the

Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the National Security Council (NSC)). The political strategic analysis should, therefore, provide:

- an understanding of the crisis situation;
- options open to the international community and options open to HMG;
- how the UK may use its assets already in country or deploy additional assets; and
- any associated risks.

In the case of a rapidly emerging crisis, however, an early political-military estimate, conducted by a nominated Strategic Planning Group (SPG), is used to identify possible (but as yet unformulated) desirable outcomes, and to evaluate potential military contributions and associated risks, for consideration by the Director of Operations (DOps)<sup>1</sup> and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

**306. Chief of Defence Staff's Planning Directive.** Having conducted the political-military estimate, and subject to the outcome of the political strategic analysis, the Strategic Planning Group drafts CDS' Planning Directive, (see Chapter 2), to initiate the military strategic estimate. In the early stages, especially in a complex or particularly fluid situation, guidance to planners may be heavily caveated, and liable to change as circumstances and political choices mature. CDS' intent, articulated within his Planning Directive, provides a useful headmark and a form of 'unifying purpose' for those engaged in concurrent but potentially discrete planning activities across the Defence Crisis Management Organisation. Significant assumptions may be required, in order to maintain planning momentum, and these are confirmed or updated as the situation evolves. The inclusion, from the outset, of all interested parties provides environmental and functional contributions to the planning process and also enables concurrent planning by subordinates. To enable the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to progress the military strategic estimate, a Planning Directive is issued as early as possible. It provides:

- a. **Strategic direction.** Strategic direction (either in draft or final form) should include, the national strategic aim, potential national strategic objectives, the military strategic end-state and/or military

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<sup>1</sup> Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS(Mil Strat & Ops)).

strategic objectives, the strategic narrative, information effect, CDS' intent, and relevant extracts from the National Information Strategy.

b. **Assumptions and constraints.** The planning assumptions, agreed in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID) where appropriate, and any relevant operating constraints and freedoms, to ensure that effort is not wasted in re-exploring possibilities already discounted.

c. **Planning direction.** Any specific planning direction, such as authority to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) or, subject to operations security (OPSEC), to engage with the Defence industrial base.<sup>2</sup>

307. **Military strategic estimate.** On receipt of CDS' Planning Directive, a military strategic estimate is conducted by the PJHQ Contingency Planning Team (CPT) in conjunction with the MOD's Strategic Planning Group and Current Commitments Team (CCT). Inputs to this process include: CDS' Planning Directive; a summary of the political-military estimate; outputs from cross-government planning; and the National Information Strategy. The purpose of the military strategic estimate is to scope the feasibility of a military contribution to crisis response, and to evaluate options for submission via Chiefs of Staff (COS) to Ministers. It uses techniques such as illustrative campaign planning, risk analysis and operational analysis (see Chapter 2) to test options. The military strategic estimate provides a critical opportunity for military planners to indicate to political decision makers: how events might unfold, what forces might be required (and the opportunity costs involved in their committal), what casualties might result, the financial costs, and the prospects of success or failure. The military strategic estimate should be periodically revisited during operations, including during multinational operations where the UK may not have the lead in planning but may be able to exert influence based upon rigorous analysis and cogent deduction. A summary of the military strategic estimate, briefed through the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is used by the Secretary of State (SofS) and CDS to advise Cabinet on the practicality and implications, immediate and longer term, of a

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<sup>2</sup> See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations*.

military contribution to any response. The identification and communication of strategic risk is an important element of the military strategic estimate process.

308. **Chief of Defence Staff's Directive.** Where the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the National Security Council decide to commit military forces, CDS issues detailed direction by means of a CDS' Directive drafted by the Current Commitments Team (see Chapter 2, sometimes referred to as his Operational Directive to distinguish it from his earlier Planning Directive). It includes:

- a. **Strategic direction.** Confirmed strategic direction (national strategic aim, national strategic objectives, military strategic end-state and military strategic objectives, strategic narrative and information effect), CDS' intent and any constraints at the operational level.
- b. **Force composition and conduct.** The Directive details available force elements (FEs) to the Joint Force, designates the theatre of operations (TOO), and provides guidance on anticipated duration, sustainability, and any legal issues including rules of engagement (ROE). The Directive may also outline strategic risks identified by the military strategic headquarters, and any threats or opportunities these may present at the operational level (see Chapter 2).
- c. **Command and control.** Command appointments, command relationships, including guidance on coordination with the single Services, Joint Forces Commander, Director Special Forces (DSF) and Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM), allies, other government departments (OGDs), host nations, international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and command and control (C2) arrangements should also be articulated.

309. CDS may issue an initial, or even a draft, Directive on a limited distribution before all the necessary detailed information is available; he may also delegate the issue of certain sections, such as coordinating instructions.

## Planning at the operational level

310. **Joint Commander's Mission Directive.** CDS will nominate a Joint Commander (Jt Comd); this is normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). The Jt Comd, with authority from CDS' Directives, issues a Jt Comd's Directive to empower the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and direct the enabling functions of deploy, sustain and, if applicable, recover. Key issues such as command authority, the deployment plan, targeting delegations, rules of engagement, intelligence, force protection, training, logistics and medical will feature in this directive. A representative Jt Comd's Directive is at Annex 2D.

311. **Collaborative planning.** Crisis planning should take place collaboratively between the CJO/PJHQ and the assigned JTFC/Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) or equivalent. The latter should conduct its own planning in parallel, and contribute to PJHQ processes as the crisis unfolds, for example, by participating in the Contingency Planning Team. The Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) establishes a Situational Awareness Group (SAG) at an early stage to facilitate this engagement (see Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00 *Campaign Execution*). Once a JTFC is appointed, liaison officers (LOs) from contributing components and, where appropriate, liaison officers from the Stabilisation Unit and other government departments who are likely to have already been involved in PJHQ/JFHQ planning, should be drawn into the JTFHQ (and likewise assigned from the JTFHQ to the same organisations) for the remainder of the campaign.

312. **Planning the deployment.** Planning for the deployment of the force, including headquarters and augmentees, should begin at the earliest opportunity in order to identify any constraints, establish the broad deployment timeline and enable lead times for civilian charter/ships taken up from trade to be met. Such planning should remain covert until a formal announcement has been made to commit forces, and must always be subject to operations security. PJHQ orchestrate force deployment, although the JTFHQ will shape much of the planning to ensure that it meets the JTFC's Intent; JDP 3-00 has the detail.

313. **Planning the military campaign.** Military campaign planning in support of any integrated cross-government or multinational planning may be completed before deployment planning begins, but they frequently overlap

(catered for by JFHQ participation in the PJHQ Contingency Planning Team and the establishment of a Situational Awareness Group). An illustrative planning sequence is as follows:

- a. JFHQ/JTFHQ staff are represented on the PJHQ Contingency Planning Team from the outset to keep the JTFC informed on progress and to represent the JTFC's views at the strategic/operational interface. The JTFC begins to formulate his plans in parallel with the Contingency Planning Team. He may issue a Warning Order.
- b. The JTFC and/or members of his staff may conduct a reconnaissance to theatre, normally as part of an Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team (see paragraph 314). The Jt Comd should outline the aim of any reconnaissance and any constraints, such as duration, limits on movement and liaison authority. The exact nature, size and duration of the reconnaissance party may vary, but it should include allies or coalition partners, potential host nations and other government departments as appropriate.
- c. The JTFC undertakes his operational-level planning (see Chapter 2) in collaboration with subordinate commanders and, ideally, drawing in other government departments, international organisation, non-governmental organisation representatives and coalition partners as required. There should be a continuous exchange of information between strategic, operational and tactical headquarters to ensure that the most recent information and assumptions are available to all planning teams.

**314. Relationship with the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** A deployed Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team may satisfy information and intelligence requirements emerging from both the military strategic estimate and the operational estimate, while it may also generate new issues for clarification up the chain of command. Although an Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team should not be an alternative planning element in its own right, it may become the core of the JTFC's deployed headquarters, should he decide to deploy forward with appropriate staff.

## **Section 3 – Contingency planning**

315. Contingency planning addresses potential military involvement in future crises (see Appendix 3B2). The STRIDE sets priorities for intelligence collection and planning, concerning areas of potential instability that are likely to affect UK interests. CDS directs CJO to develop contingency plans, in the form of generic Joint Planning Guides (JPGs) and more specific Joint Contingency Plans (JCPs), in order to reduce the time taken to produce detailed plans in the event of a crisis.

### **Joint Planning Guides**

316. Joint Planning Guides comprise generic planning data for a particular country, region or theatre, or for the military contribution to a particular type of operation, such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) or a disaster relief operation (DRO). The requirement for a Joint Planning Guide may be identified by MOD, PJHQ, the single Service Chiefs, Joint Forces Command or other government departments, but should be approved by, and communicated to, CJO. CJO then instructs PJHQ J5 to compile a Joint Planning Guide, outlining the planning parameters, likely objectives, timelines and any political or military constraints.

317. A Contingency Planning Team is formed and planners identify any extant other government department or Stabilisation Unit plans for that area. A reconnaissance may be conducted in conjunction with the relevant British military representative, or Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO), and any other government department representatives in theatre. Although not necessarily covert, Joint Planning Guide reconnaissance is normally carried out discreetly by a small team. On completion of the reconnaissance, the Contingency Planning Team circulates a draft Joint Planning Guide to all interested parties, including other government departments, proposed Supporting Commands, and relevant Embassies/High Commissions via the Consular Division of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Once their comments have been incorporated, and the Joint Planning Guide has been approved by CJO, it is maintained by PJHQ.

## Joint Contingency Plans

318. In addition to the generic planning data contained in Joint Planning Guides, Joint Contingency Plans contain more information on the military capabilities required to conduct specified operations and relevant deployment options, including readiness states and associated risks. As with a Joint Planning Guide, the requirement for a Joint Contingency Plan may be identified by MOD, PJHQ, the single Service Chiefs or the Joint Forces Command, but is ultimately triggered by CDS' Planning Directive.

319. Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops)) orders the formation of a Strategic Planning Group to conduct a political-military estimate, engage with other government departments, and draft CDS' Planning Directive (see Annex 2B). Upon its receipt, a Contingency Planning Team is formed within PJHQ, in concert with the MOD, Supporting Commands, and other specialist staffs including other government departments as appropriate. The Contingency Planning Team undertakes a military strategic estimate, may conduct a reconnaissance, and drafts the Joint Contingency Plan. Depending on the intended operation, the final Joint Contingency Plans may be submitted to the COS for approval or, via CDS and the SofS, to the Cabinet. The Joint Contingency Plan is then issued and maintained thereafter by PJHQ.

## Indicators and warnings

320. Implicit within contingency planning is the need to develop indicators and warnings – key events or signs which alert planners to an imminent crisis. Indicators and warnings should be selected to provide sufficient notice for the activation of contingency plans or, if necessary, the development of new plans in time to pre-empt, rather than simply react to, an emerging situation. The Cabinet Office's Countries at Risk of Instability list forms the basis of indicators and warnings assessments. Within the MOD, Defence Intelligence (DI) is responsible for monitoring indicators and warnings and for national links into other security organisations such as NATO.

## Section 4 – Current operations planning

321. Campaigns may be short or continue over months or years; they may be continuous or intermittent; the military contribution may fluctuate in importance compared with that of the other instruments of power. Irrespective of length, intensity or character, the organisations and processes outlined above provide an adaptive framework for the planning and management of current operations, described below.

322. The detailed conduct of operations (campaign management rather than campaign design) is covered in JDP 3-00. There are, however, two aspects of planning current operations that merit discussion here: campaign review, and campaign termination and transition. The first is relevant because it involves communication, interaction and understanding between commanders and headquarters at all levels (as well as non-military actors). The second is relevant because it involves an aspect of operations, with potentially strategic implications, that again requires extensive planning beyond the JTFC/JTFHQ alone.

### Campaign review

323. DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) is responsible to CDS for monitoring current operations and keeping ongoing campaigns under strategic review. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation, through operations planning and management processes, provides the information necessary to validate objectives, confirm or modify plans for their achievement, and adjust capability and resource allocations accordingly. This continual process of review, illustrated at Appendix 3B3, takes place at different stages.

324. **National strategic.** The government's political strategic analysis, the consequent cross-government strategy or plan, and associated national strategic aim and objectives are all kept under periodic review through policy, strategy and senior officials' groups; regular revisions to political-military estimates feed this review process. Any re-appraisal of the government's intended role for the military, informed by appropriate reviews, may result in new direction being issued and the requirement for a review of the military strategic estimate.

325. **Military strategic.** The output of cross-government review, ongoing monitoring (by the Chiefs of Staff), and assessments of risk and opportunity (from the Jt Comd at PJHQ and the JTFC in theatre) all inform the overall assessment of current and projected progress towards achieving assigned military strategic objectives. This process is sometimes referred to as strategic campaign review, the form and conduct of which varies from one campaign to another. It may result in a review of the extant CDS' Directive, and/or a force level review to confirm or adjust the balance of forces between commitments. Where the situation is judged to have changed significantly, or political intent to have altered, a Strategic Planning Group may be required to refresh or conduct a further political-military estimate, a revised military strategic estimate and so on.

326. **Operational.** Both CJO and deployed JTFCs should keep ongoing campaigns under review, using assessment (see JDP 3-00), risk analysis, and by periodic stock-takes.

### **Termination and transition**

327. Termination and transition are invariably complex and can represent periods of significant strategic, as well as operational, risk and should be factored into plans from the outset of a campaign. The pertinent planning issues, covered in Supplement 1, include:

- a. Affording appropriate weights of effort to different types of military activity as the nature of a campaign changes over time, including where appropriate, ensuring military/defence support to ongoing stabilisation efforts.
- b. Pre-empting the cessation of hostilities with contingency plans to undertake, at least in the immediate aftermath, essential post-conflict activities.
- c. Making adequate provision, in advance, for force roulement and any necessary changes in presence, posture and profile.
- d. Planning comprehensively for campaign transition/termination to ensure: enduring security (which may necessitate forces in over-watch)

and effective transition from military to civil primacy (involving thorough civil-military collaboration).

## **Section 5 – Multi-agency crisis management**

328. **Departmental processes and cultures.** Working across departmental boundaries may present challenges to the military planner. Different timelines, planning capacity, priorities, culture and risk appetite make each department unique. Levels of authority, experience, technical ability and understanding of the personnel within civilian organisations may not always correspond to those in the military; equally, it should not be assumed that a military approach is universally acceptable. These differences may introduce frictions, misunderstandings and uncertainties if not appreciated from the outset. Supplement 2 provides an overview of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Stabilisation Unit practices and culture. The military will often be major players, particularly in the early stages of an operation where conditions are non- or semi-permissive for civilians. Wherever the military becomes the *de facto* leader, its commanders must use plain, ‘jargon-free’ English and recognise that certain words can be laden with hidden meaning and values. Nevertheless, commanders should be prepared to act as campaign integrators, accepting the inevitable drag inherent in an integrated approach, to improve campaign cohesion.

329. **Multi-agency leadership.** A comprehensive response to any situation is most likely to succeed if a single figure, ideally formally empowered, orchestrates the activities of the various agencies involved. How the role is agreed, and the formal authority that the leader is granted, varies on a case-by-case basis. For UK national campaigns an Ambassador or alternative bespoke political appointee, or a military commander, may be appropriate. In multinational operations undertaken by the United Nations (UN), the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is likely to be the multi-agency leader. On other occasions, particularly where there is no single nation or international organisation orchestrating events, other mechanisms might generate the required leadership.<sup>3</sup>


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<sup>3</sup> For example, Lord Ashdown’s appointment as the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina – a position created under the Dayton Agreement.

330. **Cross-government bodies.** Departmental coordination within the UK is enhanced through cross-governmental bodies, often facilitated by the Cabinet Office, with both strategic and operational responsibilities which may include:

- a. Facilitating inter-departmental strategic planning when so directed by the Cabinet, to develop strategies and policies to deal with specific crises. A body of this type may, for example, develop national strategic objectives, having been given the national strategic aim by Cabinet.
- b. Coordinating departmental contributions to the cross-government strategy and monitoring national progress.
- c. Providing liaison and coordination for JTFCs and other government departments in theatre.

331. **Integrated planning at the operational level.** There is no universal template for collaborative planning between military and non-military organisations at the operational level. The appropriate processes are dictated by the nature of the situation, the variety of actors and the extent of their involvement, and the role of the military in the anticipated operation. Figure 3.1 illustrates possible variations in inter-departmental collaboration, using three illustrative scenarios in which the military act: alone (A); in loose cooperation with other government departments as part of a multi-agency operation (B); or finally, with close inter-agency collaboration under a unified cross-government plan (C). While all three models envisage a single national strategy, military planning may be developed: in relative isolation from other departments (A); in coordination with them (B); or subordinate to an agreed cross-government strategy (C). The integrated approach suggests that we should strive towards model C.




**Figure 3.1 – Models of integrated planning at the operational level**

332. **International and non-governmental organisations.** Military operations frequently need to be coordinated and harmonised with those of other agencies, including international organisations, non-governmental organisations donors and regional organisations. The onset of operations usually acts as a catalyst for coordination, under loose or more formalised frameworks. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for instance, normally establishes a Humanitarian Operations (or coordination) Centre (HOC) in any major humanitarian crisis. UN agencies and non-governmental organisations usually attend coordination meetings hosted by UN OCHA, but there may be other non-governmental organisation forums where various stakeholders address common issues and concerns. Dealing with these humanitarian organisations needs tact and sensitivity. Each is likely to have a distinctive culture and specific aim, and some may resent and dispute the suggestion of coordination with, let alone by, military forces (or even to be seen to cooperate with them). Additionally each organisation should be treated separately, requiring an individual approach,

rather than as a block. A JTFC should therefore be sensitive to disparate perspectives, and may need to adopt unfamiliar working practices to facilitate collaboration. He should aim to create a broad dialogue, seek advice, and benefit from the expertise and insights of different organisations, many of whom may have been present for years in a particular operating environment and have unique and valuable experience.

333. **Inter-agency collaboration.** There is no template by which a JTFC may support an integrated approach. Figure 3.2, however, offers three models.



**Figure 3.2 – Models of interagency working at the operational level**

- a. **Predominantly inter-agency.** Greatest collaboration is achieved where the majority of national and multinational partners work to an agreed strategic plan, ideally with an empowered leader. Some agencies will remain unwilling or unable to operate in this way, and aspects of inter-agency working remain challenging.

b. **Multi-agency and inter-agency.** Unity of purpose is achieved through inter-agency working, where military and other government department staffs establish long-term collaborative practices. Such arrangements may be self-established or prescribed. This approach is enhanced by collocation. Multinationality and the presence of international organisations and non-governmental organisations make this more demanding.

c. **Multi-agency.** At the lowest level, the JTFHQ coordinates with other government departments, multinational partners, international organisations and non-governmental organisations working in the same area. In such circumstances, an integrated approach is enabled through civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), without the establishment of firm relationships. This approach allows coordination or de-confliction, but does not enable a collaborative approach with agreed outcomes.

334. **Private military and security companies.** At an early stage, a JTFC should consider coordination, or at least deconfliction, with private military and security companies (PMSCs).<sup>4</sup> The majority of private military and security companies are multinational and provide a range of armed and unarmed services, including risk management, governance and development activities, security provision, force and close protection, and specific military training to government, corporate and non-governmental organisation clients. Private military and security companies also contribute to the delivery of security sector reform (SSR), particularly in multinational operations on behalf of donor governments.

## Section 6 – Multinational crisis management

335. **UK commitment to multinational operations.** Multinational campaigns and operations may be carried out within an established alliance framework or in a coalition. Coalition operations are normally facilitated by the selection of a lead or framework nation, in many cases under the mandate of

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<sup>4</sup> The term applies to all private military and security companies wherever they are registered or based, and to their local subcontractors. It does not apply to Defence industry contractors, if their activity is regulated through existing export controls, an export licence has been issued, or the commercial proposals are wholly within the terms of that licence. Additionally, unarmed contractors providing logistic support on operations to the MOD and covered by JSP 567, and private security companies that operate solely in the UK domestic market are not classified as private military and security companies.

the UN or other recognised international organisation. However, multilateral planning may have no specified lead nation, particularly when nations' levels of commitment have yet to be determined. When the UK is considering whether to contribute to a multinational operation, the MOD provides advice on the level of any UK military commitment, and appropriate military strategic objectives.

**336. Permanent Joint Headquarters in multinational operations.** In multinational operations (non-NATO Article 5), CDS delegates operational command (OPCOM) of UK forces to a nominated UK Jt Comd (normally CJO), who may further delegate operational control (OPCON), tactical command (TACOM) or tactical control (TACON) to a subordinate UK or multinational commander:

a. **UK-led operations.** When the UK is the lead/framework nation, PJHQ forms the nucleus of the multinational headquarters, augmented as necessary by staff from other participating nations. The UK also provides staff to form the nucleus of a deployed multinational JTFHQ.

b. **Non UK-led operations.** When the UK is not the lead or framework nation, CJO acts as UK Coordinator of Supporting Command Functions (CSCF). As such, he coordinates the activities of the single Services and the Joint Forces Command in deploying, sustaining and recovering UK forces assigned to the operation. He may also provide staff from PJHQ to a multinational headquarters. CJO will specify national caveats.

**337. Joint Task Force Commander in multinational operations.** As early as possible, a JTFC (or National Contingent Commander (NCC)) should be briefed on the terms and conditions under which national contingents have been provided and thereby gain a feel for the political effect his actions may have on coalition cohesion. CJO, acting as Coordinator of Supporting Command Functions, should ensure that multinational objectives complement those of the UK, and that the proposed UK contribution is feasible within available capabilities. JDP 01 *Campaigning* provides guidance on issues to be considered. The same procedures for planning the command and control, deployment, sustainment and recovery of the UK contingent should be applied as in national operations. Other nations' liaison officers based at PJHQ, and

reciprocal UK liaison officers based abroad, provide valuable links with other nations' military planning headquarters.

## **NATO operations**

338. When the UK elects to contribute to NATO crisis response, the process described in Section 2 ensures that the UK's participation is in accordance with the government's intent, and that appropriate and timely contributions are made to NATO planning (see Allied Joint Publication 5 (AJP-5) *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*<sup>5</sup> and *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)*<sup>6</sup>). In all circumstances, the MOD is responsible for liaison on strategic issues, both with NATO Headquarters (through the UK Military Representative (UKMILREP)) and with Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE also functions as Allied Commander Operations (ACO). For NATO-led operations, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation should both respond to, and proactively support, the NATO planning process. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation may wish to influence the North Atlantic Council (NAC)<sup>7</sup> early in its considerations, prior to the issue of the activation warning (ACTWARN), and in such a way that the UK's intended participation is made clear before NATO confirms its force generation plans. The Strategic Planning Group/Current Commitments Team is likely to be the principal vehicle through which the UK contributes to NATO planning and responds to force preparation (FORCEPREP), transfer of authority (TOA) and activation order (ACTORD) instructions. PJHQ is responsible for liaison and coordination on operational matters with SHAPE where applicable, relevant NATO Joint Force Commands,<sup>8</sup> and with deployed UK forces.

## **European Union operations**

339. The European Union (EU) planning process is described in Supplement 3. In EU-led operations, the EU's permanent military elements – the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff

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<sup>5</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine Publication-5 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning* dated June 2013. Available at: [http://defenceintranet.dii.f.r.mil.uk/libraries/library1/MOD/July2013/20130730-AJP\\_5\\_Planning\\_secured.pdf](http://defenceintranet.dii.f.r.mil.uk/libraries/library1/MOD/July2013/20130730-AJP_5_Planning_secured.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*, COPD Interim V1.0. Available at: <http://www.dcdc.dii.r.mil.uk/Objects/D/74FE53D8BDE649769D3BC92C2C689FD7.htm> (downloaded 10 May 2013).

<sup>7</sup> NAC is the highest level of NATO decision-making.

<sup>8</sup> NATO has two Joint Force Commands (Brunssum (The Netherlands) and Naples (Italy)).

(EUMS) – provide the principal points of coordination for the UK MOD. During the early stages of a crisis, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation functions as normal in its national capacity. EU crisis management procedures, however, envisage the EUMS drawing upon planning expertise from either EU Member States and/or NATO (under Berlin Plus arrangements) as the crisis unfolds. For the UK this expertise is likely to be provided by the MOD and PJHQ. Defence Crisis Management Organisation activity should focus on the UK's contribution to any proposed EU response, while maintaining oversight of any additional planning support likely to be required by the EUMS. UK national links with the EUMC mirror those with NATO's Military Committee (MC), and the UKMILREP attends both.

340. The EU has three alternative models for operational headquarters (OHQ), described in Supplement 3. The implications of each for UK planning are:

a. **EU-led operations *with* recourse to NATO assets.** If the EU were to call upon NATO assets and capabilities to respond to a crisis, the relationship between the Defence Crisis Management Organisation and the EU would be comparable to the NATO model. NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) (in ACO – J5) would provide planning support at the request of the EU. Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) would be the likely choice to fulfil the functions normally performed by SACEUR, as the Military Strategic Commander, for NATO-led operations. The dual-hatted UKMILREP would form the link with both NATO HQ and the EU.

b. **EU-led operation *without* recourse to NATO assets.** If NATO assets were not employed, one nation is likely to act as a framework nation using one of the five designated operational headquarters.<sup>9</sup> If PJHQ is selected as the operational headquarters, specific EU Multinational Headquarters procedures are activated. If another operational headquarters were chosen, some PJHQ staff and additional augmentees would deploy there. The JFHQ could also become the core of a deployed Force Headquarters (FHQ). Augmentees could include:

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<sup>9</sup> Located in the UK (PJHQ), France, Germany, Italy and Greece.

- **Key nucleus staff.** Pre-nominated and trained staff, drawn mainly from PJHQ/JFHQ, and immediately available for the EU role.
- **Primary augmentee multinational.** Pre-nominated and trained staff, including civilian/military staff from the EU Military Staff, and other EU Nations, at five-days notice.
- **Primary augmentee parent nation.** Nominated and trained UK staff from other headquarters at five-days notice to augment the Multinational Headquarters.
- **Additional augmentees.** Multinational staff, not pre-nominated, to be made available if required within 20 days of activation.

c. **EU operations centre.** The EU Military Staff maintains the capability to form an operation headquarters,<sup>10</sup> to which PJHQ may contribute personnel on request.

341. If the UK is the Framework Nation, the decision to appoint an Operational Commander (Op Comd) should take into account CJO's role in concurrent operations, the availability of alternative commanders (possibly drawn from the Joint Command Group), and the staff required to support a UK national contingent. It is at this point that the roles and tasks of CJO and the PJHQ may split along EU and national lines, such that CJO may act as: Op Comd and Jt Comd, Op Comd only (with CDS selecting another Jt Comd) or Jt Comd only (with CDS selecting another Op Comd).

342. When the UK provides the JFHQ as the core element of the EU FHQ, the designated Force Commander answers to the EU Op Comd, whether UK or not. In the latter case, a separate National Contingent Commander is required for the UK national link to PJHQ. Where the UK provides the operational headquarters, then it is responsible for the provision of communications to the FHQ. Similarly, where JFHQ provides the framework of an EU FHQ, it has the responsibility for provision of communications down to subordinate commands.

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<sup>10</sup> Particularly where there is a civil/military aspect or where no national headquarters has been identified – *EU Principles for EU HQs*, agreed by the EUMC 2 June 2005.

## United States-led operations

343. **US-led coalitions.** The UK recognises that in committing forces to future crises it may often operate within a US-led coalition. The US command and planning structures detailed in USA Joint Publication 5 (JP-5) *Joint Operation Planning* differ significantly from those of the UK. The President of the USA (POTUS) is by statute the Commander-in-Chief of all US forces, assisted by the Secretary of Defense (known as SecDef). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises them but does not enjoy a separate level of command equivalent to the UK MOD. Instead, the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) have a direct link to the President of the USA and the Secretary of Defense.

344. The UK national process for planning in such circumstances should be similar to that of a NATO or other non-UK led operation. The MOD and the DCMO remain the focus for national planning, linked through the British Defence Staff United States and the US Joint Staffs, with PJHQ initially deploying a small staff to liaise with the relevant Combatant Commander. A Senior British Military Adviser (SBMA) or National Contingent Commander is likely to deploy to assist the Combatant Commander in developing options for any UK involvement.<sup>11</sup>

## United Nations and other multinational operations

345. **UN operations.** The role and organisation of the UN is described in Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).<sup>12</sup> UN operations may be mounted by a single nation or on a multinational basis, either as a coalition or by an alliance on behalf of the UN. Command and control structures vary depending on the nature and scale of operations; the UN does not normally form operational headquarters but instead forms theatre/force headquarters as required, from amongst contributing nations. For operations conducted under the auspices of the UN, the military Force Commander acts in support of the civilian Head of Mission, normally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) (although in simple operations, the Force Commander may be appointed Head

<sup>11</sup> PJHQ and the Senior British Military Advisor(SBMA)/National Contingent Commander (NCC) should coordinate closely to ensure that the Combatant Commander (CCDR) receives coherent UK advice.

<sup>12</sup> Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1(A) *Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations* is under development, and is expected to be promulgated in late 2013.

of Mission). The Head of Mission's planning staff is responsible for developing coordinating plans that reflect international consensus, and should be continually reviewed against mission objectives and the changing situation on the ground.

346. **Cooperative operations.** UK forces may deploy on a national basis alongside other national contingents, who then agree to de-conflict or even cooperate outside the framework of a recognised multinational command structure. The most likely bilateral cooperative operation is the UK-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) concept; based on a brigade sized force. These cooperative operations are most likely to occur during operations such as non-combatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping and limited intervention where, although there may be joint objectives, it is likely that each nation also has individual national imperatives, objectives and responsibilities. UK involvement in cooperative operations invariably demands the appointment of a JTFC with a JTFHQ to conduct in-theatre liaison between national forces.

### **Multinational planning considerations**

347. **Doctrine.** Multinationality presents UK JTFCs and their staffs with additional planning challenges. Doctrine varies between nations, although the UK intent is to work within a recognised multinational planning framework wherever possible (such as the *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*). Nevertheless, UK planners should anticipate some disparity.

348. **Influencing allies.** UK JTFCs and staffs acting in multinational roles should seek to exert national influence:

- a. **National interest.** UK commanders and staff should represent and promote the national interest, either as an explicit planning priority or objective or, more generally in shaping multinational intent.
- b. **Unique capabilities.** The UK may have been asked to contribute unique capabilities or particular staff skills, which should be exploited fully.

c. **National caveats.** UK JTFCs and staff should seek to develop trust and close working relationships with other national representatives as part of their role in a multinational headquarters. While there is a tendency to adopt the norms and standards of a surrounding culture, they should always act within UK national guidelines. To engender a pragmatic rather than 'lowest common denominator' approach where appropriate, it is preferable to be frank about national caveats or other reservations, and to seek out areas where the UK's positive contribution could benefit the multinational force. If in doubt, UK JTFCs and staff should seek national guidance.

d. **Multinational cohesion.** Maintaining cohesion across the international community is a strategic priority in any multinational operation. It builds and maintains campaign authority and increases the likelihood of future force contributions. Building and maintaining partnerships and trust may occupy significant amounts of a JTFC's time and effort. Additionally, it may be appropriate to monitor multinational cohesion as part of campaign assessment.



## Annex 3A – Crisis management groups

Where annotated the material has been extracted from the online version of *How Defence Works - The New Operating Model*. This has been refined to reflect feedback from staffs at all levels in the Departments and is the single, authoritative, web-based source of information on how Defence works from April 2013.

### Monitoring

**3A1. The Defence Engagement Board.** The Defence Engagement Board is chaired jointly by Director General Security Policy (DG Sec Pol) and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Director General Defence & Intelligence.<sup>1</sup> It provides the strategic context which should govern, and allow relative prioritisation of, the use of defence assets in pursuit of the wide range of thematic strategies which also exist. These strategies include the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), Counter Terrorism (Overseas CONTEST), Counter Proliferation, Cyber Security, Organised Crime, Overseas Territories, Countries at Risk of Instability, Prosperity, Consular and Emerging Powers. All International Defence Engagement and other activities will come together in the FCO-led Country Business Plans in line with the direction of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).<sup>2</sup>

**3A.2. The Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement.** Below the Defence Engagement Board is the 1\* level Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement (STRIDE). It is jointly chaired by Head Military Strategic Plans (Hd MSP) of the MOD, and Head Security Policy (Hd Sec Pol) of the FCO, and brings together relevant stakeholders from across MOD and wider government. The STRIDE is responsible for ensuring implementation of the International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES), in accordance with the strategic direction from the 3\* Defence Engagement Board and meets four times a year.

**3A.3 Defence Crisis Management Organisation.** The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) coordinates input from the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, Head Office, Joint Forces Command (JFC), Permanent

<sup>1</sup> *How Defence Works – The New Operating Model*, April 2013, paragraph 2.55.

<sup>2</sup> *International Defence Engagement Strategy*, 7 February 2013, paragraph 19.

Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Director Special Forces (DSF) and the Service Commands. It is the focus for the provision of Defence advice within the Government's overall management and resolution of crises, and provides the conduit for all briefings to Ministers and for the dissemination of strategic direction to operational level command.<sup>3</sup>

## **Response to emerging crisis or a change in strategic circumstances**

**3A1. Current Operations Group.** A Current Operations Group (COG) is chaired by DCDS (Mil Strat & Ops) or the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS (Ops)) in his absence, and attended by selected staffs from across the MOD. A Current Operations Group may be convened in response to an emerging crisis, or to study a particular aspect of a current operation (such as a change in strategic direction). In the case of the former, its purpose is to provide situational awareness, orientate the Defence Crisis Management Organisation to the crisis, and consider the utility of (as well as any risks involved in) military intervention, to inform the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and hence Ministers.

**3A2. Strategic Planning Group.** A Strategic Planning Group (SPG) is (usually) led by the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy) (ACDS(MS)) vice Head Military Strategic Plans (Hd MSP), and includes members from across the MOD as required; PJHQ J5 and relevant other government departments are also usually represented. A Strategic Planning Group may be formed, prior to a Current Operations Group,<sup>4</sup> to initiate a political-military estimate to inform cross-government political strategic analysis. Subsequently, once a decision has been taken to initiate more detailed planning, a Strategic Planning Group drafts CDS' Planning Directive to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd).

**3A3. Permanent Joint Headquarters Contingency Planning Team.** A Contingency Planning Team (CPT), led by J5, includes staff from across PJHQ, the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and, where appropriate, the Joint Forces Command, Defence Equipment and Support, and the single Services. A Contingency Planning Team may form in parallel with the associated MOD

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<sup>3</sup> *How Defence Works – The New Operating Model*, April 2013, paragraph 2.49.

<sup>4</sup> For smaller operations, and/or due to time constraints, a Current Operations Group (COG) may not be formed and Head Military Strategic Plans (Hd MSP) may simply form a Strategic Planning Group (SPG) himself. For larger operations the formal planning process may commence months in advance of deployment.

Strategic Planning Group (SPG).<sup>5</sup> Leadership and membership varies according to the priority, scale and complexity of the planning task (which may involve either contingency or crisis response planning). On receipt of CDS' Planning Directive, the Contingency Planning Team conducts a Military Strategic Estimate (MSE). A Contingency Planning Team may also (re-)form to address longer-term issues as part of current operations planning.

The PJHQ Contingency Planning team process ensures that FLCs (including JFC for Joint Enablers) are appropriately engaged in the PJHQ planning and decision-making processes for both contingent and current operations; this also feeds into the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO).<sup>6</sup>

### **Management of commitments**

**3A4. Current Commitments Team.** A Current Commitments Team (CCT), formed under an Operations Directorate (Ops Dir) lead (at 1\* or OF 5 level), includes staff from across the MOD; it liaises with PJHQ, the single Services, Joint Forces Command, other government departments and, where required, with multinational partners. Current Commitments Teams are formed at the onset of a crisis, or on the issue of CDS' Planning Directive. It remains in being throughout a crisis, providing a strategic focus for the Defence Crisis Management Organisation. The Current Commitments Team coordinates advice to CDS, the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) and Ministers, and interprets policy decisions into clear and unambiguous direction and guidance for the conduct of operations. Accordingly a Current Commitments Team, in conjunction with the associated Strategic Planning Group, formulates relevant military objectives in relation to the outcomes sought, prepares ministerial submissions and responses to parliamentary questions, and develops CDS' Operational Directive to the Jt Comd (see Annex 2C). Thereafter, a Current Commitments Team focuses on current issues concerning the deployment, activity, sustainment and recovery of forces.

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<sup>5</sup> In fast moving crises, a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) may form before a Strategic Planning group (SPG) to maximise planning time. In any case, for emerging crises and situations, the Strategic Planning Group and Contingency Planning Team work as a single entity, aided by video teleconferencing.

<sup>6</sup> *How Defence Works – The New Operating Model*, April 2013, paragraph 2.81.

**3A5. Permanent Joint Headquarters Operations Team.** Once CDS' Operational Directive is issued, an Operations Team (OT) – led by PJHQ J3<sup>7</sup> and drawing upon other expertise as required – develops the Jt Comd's Mission Directive (see Annex 2D).

**3A6. Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** An Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), despatched to a theatre of actual or potential operations, at the outset of an emerging crisis or as part of contingent planning, adds significantly to situational awareness and facilitates planning. The JFHQ has the core of two Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams on permanent standby, comprising a team leader and core intelligence, operations, logistics and communications staff. Where required, staff from PJHQ, the single Services, Joint Forces Command, the Stabilisation Unit and other government departments may participate to inform decision making at the strategic and operational levels. Where this wider representation is not possible, core Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team members should take checklists provided by those excluded from deploying, to ensure that the requisite information is acquired.<sup>8</sup> Where possible, an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team should integrate with in-theatre UK diplomatic structures. Reconnaissance should use Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILOs) (if deployed), UK military training teams (if applicable), Embassy or High Commission staffs and other in-country sources such as international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international commercial organisations. Increasingly, Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams will be integrated teams to support cross-government analysis, including personnel from MOD, FCO, DFID and the Stabilisation Unit as required.

**3A7.** Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team activities may include:

- a. **Liaison.** Liaison with host nation authorities, allies, potential coalition partners and other important agencies and organisations already present in the area of interest.

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<sup>7</sup> This may be an entirely new Operations Team (OT), or an existing one whose area of responsibility is relevant to the new operation.

<sup>8</sup> While ideally there should be a separate reconnaissance at each level (strategic, operational and tactical), pressures of time and practical constraints imposed by the host nation may dictate that they be conducted concurrently.

- b. **Reconnaissance.** Detailed reviews of, for example, appropriate locations for command and control (C2) elements, requirements for Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), existing or new Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), or the need for access, basing and overflight (ABO).
- c. **Review of existing plans.** Review of existing contingency planning.
- d. **Advice and reports.** Reporting through PJHQ, the OLRT either returns to the UK to back-brief their findings or it remains in theatre to facilitate Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) (or equivalent) entry and bolster any advance elements.

### **Crisis management group relationships**

3A8. **Strategic Planning Group/other government departments.** Links between the MOD and other government departments are formalised in Strategic Planning Group meetings, Current Operations Groups and through a variety of other cross-government engagement, but considerable *ad hoc* liaison is achieved during routine staff discussions and other contacts.

3A9. **Strategic Planning Group/Current Operations Group.** The Strategic Planning Group Leader is usually a member of the Current Operations Group. Other members of the Strategic Planning Group may also be present at Current Operations Groups, albeit as capability directors or specialists rather than as Strategic Planning Group members.

3A10. **Strategic Planning Group/Current Commitments Team.** In the early stages of a crisis, a Strategic Planning Group is committed to developing plans and then, as events unfold, refining them in conjunction with PJHQ J5. During this process, the Strategic Planning Group secretariat is responsible for raising submissions to Ministers, through the Director Operational Policy (D Op Pol), on matters requiring their decision or attention. A Strategic Planning Group has no active involvement in the coordination of current operations, which is the remit of the Current Commitments Team. The presence of a Strategic Planning Group member within the Current Commitments Team ensures that current operations remain harmonised with strategic aims and helps the

Current Commitments Team to produce CDS' Operational Directive. As the crisis develops, the Strategic Planning Group member also provides forward planning insights to the Current Commitments Team.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> For example, in enduring operations the Strategic Planning Group may conduct termination planning while the Current Commitments Team is engaged in current operations planning.

## Annex 3B – Planning at the strategic and operational level

Crisis Management Group	Crisis response planning	Contingency planning	Current operations planning
<b>MOD</b> Chiefs of Staff Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Principal crisis and commitments management body</li> <li>▪ Strategic coordination with other government departments (OGDs)</li> <li>▪ Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) advice to Ministers</li> <li>▪ Military strategic direction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provides strategic direction</li> <li>▪ Approves Joint Contingency Plans (JCP) or pass to Ministers for approval</li> <li>▪ Military strategic direction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reviews commitments against national strategic objectives</li> <li>▪ Balance of forces across commitments</li> <li>▪ Directs future strategy and force levels</li> </ul>
<b>Crisis monitoring groups</b>			
<b>STRIDE</b> Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ensures regional strategy direction is reflected in command plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provides advice to the Defence Engagement Board on Defence Engagement regional strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reviews progress against delivery of regional strategies and Defence Engagement Board priorities</li> </ul>
<b>MOD</b> Defence crisis management brief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish common understanding</li> <li>▪ Assists decision making</li> <li>▪ Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish common understanding</li> <li>▪ Assists decision making</li> <li>▪ Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish common understanding</li> <li>▪ Assists decision making</li> <li>▪ Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs</li> </ul>

Crisis Management Group	Crisis Response Planning	Contingency Planning	Current Operations Planning
<b>Crisis Response Groups</b>			
<b>MOD</b> Current Operations Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provides Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS (Mil Strat &amp; Ops)) with appropriate expert advice</li> <li>▪ Provides initial briefing to CDS and Chiefs of Staff (COS)</li> <li>▪ Decides on formation of Strategic Planning Group (SPG)/ Current Commitments Team (CCT)</li> </ul>		
<b>MOD</b> Strategic Planning Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political/military estimate</li> <li>▪ Long-term planning (MOD J5)</li> <li>▪ Liaison with other government departments</li> <li>▪ Interaction with Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)</li> <li>▪ Produce Military Options paper for DCDS (Mil Strat &amp; Ops)</li> <li>▪ CDS' Planning Directive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political/military estimate</li> <li>▪ CDS' Planning Directive<sup>1</sup></li> <li>▪ Submissions to Ministers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refine/revise political/military estimate</li> <li>▪ Maintain long-term planning</li> <li>▪ Contribute to cross-government strategy/plan</li> <li>▪ Updated CDS' Directive</li> </ul>
<b>PJHQ</b> Contingency Planning Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Close liaison with MOD</li> <li>▪ Conducts military strategic estimate (MSE) with SPG/CCT</li> <li>▪ Summary of MSE</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MSE</li> <li>▪ Joint Planning Guides (JPG)</li> <li>▪ JCPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reviews/refines MSE in liaison with CCT</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> For Joint Contingency Plans.

Crisis management group	Crisis response planning	Contingency planning	Current operations planning
<b>Crisis orchestration groups</b>			
<b>MOD</b> Current Commitments Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monitoring of current ops and issues (MOD J3)</li> <li>▪ Staffs MSE (in conjunction with PJHQ Contingency Planning Team (CPT))</li> <li>▪ Liaison with other government departments on current issues</li> <li>▪ Ministerial submissions</li> <li>▪ CDS' Directive</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coordinate reviews</li> <li>▪ Liaison with other government departments and allies</li> <li>▪ CDS' Directive Review</li> <li>▪ Force Level Review (FLR)</li> </ul>
<b>PJHQ</b> Operations Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Expanded from CPT (J3 Lead)</li> <li>▪ Run current ops for Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)</li> <li>▪ Jt Comd's Mission Directive (in conjunction with CPT)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support CDS Directive reviews</li> <li>▪ Initiate PJHQ review process</li> <li>▪ Update/reissue extant Jt Comd's Mission Directives</li> </ul>
<b>PJHQ/JFHQ</b> Operational Reconnaissance and Liaison Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Theatre reconnaissance</li> <li>▪ Potential forward planning nucleus for deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ)</li> <li>▪ Inform/conduct initial campaign planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Theatre recce</li> <li>▪ Review/develop contingency planning</li> </ul>	


Defence crisis management

<p><b>JFHQ<sup>2</sup></b> Situational Awareness Group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monitor the development of crisis</li> <li>▪ Initial and deployment planning</li> </ul>		
<p><b>JFHQ<sup>2</sup></b> Planning groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conduct operations planning</li> <li>▪ Conduct deployment planning</li> <li>▪ Campaign planning</li> <li>▪ Deployment plans</li> <li>▪ Subsequent orders and plans</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conduct campaign assessment</li> <li>▪ Iteratively refine operations planning</li> <li>▪ Issue subsequent orders and direction</li> </ul>


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<sup>2</sup> Or equivalent from alternative deployed operational-level headquarters.


# Appendix 3B1 – Crisis response planning



## Appendix 3B2 – Contingency planning



## Appendix 3B3 – Current operations planning





## Supplement 1 – Transition and termination

This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the considerations associated with campaign transition and termination planning as at December 2008.

### Nature of operations

1S1. The contemporary operating environment does not encourage the classification or labelling of discrete types or phases of military intervention(s), such as counter-insurgency (COIN) or stabilisation operations. Two complementary models can be used instead to indicate the different *contexts* within which military action may be required and, building on that foundation, the different *activities* to which a commander may attribute varying weights of effort during the course of a campaign.

1S2. **Context.** Major warfighting, characterised by, for example, large-scale deliberate intervention or, in *extremis*, the use of strategic weapon systems in a war of national survival, is likely to be identifiable as such. But combat may also be required in other circumstances, including during security operations and stabilisation, which will see conditions ebb and flow between permissive (for other agencies' development work) and non-permissive environments. There will rarely be the clear erstwhile distinction between combat and peace support operations.

1S3. **Activity.** Military activities undertaken during a campaign include: (major) warfighting, the countering of irregular activity, security operations and stabilisation; ongoing peacetime military engagement may also contribute. The relationship between these types of military activity (or military contributions to integrated, multi-agency activity) will vary over the course of a campaign, and a commander should focus his resources accordingly as a situation evolves. See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 *Campaigning* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), Chapter 1 for more detail.

### Campaign transition

1S4. As emphasis shifts between different types of military activity, so a campaign changes in character and transitions from one state to another. Different combinations of military activities, and weights of effort afforded to

different activities, require different force structures and postures. The cessation of hostilities represents a particular transition, indicating the beginning of a move from military to civil primacy. This requires agility on the part of a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), and planning in advance for the immediate aftermath of hostilities (including any transfer of responsibilities to indigenous forces or civilian agencies) and subsequent changes in force structure and posture. When all campaign objectives have been achieved, a campaign is said to terminate (although this may not mean the end of all military involvement, as explained below). Perceptions of campaign transition and termination are likely to vary between contributing nations involved in multinational operations, and between military and other actors engaged in multi-agency operations. Friction may be alleviated by a JTFC sharing his thinking with other stakeholders, and planning collaboratively with them where appropriate, rather than assuming that they will all necessarily share his perspective on changes in the nature of the campaign.

### **Actions in the immediate aftermath of hostilities**

1S5. **Cessation of hostilities.** Hostilities may be brought to an end by:

- a. **Capitulation.** Capitulation or surrender occurs formally at a particular time, within defined geographic boundaries, and affects specified units (who may be obliged to give up occupied territory, for example). A JTFC should be prepared to initiate or participate in negotiations of surrender, to receive surrendered forces, or to handle prisoners (depending upon the situation).
- b. **Cease-fire.** A cease-fire, which may be declared unilaterally by one side, temporarily suspends the use of arms. It may also initiate a lasting settlement.
- c. **Peace settlement.** A peace settlement may be drawn up between belligerents who either reconcile their differences or decide to pursue their interests by alternative, peaceful means (perhaps perceiving that their losses may outweigh the likely gains).
- d. **General truce.** A truce, often arising from a stalemate, provides an opportunity for a negotiated settlement.

- e. **Transition to peace.** Even in the absence of a cease-fire or other declaration, a general transition to peace may still occur. Without formal terms, however, this may be a fragile or temporary arrangement.

1S6. **Stabilisation.** In the immediate aftermath of hostilities the process of stabilisation begins. This may encompass: preventing or reducing violence, protecting people and key installations, promoting political processes, which lead to greater stability, and preparing for longer-term development and non-violent politics. Stabilisation activities will be delivered by a range of other government departments (OGDs), international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and indigenous groups (as they increase), as well as the military, and must be planned collaboratively from the outset. They may see the military in either a **supporting** or **supported** role and close coordination with relevant civilian agencies will be critical. Multi-agency involvement will, however, only be possible within the context of adequate security and a permissive environment. The core military role is, therefore, to enable non-military efforts by contributing to the delivery of a safe and secure environment. Until this is achieved, the military might assume initial responsibility for a broader range of activities, many of which might ordinarily be undertaken by civilian organisations. In this instance, the JTFC's actions must be coherent with longer-term development aims. The four principal areas of military contribution to stabilisation activities are:

- a. **Security and control.** Activities to achieve security and control should be at the core of the military role, in order to provide an environment within which other agencies can operate. They may be conducted without the assistance of indigenous security forces initially but every effort should be made to transfer authority as they become available.
- b. **Support to security sector reform.** Security sector reform (SSR) is the reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective and accountable role in providing security for their citizens, under the control of a legitimate state authority, and to promote stability. It covers not only the Armed Forces, but also policing, judiciary and penal systems. Military involvement in security sector reform should be applied to specific areas as part of an integrated approach, with the process for transfer of responsibility planned in advance.

c. **Initial restoration of essential services.** Initial restoration of essential services, which includes infrastructure, is primarily the domain of military engineers, logisticians and medical services. They must be able to mitigate the impact of the likely civilian capacity void during and immediately after hostilities. Tasks may be in direct support of own troops, such as route and airfield repair, but may also support the operation by generating beneficial effects for the local population and other agencies; helping to restore health, building consent or limiting political problems through averting humanitarian disaster. While this type of activity might initially be in support of military objectives its potential effects may also contribute to longer-term reconstruction.

d. **Interim governance.** The provision of a coherent and credible system of national, regional and local government is central to the task of establishing authority and restoring order. In the absence of an effective civil administration, the military may assist international agencies and indigenous actors in establishing an interim administration, normally through local engagement with indigenous leaders and opinion formers. Particularly close liaison and contact needs to be maintained with local civil government and their associated organisation, which may demand collocation.

e. **Stability tasks.** The four principal military stability activities can be further broken down into military tasks, as shown in Table S1.1.

<b>Stability activities (illustrative)</b>		
<b>Security and control – Military tasks</b>		<b>Support to security sector reform – military tasks</b>
Supervision of cease fire Airborne surveillance Space surveillance No-fly zone enforcement Prisoner/detainee handling Enforcement of ORBAT areas Separation of hostile forces Observation and monitoring	Conflict containment Route protection Refugee movement Sanctions and embargoes Protection of civilians Freedom of movement Denial of movement Control of the sea	Disarmament of belligerents Demobilisation of belligerents Reintegration of belligerents into civil population Selection and recruitment of future security force Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility
<b>Initial restoration of services – military tasks</b>		<b>Interim governance – military tasks</b>
Provision of mobility on roads, railways and waterways Restoration of airfields, harbours and ports Provision of essential water, fuel and power Restoration of essential health infrastructure and services Restoration of essential public buildings and services Explosive ordnance disposal Limited medical assistance/advice Support to humanitarian assistance Securing critical national infrastructure		Rule of law – specifically against criminal activity Services – refuse, health, customs Support to elections Support to humanitarian assistance

**Table S1.1 – Examples of military tasks with stability activities**

## **Force structure and posture**

1S7. **Roulement of forces.** Roulement enables both straightforward relief in place but also the introduction of differently configured forces. New forces in theatre can provide capabilities that are more appropriate to a changed situation, as well as signalling a change in force posture, from invasion/occupation to stabilisation/ reconstruction and departure (perceptions of which may be important to sustain campaign authority). Roulements can, however, threaten continuity and should be planned in detail to make them as seamless as possible. Any (real or even perceived) capability vacuum or loss of tempo may increase the vulnerability of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and risk exploitation by opponents (including those temporarily vanquished). Sequencing handovers, exchanging liaison officers between headquarters and formations and units, and retaining the campaign plan at a higher level headquarters, can all help to mitigate risk.

1S8. **Presence, posture and profile.** A JTFC, in conjunction with the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), decides upon the appropriate presence, posture and profile of his forces during a campaign. The cessation of hostilities is likely to cause a specific review. Adjustments to *modus operandi*, including rules of engagement (ROE) and relations with other actors such as former opponents, are likely to be required. These may be introduced separately from, but are likely to be most effective after, a post-hostilities roulement of forces.


## **Campaign termination**

1S9. Planning to *end* a campaign is part of planning its *conduct*, especially as termination is likely to be reached gradually rather than as a single event. The handover of responsibilities to indigenous forces and structures requires careful coordination. Enduring operations can establish precedents and generate expectations in terms of security, physical presence, resources and financial support which cannot be sustained indefinitely. Outstanding liabilities to those who have provided service and support during a campaign should be met in full, but not to the prejudice of, for example, local market forces or political progress.

1S10. **Terminating military involvement.** Even after initial campaign objectives have been achieved, there may be a continuing requirement for military involvement, either to provide direct support to indigenous forces (either specific capabilities such as engineer or logistic personnel, and/or capacity-building military training teams), or in the form of over-watch.

1S11. **Overwatch.** Some form of over-watch may be retained where it is considered that, while there is no longer any requirement for a Joint Task Force to be actively engaged in-theatre (indeed it may be counter-productive for it to do so), the developing indigenous capability is insufficient to ensure security. A reserve force is therefore retained until the situation is deemed sufficiently stable, or the indigenous capability sufficiently well-developed, to allow it to be drawn down. Overwatch can be provided at different levels, as shown in Figure S1.2.

- **Tactical overwatch** – available in theatre at immediate notice, for example in local barracks.
- **Operational overwatch** – available in theatre, at short notice.
- **Strategic overwatch** – positioned outside the joint operations area (JOA), but available at notice to intervene if required.



1. Indigenous security forces increase in size and capability.
2. Visible multinational force levels on the ground decrease as indigenous forces increase to avoid culture of dependency.
3. Potential security vacuum could arise (transition challenge).
4. Overwatch forces provide reserve capability for indigenous forces; overwatch drawn-down in stages (tactical, operational and strategic) as indigenous capability increases.
5. Total security force levels remain acceptable, mitigating risks of transition challenge.

**Figure S1.2 – Levels of overwatch**

## Supplement 2 – Planning with other government departments

**This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the guidance for cross-government crisis planning, updated October 2012.**

2S1. **Understanding other departments.** A guiding principle of an integrated approach is that ‘institutional familiarity will enhance collaborative working and trust between entities’.<sup>1</sup> Just as knowledge of relevant doctrine could enhance conduct in multinational operations, so too an understanding of other government departments (OGDs) can enhance cooperation and planning. This principle has equal applicability when operating with international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Of the principal government departments involved in crisis planning in the context of conflict (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), with the interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit facilitating these processes), each has a unique way of doing business. Generally, the causes of these differences may be understood in terms of:

- a. **Size and structure.** The FCO (with 16000 personnel) and DFID (with 2500 personnel) are much smaller than the UK Armed Forces (with approximately 159,000 regular military, 80,000 civilian personnel and 35,000 reserves)<sup>2</sup>. Inevitably, this makes their associated processes less bureaucratic and complex.
- b. **Culture.** The military culture, based on authority and discipline, is often directive. Civilian practice, however, needs to be consultative, democratic and less hierarchical.
- c. **Crises orientation.** The UK Armed Forces have traditionally been resourced, prepared and trained as a contingency against future crises which, when they occur, usually attract further funding from the Treasury. Conversely, other government departments tend to view

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 *Campaigning* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).

<sup>2</sup> 2015 projection from Strategic Defence and Security Review, modified by the Reserves Review and Three Month Exercise.

crises as a continuum of ongoing, day-to-day business to be managed within existing funds.

d. **Planning approaches.** Due to the characteristics of military crisis response, and the planning resources available, the UK Armed Forces use a formal approach to planning. Some other government departments follow broadly similar lines; however, in certain situations more fluid models are appropriate, to allow flexibility according to the political nature of the situation. The approach to policy-setting and decision-making may be progressive and iterative.

e. **Risk appetite.** The covenant to undertake operations unquestioningly in conditions of mortal danger is unique to the Armed Forces. While other departments can and do work in hazardous locations, they will withdraw their personnel if they judge the situation to be too dangerous.

2S2. **Understanding ourselves.** Military planners engaged in multi-agency operations should recognise that military practice can appear alien to civilian partners. While other departments recognise the military's competence, they often have difficulty recognising where and how they can engage effectively. Military processes are sometimes seen by other government departments as cumbersome, labour-intensive and introspective. In particular, civilian planners often cite the sense of 'unstoppable momentum' that characterises the military response to a new crisis. This, while a key characteristic of the 'can do' spirit of UK Armed Forces, may not be conducive to influence by other government department representatives.

## **Department for International Development**

2S3. **Purpose.** DFID's primary focus is poverty reduction, including work towards achievement of the United Nation's (UN) Millennium Goals for poverty reduction, which is reflected in the Department's objectives and targets. The UK, along with most western countries, is a signatory of the Paris Declaration. This calls on donor nations to work with the governments of states in crisis, as partners, in the development of poverty reduction strategies. DFID will always seek to draw representatives of afflicted states into its planning processes. In order to deliver sustainable development, DFID must work with other donor

nations, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and the agencies of the crisis state, to ensure a coherent international development effort. Consequently, DFID give priority to working with such partners.

2S4. **Processes.** DFID has developed specific analysis and planning methodologies, which are often conducted by in-country DFID offices (which tend to have greater devolved power than other departments' deployed representatives):

a. **Country Assistance Plan.** A Country Assistance Plan (CAP) is compulsory for all countries or regions where DFID works (where a threshold of £20M of funding has been reached), and considerable weight is placed upon gaining a detailed understanding of the situation before the plan is written. A number of assessment tools have been developed to help achieve this, some of which – including the 'Country Governance Assessment' and 'Fiduciary Risk Assessment' – are compulsory. Others, such as the 'Strategic Conflict Assessment' and 'Drivers of Change' assessments, will only be done where and when needed. Country Assistance Plans should provide a long-term strategy, and are usually reviewed every three years.

b. **Logical framework analysis.** Once developed, Country Assistance Plans could be broken down further into separate sectors, for example education, health or governance, and addressed through a collection of programmes and projects. An important tool when developing these projects is 'logical framework analysis', or 'logframe'. This should lay out the hierarchy of objectives within the project, identify key assumptions, state means of objective verification, and highlight any indicators of progress, thereby capturing the logic in the plan.

2S5. **Rapid onset disasters.** Whereas the responsibility for dealing with chronic or prolonged crises tends to lie with the regional leads in DFID's country offices, rapid onset disasters (crises) are dealt with by DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (CHASE) Department. The relationship between DFID and the MOD in disaster relief operations is described in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-52 '*Disaster Relief Operations*'.

## Foreign and Commonwealth Office

2S6. **Purpose.** The UK's foreign policy objectives are articulated as departmental strategic objectives, including four policy goals, in those areas where the FCO leads the UK's international engagement. The policy goals cover: countering terrorism and weapons proliferation, prevention and resolution of conflict, promotion of a low carbon, high growth global economy and supporting the development of international institutions.

2S7. **Diplomacy.** The FCO is not resourced for significant crisis response and instead considers each situation within the context of an ongoing dynamic of international diplomatic relations. As a result, the FCO tends to focus on immediate issues, in what is frequently a rapidly changing situation. With the exception of the crisis management plans held by diplomatic posts,<sup>3</sup> detailed contingency plans are of limited utility to the Department as they can very quickly become out-of-date and may limit future flexibility. Furthermore, the tools of diplomacy tend to involve the fostering and subsequent exploitation of personal relationships. Diplomacy, therefore, is a far more individual process than the task-oriented activities carried out by either DFID or the MOD, requiring few formal strategies and plans. Instead, it is more usual to find the UK's diplomatic position articulated within an amalgam of 'lines to take', Ministerial briefing papers, policy statements and 'e-grams' from ambassadors. These are usually the outcome of intense dialogue between regional desks, policy departments, UK missions (to the UN or European Union (EU)), and embassy staffs, as well as with appropriate other government departments. This results in an agreed view that is then taken forward by FCO staff in Whitehall and the network of embassies, high commissions and other diplomatic posts overseas. The FCO is currently developing a more structured approach to planning, but it is unlikely to reflect that of the military.

## Stabilisation Unit

2S8. **Purpose.** The Stabilisation Unit was established in 2004 as a tri-Departmental unit of the MOD, FCO and DFID. The Stabilisation Unit's aim is to deliver integrated conflict prevention and stabilisation expertise for fragile and conflict-affected state, in support of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) objectives. The Stabilisation Unit works in partnership with 'parent' government

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<sup>3</sup> Described in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-51 *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).

departments, and has a deployable capability comprising civil servants and civilian experts.

2S9. **Objectives.** The Stabilisation Unit has seven objectives. They are to:

- coordinate and oversee the delivery of stabilisation activity in priority regions;
- provide expertise on stabilisation and conflict, sharing lessons to inform HMG policy and practice;
- provide effective security and justice advice and support (including policing) to fragile and conflict-affected states;
- maximise the contribution of UK policing capabilities in support of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) objectives;
- safely deliver the right people to the right place at the right time and deliver a new UK team of experts dedicated to combating and preventing sexual violence in conflict, in support of the wider FCO initiative;
- increase the support to and understanding of stabilisation, including promoting the role of the Stabilisation Unit and the importance of the integrated approach; and
- successfully implement the changes to the Stabilisation Unit resulting from the 2012 Review.

2S10. **Processes.** The Stabilisation Unit supports cross-government analysis of the drivers of conflict and sources of stability in conflict states, known as the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS). In addition, the Stabilisation Unit facilitates an integrated approach to strategic planning for conflict and stability. There is inter-departmental guidance that covers joint analysis and the integrated planning process. Analysis and planning for particular contexts are formally commissioned by the National Security Council, the Building Stability Overseas Board or other senior officials.

2S11. **Joint Analysis of conflict and stability.** The Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability approach can be used in active conflicts, and in situations that are fragile but currently peaceful. The process can be light-touch or in-depth,


depending on the available timescales and customer needs, and is focussed at the strategic level. The approach is based on three phases:

- a. **Phase 1.** Phase 1 reviews what is already known, establishes objectives, and agrees the timing and the scope of the study. The focus is on drawing in all relevant parts of HMG to agree on key questions, and map out existing UK interests and priorities.
- b. **Phase 2.** Phase 2 requires detailed analysis responding to the objectives set out in Phase 1. An HMG team carries out desk and field studies, examining drivers, actors and dynamics in conflict, and sources of resilience and other opportunities for peace. The team provide a set of detailed conclusions and recommendations for further consideration by HMG.
- c. **Phase 3.** Phase 3 focuses on the utilisation of analyses. It aims to ensure that the findings of analysis inform subsequent UK policy and action.

2S12. **Integrated planning.** Ideally the goal in any conflict-affected environment is to achieve an inclusive political settlement that creates the conditions for sustainable peace and a functioning state. Consideration of the following will help HMG think through its priorities, level of ambition, and how best to engage in a given country, and ensure value for money (economy, efficiency and effectiveness):

- identify whether there is a UK interest and an intention to engage;
- clarify governance and coordination roles for the UK inter-departmental team early on through written terms of reference;
- ensure that there is a shared understanding across government departments of objectives and key drivers;
- consult closely with people in theatre;
- understand the plans and intentions of local actors;
- identify whether or not assistance is welcomed by the state, and whether or not the operating environment is permissive;

- identify key stakeholders in the international effort, the extent of their authority or influence, and whether one state or multinational body is positioning itself to lead;
- establish the legal boundaries around any intervention;
- decide on options for activity on the basis of consensus, after full consideration of the range of options (if there is no consensus, planners should refer to the National Security Council (Officials) (NSC(O)) or delegated authority.);
- secure Ministerial and/or senior level support;
- establish baseline measures and an integrated monitoring and evaluation framework from the outset; and
- implement agreed activity.




**Figure S2.1. An integrated approach to strategic planning for conflict and stability**

2S13. **Initiation.** Any department may initiate integrated planning, and planning is an iterative process. Following any rapid-onset crisis, HMG leadership will be provided at the highest level by the prime Minister and the NSC. National Security Council (Officials) (NSC(O)) is the Permanent Secretary-level group that supports the NSC. It will provide the steering group that agrees the aim, objectives and associated owners of the integrated plan, as well as the exit conditions. Below this there will be a core group of working-level officials.

2S14. **Deployment.** The types of teams that deploy, and the timing of the deployment will depend on the assessment of the crisis. Planning can be done on a contingency basis, rather than leading inevitably to action. It may also be the case that, during the planning process, Ministers and officials conclude that there is no reasonable chance of success. Plans will therefore need to be revisited at appropriate intervals. If teams are to deploy, then one of the key early considerations will be whether or not there is a consular crisis, and a need to evacuate UK nationals. Another consideration will be the nature, relevance and accuracy of the information that already exists, and whether further scoping is essential to make informed decisions about activity in the local context

2S15. **Implementation.** Successful implementation will depend on clear and open lines of communication. The diagram below is for illustrative purposes and must be adapted to the specific context, depending on the scale of the intervention, and whether or not there is a major UK military deployment. Activity will continue until Ministers and officials are satisfied that exit conditions have been met.



**Figure S2.2 – Implementation**



## Supplement 3 – European Union military planning

**This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the EU military planning process as at December 2008.**

### European Union capability

3S1. The European Union (EU) has the capacity to conduct EU-led operations should the Council of the EU elect to do so. The Council exercises overall responsibility for planning and conduct of EU led operations, either civilian or military, delegating political control and strategic direction to the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

3S2. EU-led operations could involve a range of instruments of power, including diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and civil, as well as military, and therefore the requirement for coordination at every level is paramount. The EU is therefore able to have a comprehensive approach to crises. The EU, especially the EU Commission, could already be engaged in areas where UK national or coalition military operations are being considered. Alternatively, the EU could become engaged either militarily, or in other ways, in crises where the UK has a strategic interest.

### Permanent military structures

3S3. Permanent military structures are provided by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) who are located in Brussels. Their roles are:

- a. **EU Military Committee.** The EUMC is responsible for providing the Political and Security Committee with military advice, and recommendations, on all military matters, and for exercising direction of all military activities within the EU's remit. The Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) acts as the primary point of contact for the Operation Commander (Op Comd)<sup>1</sup> during EU-led military operations.
- b. **EU Military Staff.** The EUMS provides early warning, situation assessment, and conducts planning at the political and strategic level

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<sup>1</sup> The EU title assigned to the officer performing the (broadly) equivalent role of the UK Joint Commander.

for Petersberg tasks,<sup>2</sup> including identification of appropriate European national and multinational forces. This could include the development of military strategic options, the preparation of an EUMC Initiating Military Directive to the Operation Commander, and the coordination of military planning with the EU's Commission and Parliament.

3S4. In the event of a crisis, the EU assesses options, usually in consultation with nations and other international organisations (IOs), especially NATO. Military aspects of the crisis should be examined by the EUMC, drawing on the expertise of the EUMS.<sup>3</sup> At an appropriate juncture, following the development of a crisis management concept, the Council should approve a general political assessment and a cohesive set of options. Thereafter, the EUMC should issue a Military Strategic Option Directive<sup>4</sup> to the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS), formally inviting him to draw up one or a series of military strategic options.

3S5. Once the Council has decided to take action, and a military strategic option has been selected, an Operation Commander should be appointed, a chain of command designated, and an Operation Headquarters (OHQ)<sup>5</sup> selected. There are three options available:<sup>6</sup>

a. **EU-Led Operations *with* Recourse to NATO Planning Assets.** NATO's ACO - J5 planning staff generate initial planning support for the EU, and provide planning staff and facilities thereafter. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) would be the likely choice as Operation Commander.

b. **EU-Led Operation *without* Recourse to NATO Planning Assets.** If NATO planning assets were not to be employed, one nation could elect to act as the Framework Nation,<sup>7</sup> using one of five potential

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<sup>2</sup> The Petersberg tasks are an integral part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). They were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992.

<sup>3</sup> EU crisis management procedures envisage the need for the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to draw on operations planning expertise from either EU Member States and/or NATO.

<sup>4</sup> These terms differ from NATO terminology since the EU structures and way of handling crises are different from NATO. Wherever possible, however, NATO terminology has been adopted.

<sup>5</sup> Broadly equivalent to Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).

<sup>6</sup> EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) Standard Operating Procedures, version 4.0, dated 8 June 2006.

<sup>7</sup> The EU defines a framework nation as 'A Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control.'

EU OHQs (located in the UK (Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)), France, Germany, Italy and Greece).

c. **EU Operations Centre.** The EUMS maintains the capability to form an OHQ in Brussels, drawing on nations as required.<sup>8</sup>

3S6. The selection of a Force Commander and Force Headquarters (FHQ)<sup>9</sup> could occur simultaneously or, if alternatives are available, await the appointment of the Operation Commander. The most likely command and control (C2) template, based on a Framework Nation model, would have both the OHQ and FHQ formed by the same nation, although other command and control combinations are possible. Where a Framework Nation model is used, other EU nations, as well as EUMS personnel, could be expected to provide personnel to fill posts in both the Operation Headquarters and Force Headquarters.

3S7. Following a Council decision to take action, the EUMC should issue an Initiating Military Directive to the Operation Commander, which directs him to begin operational-level planning.<sup>10</sup> The EU planning methodology is very similar to that of NATO, and the outputs include a concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plans (OPLANs), and ultimately the generation, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a Joint Force. The EU process is, however, initially more 'linear' than NATO's, which can conduct operations planning in parallel at various levels; this is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate that of NATO. Hence subordinate levels of command have to be established for a particular operation before planning in parallel can commence. Efforts to streamline the process, for example, by early designation of an Operation Commander and Operation Headquarters, are used as much as possible.

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
A Framework Nation provides the Operation Commander/Operation Headquarters and the core of the military chain of command, together with its Staff support, the Computer Information Systems and logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation. Although EU concepts and procedures remain applicable, procedures may also reflect those of the Framework Nation'. EU Framework Nation Concept 11278/02, dated 25 July 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Particularly where there is a joint civil/military aspect or where no national HQ has been identified; *EU Principles for EU HQs*, 2 June 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Equates to the UK's Joint Task Force Headquarters; EU Force Headquarters Standard Operating Procedures, version 3.0, dated 30 June 2006.

<sup>10</sup> On some occasions, the Operation Commander may not be selected until after the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) has been issued. This is less preferable, as early appointment allows this commander to engage fully in the planning and direction process.

3S8. Although exact command and control arrangements for any EU-led military should be mission-dependent, they normally encompass three levels of command, as shown in Figure S3.1.



**Figure S3.1 – EU command and control arrangements**

3S9. **Comprehensive approach.** EU planning for EU-led operations takes into account the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management. Such planning cannot be conducted in isolation. The tools available to the EU in times of crisis are wide ranging across its institutions and policy areas and comprise political and humanitarian, as well as military, actions. This comprehensive approach leads to an important principle in EU military headquarters at all levels, which is the development of links, dependent on the mission, to ensure coordination with: governments and authorities in the crisis area; authorities of force contributing nations; EU representatives and bodies (for example, the EU Police Mission); international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); supporting headquarters; and national intelligence organisations.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> EU Principles for EU HQs, 2 June 2005.

## Lexicon

This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication. Many of the terms and their definitions detailed in Part 2 are either *new* or *modified* following a recent review of this and other Capstone/Keystone doctrine.<sup>1</sup> The source of each term is shown in parenthesis. For fuller reference on all other UK and NATO agreed terminology, see the Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6 *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* and Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 *UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database*.

### Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

ACO	Allied Command(er) Operations
ASSESSREP	Assessment Report
BDD	British Defence Doctrine
C2	Command and Control
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCT	Current Commitments Team
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CinC	Commander in Chief
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CoA	Course of Action
COG	Current Operations Group
COMBRITFOR	Commander British Force
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
COPD	Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
COS	Chief(s) of Staff
CPT	Contingency Planning Team
CT	Counter-Terrorism

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<sup>1</sup> This Lexicon also includes new/modified Terms/Definitions and Acronyms/Abbreviations extracted from JDPs 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) and 3-00 (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition).

## Lexicon

DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DCDS(Mil Strat & Ops)	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations)
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DI	Defence Intelligence
DOps	Director of Operations
DSF	Director Special Forces
DTG	Date Time Group
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FID	Force Instructions Document
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GEO	Geographic
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HQ	Headquarters
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JCP	Joint Contingency Plan
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JFCIS	Joint Force Communications and Information Systems
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFLogC	Joint Force Logistic Component
JFLC	Joint Force Land Component
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JHC	Joint Helicopter Command

JOA	Joint Operations Area
Jt Comd	Joint Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
LEGAD	Legal Adviser
MOA	Measurement of Activity
MOE	Measurement of Effect
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSC(O)	National Security Council (Officials)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGD	Other Government Department
OHQ	Operation Headquarters (EU)
OLRT	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OP COMD	Operational Commander
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
OPS Coord	Operations Coordination
ORBAT	Order of Battle
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PUS	Permanent Under Secretary
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SE	Supporting Effect(s)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

## Lexicon

SITREP	Situation Report
SofS	Secretary of State
SOP	Standard/Standing Operating Procedure
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
sS	single Services
SSN	Submarine, Attack, Nuclear
STRIDE	Strategic Regional Implementation group for Defence Engagement
SU	Stabilisation Unit
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
TASKORG	Task Organisation
UKMILREP	UK Military Representative
UN	United Nations

## Part 2 – Terms and definitions

### **analysis**

The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **analysis**

In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (AAP-6)

### **apportionment**

The quantification and distribution by percentage of the total expected effort, in relation to the priorities which are given to the various air operations in geographic areas for a given period of time. (AAP-6)

### **area of interest**

The area of concern to a commander, relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his joint operations area/area of operations and adjacent areas. *See also joint operations area and area of operations.* (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **area of operations**

A geographical area, defined by a Joint Force Commander within his joint operations area, in which a commander designated by him (usually a Component Commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. *See also joint operations area.* (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **assessment**

The evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision making. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **battlespace**

All aspects of a joint operations area within which military activities take place subject to battlespace management. *See also battlespace management and joint operations area.* (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **battlespace management**

The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity.

(JDP 3-70)

### **campaign**

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a given timeframe and geographical area, which normally involves joint forces, frequently in concert with other instruments of national or multinational power. (JDP 3-40)

### **campaign authority**

The authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Note:** Campaign authority is an amalgam of four inter-dependent factors:

- the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action;
- the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively;
- the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate;
- and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

### **campaign design**

Campaign design develops and refines the commander's (and staff's) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **campaign effectiveness assessment**

Evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision making. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **campaign end-state**

The extent of the Joint Force Commander's contribution to meeting the national strategic aim. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**campaign fulcrum**

The point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly; one side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly.

(JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**campaign management**

Campaign management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**campaign objective**

A goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**campaign plan**

A campaign plan is the actionable expression of a Joint Force Commander's intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders. (JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**campaign rhythm**

The regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign.

(JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**centre of gravity**

Characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**civil-military cooperation**

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (AAP-6)

**coalition**

An *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

(JDP 0-01.1)

**command**

The authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions.

**Note:** It comprises three closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**commander's intent**

A concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why, focused on the overall effect the Joint Force is to have and the desired situation it aims to bring about. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**component commander**

A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (AAP-6)

**contingency plan**

A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6)

**contingency planning**

Planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future. (JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**contingents**

Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

**control**

The coordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**crisis management**

The process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**crisis response planning**

Planning, often at short notice, to determine an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis. (JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**culminating point**

A joint force reaches its culminating point during a campaign when current operations can be maintained, but without the prospect of further progress. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**current operations planning**

Planning to manage a current operation, to prevent escalation, and to sustain the necessary military activity to achieve the desired outcome. (JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**decisive condition**

A decisive condition is a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when achieved, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent, or contribute materially to achieving a campaign objective. (This is an Aug 12 revise of the JDP 01 definition: *a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective* to reflect NATO doctrine on decisive conditions. The revised definition is consistent with the original description of a decisive condition in JDP 01 and JDP 5-00 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)).

**desired outcome**

A favorable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. (JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Change 2)

**fighting power**

The ability to fight, consisting of a conceptual component (encompassing the thought process involved in producing military effectiveness); a moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight), measured by assessment of operational capability. (BDD, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**fires**

The deliberate use of physical and virtual means to support the realisation of, primarily, physical effects. (JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**framework nation**

Forces generated under a 'framework nation' are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the HQ. (JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**Note:** The framework nation is also likely to dictate the language and procedures adopted.

**information management**

The integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

The activities that synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of collection capabilities, including the processing and dissemination of the resulting product. (JDP 2-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**interoperability**

The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives. (AAP-6)

**irregular activity**

The use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (AAP-6)

**joint**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6)

**joint action**

The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on an actors' will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence.

(JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**joint commander**

The Joint Commander, appointed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1)

**joint coordination board**

The Joint Coordination Board (JCB) is an operation synchronisation meeting used to promulgate the Joint Task Force Commander's guidance and objectives to component commanders. It is his method of ensuring unity of effort. The board will review the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL) to ensure that it reflects the Joint Task Force Commander's Campaign Plan and is in line with HMG objectives. (JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**joint effects meeting**

The Joint Effects Meeting is a staffing board whose role is to ensure that the Joint Fires process (which includes targeting) takes full account of the Joint Task Force Commander's prioritised objectives within the overall campaign plan. It is also responsible for the coordination and de-confliction of Joint Task Force Commander controlled assets. It will produce the daily Target Nomination List from the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List for later approval by the Joint Coordination Board. (JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**joint enablers**

Operational activities that do not have an end unto themselves and are likely to be discrete lines of operation in achieving the end-state. Their principal purpose is to enable other activity to take place. (JDP 3-70)

**joint force**

A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-01.1)

**joint force commander**

A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

**joint force planning group**

The Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Task Force Commander and normally chaired by his Chief of Staff, is the forum where progress against the campaign plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks. (JDP 0-01.1)

**joint operations area**

An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint operations area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

**lead nation**

Forces generated under a lead nation are commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders. (JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**lines or groupings of operation**

In a campaign or operation, a line or grouping linking decisive conditions, and hence campaign objectives, in time and space on the path to the campaign end-state. (JDP 5-00, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**main effort**

The concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**manoeuvre**

Coordinated activities necessary to gain advantage within a situation in time and space. (JDP 3-00, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Change 1)

**manoeuvrist approach**

An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1)

**measurement of activity**

Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**military risk**

The probability and implications of an event of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences taking place. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**military strategic end-state**

The extent of the Military Strategic Commander's contribution to meeting the national strategic aim, reached when all the military strategic objectives have been achieved. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**military strategic objective**

Goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the national strategic aim. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**mission command**

A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1)

**multi-agency**

Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**multinational**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. (AAP-6)

**national strategic aim**

The Government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**national strategic objective**

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**national strategy**

The coordinated application of the instruments of national power in the pursuit of national policy aspirations. (BDD, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**non-governmental organisation**

A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (JDP 3-90)

**operation order**

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)

**operation plan**

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

**operational analysis**

The application of scientific methods to assist executive decision makers. (AAP-6)

**operational art**

The orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**operational level**

The level of warfare at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronise action, within theatres or areas of operation. (BDD, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**operating space**

All aspects of a joint operations area within which activities, both military and non-military, take place. *See also joint operations area.* (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**red team**

A team that is formed with the objective of subjecting an organisation's plans, programmes, ideas and assumptions to rigorous analysis and challenge. (DCDC Red Teaming Guide, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**red teaming**

The independent application of a range of structured, creative and critical thinking techniques to assist the end user make a better informed decision or produce a more robust product. (DCDC Red Teaming Guide, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**security sector reform**

The reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective, legitimate and accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens under the control of a legitimate authority and to promote stability. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**situational awareness**

1. Generically, the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task). (JDP0-01.1)
2. In intelligence usage, situational awareness is the ability to identify trends and linkages over time, and to relate these to what is happening and what is not happening. (JDP 04)

**strategic objective**

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**supported commander**

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6)

**supporting commander**

A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6)

**supporting effect**

The intended consequence of actions. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**theatre of operations**

A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the joint operations area), within which he conducts operations. (JDP 01, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)